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'fALiaARH.jj! 
Tb« probl«i£ of iiivll Is OQ« of th« aaciant problem 
and tha old eoatrovarsy batwaaa pesalsists and c^tlalsta 
ragardlQg this problaa s t i l l parsists* This Is a problas not 
only for thalsts but also for a l l saasltlva parsons. In tha 
prasaot thaals ve hava discussad tha natapnleal quastion 
ragardlng good and avll and It*a kinds In a thaoaophlcal fraaa 
work that Is If God craatad the world or If Ha sustainst nanagas 
or suparvlsas It* snd If God Is InflaItaly goody hov shall va 
axplaln a l l tha pain and ev i l , the sin and sorrmrt and tha 
suffaring and dlsappolnt^rtants wtileh ara avldant avaryvhare in 
tha world? Thara ara qulta a numbar of adaquata 80lutl(»ia of 
tha problaa of iivll praawitad by dlffareat thlnkars. 3ut In 
tha prasant tv.asis wa ara sialnly concarnad with tha solutions 
presantad by Jt . Augustine» Imaci Al-Gbazall sauid St« Thc^as 
Aquinas. 
s,%* Augustlna was born la 354 A.i/. atid ha dlad In 
3 ^ A.D. Ha was tha precursor of isadlaval parlod md scholastic 
philosophy. He triad to aolva tha problam of Kvil through 
tha concaptlon of "Privation of good". Ha elasslflad avll into 
two eatagorlasy "Cosialc avil", and "Moral evil". 
a jostlflaa cosmic avll through tha doctrlna of 
"natura". Ha arguas that tha souroa of axlstanca Is God and 
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God I s foodf therefor© He can aot c rea te e v l i . H« further 
says t h a t nature I s also created by Cod, the re fo re , nature I s 
not ev i l* But the corruptl(m of t h i s nature i s ev i l* And 
t h i s corruption can not be of tiie wt.olo belnp. Ihus he j u s t i f i e s 
cosmic ev i l through i n f i a i t e vlsdoie and absolute goodness of 
God who ordains a l l ano whose ways are beyond huoaa understaidlnr* 
He explains moral e v i l on the basis of free w i l l . 
He admits tha t God has given ffi«i free wi l l* wi l l i s good 
because i t i s created by (-od. But the turning of w i l l towards 
isutable good Instead of Iffliautable good i s ev i l* because man*s 
chief good Is the good of the both, the body aitid the soul* 
The good of soul i s the perfect s a t i s f ac t i on which depetids on 
ul t imate happiness ^ i c h can be a t ta ined by chief good and chief 
good i s Godf the re fore , the turning of the w i l l towards rutablo 
good i s ev i l* livil l i e s ne i the r in the w i l l nor in mutable 
ob jec t s , but only in turning of the wi l l towards the lower 
than the higher good* 
Inam Al-Ghazali was bom at t u s in 1058 A*D* ead 
died in 1111 A.D* lie was a great theologian and profound 
philosopher* There is no descr ip t ion of cosrsic e v i l in 
Al Gha£ali*8 system* lie believed tha t every thing In the world 
i s in Uie r r i p of God* There i s divine purpose lia.clng the 
antecedent to the consequent and t h i s dlvirie purpose i s nianlfested 
in. t^e •xist log orderly auocssslon of •vonts without th« 
l«ast break or irrefruiarlty. l>lvlae purpose Is a mystical 
oa«* j^vary one oaa aot know it* Thus he ressainad sil«rit 
so far the cosmic evil was co^eeroed* 
He called moral evil as »^har. I t i s the prohibitions 
of God and iChalr (good) Is the coffmatidBait of God. He 
explains ntoral evil throufh the doctrine of free will and 
doctrine of "Kasab" (acquisi t ion) . 
F i rs t ly he explained the nature of aanf i . e . both 
material and sp i r i tua l . Ue says that human heart is suscep-
t i b l e to both the elements, i . e . Satanic and divine ©lerent. 
Then he analysed himari aotior., i . e . natural , intentional and 
voluntary oae. /ill hur^ an actlcMs are directed to some «id. 
Al-Ohazali ca l l s this eod as ^Sa'ada (Blessediiiess) %rtiich l ies 
in the raal ieat lon of perfeotlon. Man's perfection is in the 
vision of God which i s the a^usram iX»ium« i4an*s will is neither 
free nor determined. Al-Ghaxali called th i s position as 
'*i:Casab'* (acquisi t ion) . Therefore he presented sequence 
theory of causation, ^^t i t i s in the hacid of man ei ther to 
use his power iu tlie right direct loo or la tlie wroof direct ion. 
The wronr direction is the doiioance of Uie '*uwat»i Shatanlya 
(Devllle power); ^ e n •Jhatanic power dor-^lnates ev i l occurs. 
a-
3 t . Thosnas Aquinas was born in V2b A.U. in Xtly and 
died on 7th March 1274 4.D. at th® Abbey of Fessaiaoya. There 
• I 4 l« 
Is th« oulislaatioa of Scholasticism In his ajstmb. He 
was the follower/i^of Aristotle, but he was also iaflueneed 
by Flotifius, 3t« Aafustine a-^ Muslim Philosophers. 
la solYing the problem of evil he agl^ eed with 
St. Augustine that "Lvil is Privation of Good". He classified 
evil into two (a) Hvil in being a^ id (b) Kvil in action* 
He believed that being in itself is good beeaxuie it proceeds 
frOB God who is all Good, secondly there is a gradation of 
food^^ke ^^ t. Augustine he also Justifies this gradaticm 
throufh Uivine wisdos. He explained moral evil like >^ t. 
Augustine and Imae Al-Ohasali on the basis of free will and 
he made an analysis of actions. -^9 argues that the goodness 
of an action depends en two elements, vis. (1) formal elecent 
which relates to the end towards which the act la directed 
and (11) the material eleraent which is related to the means 
that is adopted to attain tliat end and circumstances that are 
connected with the choice of the means. If all these are 
bad the action is evil. 
lie, further, explains will. According to hiia will is 
natural and wills something naturally. Therefore will is fr&e 
to move towards end and to choose its means, but insplte of 
this freedom its actions etm be controlled by reason, i.e. by 
man. Therefore nsan is responsible for the action of his will. 
«s 5 i-> 
The present tJi^als consists of tht following 
heads t 
Chapter I - Iatro(Juctioa: 
A brief historical survey of the probler. of 
evil In tl-ie background of history of philosorsby 
Chapter II - 3t. Augustine* 
(a ; i'ife and times of S t . Augustine 
(b) His isetanhysics 
(c> His conception of v i l 
Chapter I I I - Inias al-Ohasal l t 
(a ; i'if© and tlisea of Al-Ghaxflll 
ibJ Ills isetaphysicg 
(c ; Conception of ..vil 
Chapter IV- J t . ThOEias Aquinas> 
(a) i ' ife and t i s e s of ^t* Thomas Aquinas 
(b) His metaphysics 
(c) His conception of juvll 
Chapter V- Conclusion 
A c r i t i c a l evaluation of th© problem of ^ivil in the 
philosophy of ;>t« Augustine, Isani Al-Ghazali and J t . Thooas 
Aquinas 
ml 6 t « 
In coticiusloa we eaa saf t h a t a l l these thr«« 
phlloaophars vara pr imar i ly tha scholars of r a l l r i o n md 
they dea l t wltli the problem l a t h e i r own way. They share 
each other on many p o i n t s . ;it» Augustine, a t . ThoEias Aquinas 
do not bel ieve in the exls teaoe of e v i l in r ea l s®nse but 
they c a l l i t as a l e s s e r good in respect of hlfher good. 
t3ut ev i l i s e v i l , '.^ e can not c a l l i t l e s se r good or food 
in i t s e l f 88 the blindnesa of mm or the suffering of innocent 
can not be cal led l e s s e r good, '^houfh these ev i l s can be 
j u s t i f i e d by saying t h a t God punishes the wicked na t ions for 
t h e i r e v i l deeds, yet what resiains unexplained i s the fact 
tha t the Innocent persons should not be pai ishedi econdly 
the solut ion of Evil as the privatioti of good seeiss 
contradic tory in I t s e l f . The absence of good Is lo t posaible 
in nature which i s good in i t s e l f . 
iow i t i s c l ea r that e v i l i s not food in any for©, 
i t Is d i f fe ren t frora good. i»o far laoral e v i l i s coacerned 
the stand aay be appreciated that good and ev i l are based 
on the pronouncement of God. 119 a l so gave freedojs of wil l 
to aan, so tha t he Bay choose between pood aad e v i l . This 
choice would have beea i i ^os s ib l e without the a l t e rna t i ve s 
wid without choice free wi l l would have no meaning snd there 
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would aot b« any juatlf lcat lon for reward and pualshment 
In the next world. That la why Jt» Augustine| 3 t , '^ hOKas 
Aquinas and Inam Al-Chazall preached the freedom of mteim 
in tn ls way aan Is responsible for moral evil as he has 
the free wi l l . 
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When we see around ti^  e world In which v* l i ve we 
have to face storms, earthouakes, f loods, drouetht, 
famines, dea ths , mental suffer ing, bl indness , s t r i f e s , 
murders, robbery e t c . in our da l ly l i f e , What are these? 
No one can deny that these are the e f l l s , then automati-
ca l ly a question a r i s e s , what i s ev i l? 
The existence of ev i l i s one of the oldest problems 
which has caused perplexity to the philoso^'hers throudi 
a l l the 3pes frr^ the e a r l i e s t time. The abs t rac t notion 
of ?ood qnd evi l bepan to be r r f lec ted upon since the t i ne 
when mqn be»? n to r^  f l ee t upon himself. We fln'^ the d i s -
cussion on t h i s problem in the scr ip tures such as Htgver^a, 
the Bible and the QiVBti and as well as in the discourses 
of noted eas tern ^nd western philosophers. Even todny i t 
is the most burning problem. 
This problem i s very s ign i f ican t for those who bel ieve 
t h a t Gtod i s (hinlpotent, All Good and Creator of a l l th ings . 
The d i f f icu l ty ar ises as to how the problem) of e v i l can be 
reconcile'^ with the oranlpotenc'^ sn'^ goodness of God, As 
Joice snys, "The existence of ev i l in the world must a t a l l 
times be the greates t of a l l problems wMch the mind 
4 
encounters when I t r e f l e c t s an Gad an His r 1 tlDn t o 
t h e world. If He I s ln<?eed a l l good and a l l Powrfulf 
hov has e v i l any pi a r e i n the world which He has aade? 
If He 1? fill j^o^d why -lin He a l low I t t o - r i s e , if «11 
1 
powerful , why f!>ps He not d e l i v e r us frors t n e burden' ' . 
In o rd r r t o underst'^nd t b e p rob lea of e v i l I t would be 
b e t t e r f i r s t t-> bove a c l ' ^ r no t ion of e v i l . "The ?ie^.n-
lns?s sn' ' l-^pl Icrjtton?? of {»0">d ?»nd ev i l gre "nost var ied 
su<'h «i? * wood person, s?o">d «5Ctlon, «»ood c rp»n te r e t c ' . 
I n s l l c - s e g , In promu'T ' ln ' ' ^ t h t n f pood --e -^re Jud«?lnfi? 
I t s V':lue, snd the n-vininf^ of • i^ood' or l t * s oppos i te In 
«iny p??rticul ^r c a s e depends on t r e point of v ! w from 
which we 3u"'«»e. I t may be a Pur l y oucintlt t l v jad-^f-
"tent, a jud=trw-nt of sensous v-^lue or sn ?5csthet1c one. 
The f!Ood -nay mean •well bolng» or ' W K I I doing* h i t ' e v i l 
i s the o p p o s i t e of t h e b o t h ' ; I t me ns 111 of jood, ^s 
I t s Cleaning d i f f e r s from c o n t e x t t o c o n t e x t , I t has been 
f 
define-^ d i f f e r e n t l y by ' ' I f f e r e n t t h i n e r s . 
In the words of Navl le , "Good I s v;h t ought t o be , 
unfi e v i l Is ^jh^t ous^ht not to be" . But t M s d e f i n i t i o n 
I s onen t o two o b j e c t i o n s . F i r s t l y the terrr; 'ou-Tht' doe-
not qpply t o t h e I r r t l ^ n ^ ob,1^ c t s llV-e f l r l ^ n-^  t b l e . 
Secondly 'wh-^t osip^ t^ t o be* •^ f^ -ans ' w h t ' ? r l ' h t ' , which 
I s QUltc d i f f e r e n t f r o r «w«at Is pood ' , because r l ^ h t mt ans 
'according to r u l e s ' , cDapellint* or prescribing power 
of thp.t Ideal while 'p^ood' me^na 'valuable* for some 
3 
end and Injplles It*- a t t r a c t i v e power of the i dea l . 
To Sidgwlck "the (»o-)d in a l l i t s sense i s the des i r -
ab le , and ev i l Is the undesirable . Bat here des i rab le 
4 
does not necessar i ly imply pleasurable . 
Patr ick holds that 'as higher and higher l eve l s of 
sood sre suces?lvely renillzed, the lower l eve l s beco^ne 
5 
e v i l " . The sl«?nlflcsince i s th=jt there is no uniform 
standard «»monj» men as to what Is ev i l - - wiiat i s one place 
i s esteemed as v i r t u e , in isnother place i t Is held to be 
v i c e , i^at sorrie -nen pipprov© most b l»hly , other cgnnot find 
words to express t h e i r adherence. 
So fnr the r e a l i t y of ev i l Is concerned there are 
two contrary views namely p e s l E l s t l c and op t imi s t i c . For 
the pessimists the "World is f u l l of misery". Evil i s 
found everywhere in one form or the other. To lay emphasis 
on the misery of l i f e a pessl 'aist saysi-
" l i f e which ye pr ize i s long drawn a^ony". Thus for 
pesslmli ts t«"e very existence i s an i v l l . They say, "No 
6 
world wo'Jlf^  be b e t t e r " . 
6" 
They b«lieve tha t God i s not sjood, or what oomea to 
the same thln» t h " t the ^a-Jdness of ^od is aosnething essen-
t i a l l y di f ferent fro-^ what we In e^ery other case understand 
by gOT?ness, Therefore existence t s evi l 'ini'' the root of 
a l l evil Is the des i r e for exis tence. I t I s also accepted 
by Budhlsts, They tn^^jintaln thf t f ina l 7 0od Is one never 
t o be deslre^l, nev-^r to be enjoyed, never to be consciously 
af-alned. In view of Schopenhawar " '€11 i s the innermost 
essence of everything =*nd of the t o t a l i t y of th ings . This 
wi l l is b l ind , stapled and «»roping. He bel l ves t h s t world 
7 
i s so bad the t non-existerwe would be preferable" . 
On the other h??nr^  optimists hold th^t ev i l does not 
ex i s t and even i f I t ex is ts to so^e extent , i t i s promptly 
solved, concjuered -nd i t i s f»o-^ d in other extend. They 
believe t h ' t : 
good sha l l f a l l , 
At li^st far off, at I ' iat to aJl 
And ©very winter chj^nee to spring". 
The charmcteris t lc formula of e l l such theor ies i s "Par t ia l 
evi l i s universal good". As Bollng Broke says, "Whatever 
i s , i s r i g h t , i . e . there i s r e a l l y no e v i l . Suffering i s 
t o be borne with content because the evi l sufferec^ i s serv-
ing a gre^t universal end. Nature i s not to be rebuked for 
enforcing her laws at the expense of an individual . Therefore 
1 
9 
nature of mil ex i s t s not in the universe . 
I t may be said tha t e v i l appears only i n pa r t i cu l a r s 
and tha t when we take a comprehensive view of the great 
whole i t disappears; the world i s indeed harmonious as 
a whole, 
Accordii:^ t o Stoics "Evil i s the necessary condit ion, 
the co r re l a t e without which good i s not conceivable. No 
10 
e v i l , no good. In other words, they be l ieve t h a t ev i l i s 
merely negative or p r iv i t l ve conception meaning only the 
absenc- of good, 
/ever, Pessiralrm and optlmism,/are not merely est imates of 
the extent to %fhlch evil e x i s t s ; these are t h e o r l r s of 
o r ig in , s ignif icance and f i na l i s sue of e v i l . One who 
can adopt the pessimist est i '^ate of the extent of ev i l 
may yet be an opt imis t ic as holding tha t good is f i n a l 
goal of 111, 
There are qui te a namber of ade(|uate solut ions of the 
problon of e v i l and some of these have been adopted by 
Various th inkers , for example, some philosophers denied 
God»8 oranipotency and severely r e s t r i c t e d i t s meaning. 
For some th inkers , 'Ev i l i s an i l l u s i o n * , According to ttiem 
s 
th« nhole world of tanporal nnd changing thing If nothing 
other than I l lus ion and that what we c a l l ev i l belongs 
only to this world, therefore e v i l Is not rea l ly e v i l . 
They further argue that It i s due to our necessari ly llrsl-
ted and short sighted point of view as a f i n i t e being, 
our Inabil i ty to see things as they real ly are from the 
stand point of eternityi 'Evil la the delusion of mlnd«» 
n 
SplnoEa ca l l s i t '^ as darkness in us". But according 
to some, "Evil i s an I l lus ion . It i s also inconsistent 
12 
thinking because this i l lus ion i s i t s e l f an e v i l . Secondly 
If ev i l or pain i s due to our mind - since ai^rt from 
mind i t \roal(* not eicist then to fay that al l suffering 
i s a delusion of invi*s mind would be to mal^ e the existence 
of that laind the worst of e v i l s . Thirdly i f one of the 
fuManiental el tnents of human experience i s an i l lu s ion , 
12 A 
this fact is I t s e l f an e v i l . 
According to some '*Evil i s necevtary as a counter 
part to good** or "good cannot ex i s t %rlthout evi l" . To 
tiiem ev i l i s not an unfortunate blot v4iich the finished 
picture cannot help having) the blot Is essent ia l to i t s 
beauty; the ar t i s t del iberately put i t , there I t i s an 
element contributing to the perfection of the whole, l ike 
a black cloud in one ^f eontable's picture. In the eternal 
things Pain and s in are nothing to worry. But i t l imits 
9 
th« onnlpotency of Ood that (Sod cannot create good with-
out ilfflultaneoualy creating evi l . It may be said that 
oeinipotenee has never meant the power to do what i s logi-
cally iraposslble, and on the present view the existence 
of good without evil would be logical impossibility. Bit 
this i s also true that lo^ic i t s e l f is created or laid 
down by Ood. Secondly this solution denies that evi l i s 
opposed to good in our original scrise i f good and evi l 
are counter parts^a good thing v i l l not "eliminate evil 
as far as i t can. This doctrine implies that Ood not 
only permits evil^ but that He deliberately creates i t ; 
He purposely does evil that good may come. The argument 
teat ^ e end justifies the means i s as morally unjustifi-
able for God as for men. "The universe i s better witi) 
13 
some er i l in i t than i t could be i f there were no evil". 
According to SCMNI, evil may contribu^ to the goodness of 
a whole in vhlch i t i s found, so that the universe as a 
whole i s better as i t i s , with some evil in i t , than i t 
would be if there ware no evi l . The best possible organi-
sation of the universe will not be static but progressive, 
that the gradual owereoming of evil by good is really a 
finer thing than would be the eternal unchallenged sup-
remacy of good. I t defends Ood*s goodness and mnnlpotenee 
on the ground that this is the best of all logically possi-
ble worlds, because i t includes the important second order 
10 
goods arid yet i t admits that real e v i l s , namely f i r s t 
order i ^ l l , exis t . Good does not tend to elisdnate evil in 
general. Fi rs t order good (e .g . happiness) contrasts with 
f i r s t order evil (e.g. misery), these two are opposed in 
a fa i r ly mechanical way; some second order goods (e .g. 
benevolence) t ry to maximise f i r s t order good and rainlsdae 
f i r s t order evi l ; bat God*s goodness i s not t h i s , i t i s 
rather the will to raaxirnise second order good. Ws might, 
therefore c«ill Ood*s i?oodness an example of a third order 
• 14 
goodness, or good. 
there adgjat, however, be several objeetlom to th is 
solution. As, some might argue that such dualit ies as 
benevolence have a merely derivative Value, that they are 
not higher sorts of good, but merely means to good , Second* 
ly I t follows from this solution that God i s not in our 
sense benevolent or sympathetic; Hs i s not concerned to 
minimise ev i l , but only to promote good) and th is might 
be a disturbing conclusion for some t h e i s t s . Thirdly the 
analysis show? clearly the possibi l i ty of the existence 
of a seeonl order ev i l , an evil contrasting with good, as 
evi l contrasts with ev i l . This would include malevolence, 
cruetly, callousness, cowardice, |nd s ta tes in which good 
i s decreasing and evil increasing. 
n 
•^vll Is due to human free ^^11". Evil Is due to the 
independence of the actions of human being It i s not to be 
ascribed to Ood at a l l . I t i s supposed to have been endowed 
by God with freedom of the wi l l , God gave men freewi l l , 
although It would le^d t3 some laportant e v i l s . I t must 
be argued that i t i s better on the whole that men should 
act f ree ly , and sometimes err, than that they should be 
innocent automata, acting rightly in a wholly determined 
• 15 
way. 
But to some *if God has made men such that in their 
free choices they sor-ietirnes prefer whst Is good and some-
times what i s e v i l , why could He not have made men such 
that they always freely choose the good? There was open 
to him the obviously better poss ib i l i ty of raaking beings 
who would act freely but always go right. His fai lure 
to avail himself of this pospibi l i ty i s inconsistent with 
His being both omnipotent and wholly good. But to some 
• 16 
wrong dioices Is l og ica l ly necessary for freedcaa*. 
There are, i n fac t , many so-called solutions which 
purport to remove the contradi^ion without abandoning 
any of I t s constituents propositions. These must be 
fal lacious , but It Is not so easy to see in each ease 
precisely where the fal lacy l i e s . These fa l lac ious solu-
t ion often turn upon some ecfuivocation with the words 
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'good' and '©vil*, or upon some vagueness about the way 
in vhlch good anr! ev i l are opposed to one another, or 
about how imich i s meant by 'Omnipotence'• 
Thus e v i l la a problem for the the ls t In that a 
contradiction la Involved In the fact of e v i l on the one 
hand, and the bel ief In the omnipotence and perfection 
of Ood on the other, God cannot be both a l l powerful 
anA perfectly good if ev i l la real . 
Evil may be c lass i f i ed Into various categories . 
For convenience I t may be broadly divided Into two 
(1) "EvU which befa l l s us and which we suffer and endure 
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(S) Evil which we do? these two broad categories may 
be further sub-dlvlded into four c la s se s : 
(1) Natural Evil 
(2) Physical Evil 
(3) Metaphysical Evil 
(4) Moral Evil 
(1) fiAIURAIi a i l L 
Natural ev i l i s the e v i l or pain in f l i c ted upon 
humanity through particular arrangement of natural elements 
or forces in accordance with their s in as storm, famine. 
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flood and earthcfuake etc and e v i l with which so many are 
born, the v^^rlous i^ys tca l deformities and defects such as 
b l indness , defness and dumbness e t c , Most of these ev i l s 
con t r ibu te towards increasing human pain an'l suf fer ing , 
but not a l l physical ev i l s are reducible simt:ay to pain. 
The natural ev i l c rea tes not only one problem but a number 
of d i s t i n c t problems. According t o Joice **t^ e ac tual 
amount of suffering which the human race endures i s immense. 
Disease has a s to re of torments for the body> and disease 
and death are the l o t to which we must a l l look forward. 
At a l l times, too great rwnbers of the race are pinched by 
want. In short the problem i s not one tha t r e s u l t s froa 
looking at only one aspect of the universe . I t may be the 
case that over a l l pleasures predcMninate the pain and that 
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physical goorl, i n general , predominates over physical e v i l , 
•Physical ev i l means a l l the suffer ings , a man may 
have t o endure with bodily and mental , nervous and sympa-
t h e t i c , a l ike as a d i s t i n c t individual aid soc ia l u n i t , 
a l i ke as a na tu ra l being-fleshy and mortal and as a human 
being, sharing i n the special h is tory of people and i n the 
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co l l ec t ive fortune and immortality of the race». 
No doubt the animals too have sufferings and pain and 
sus ta in injury due to natural ev i l and in case of human 
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being ttie possible explanation for that may be moral ev i l 
but i t cannot be applle<! to animals. The Augustinian Christian 
theodocy tr ies to justify the aniinals suffering on the 
basis of f a l l of Adam, They say that f a l l of Satan perver-
ted the entire evolutionary process to a savage strug'ile 
for existence. According to eastern theodocy animal 
suffering i s explained on the basis of doctrine of re-birth, 
re-incarnation of soul, A re-born i n animal Is due to his 
e v i l actions. 
(3) H^lAZ^lklQkk ] ^ £ I L 
The flnitude, contingency and hence imperfection 
of a l l created things have been called by some thinkers 
as metaphysical e v i l , "Metaphysical e v i l (the fact that 
ye are f in i te ) i s not ev i l at a l l . 'To be f i n i t e i s 
unsatisfactory« says Royce but i t i s scarcely a thing to 
complain about, i f vie actually f ind, the finltude i s capable 
of indefinite expansion, and If , we have groaad for hoping, 
th i s is destined to be immortal* ^ e n knowledge can not 
be extended, when poss ib i l i t i e s of discovery and Invention 
have been exhausted. I t may be time to find our flnitude 
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an ev i l . When our world i s concfuered, we may weep**, 
Ihis i s the ev i l which i s in f l i c t ed upon beings by 
God as a punishment of their sins which are committed on 
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account of l-aperfect, Inherent nature through natural 
agencies or physical element. 
(4) M i 2 I 4 L & ! I I i 
Moral ev i l i s purely the outcsme of the human acUons, 
particularly of his voluntary actions. Moral evi l i s simp^ 
l y Inmorality, Evil such as se l f i shness , envy, greed, dece i t , 
cruelty, cal lousness, cowardice and the larger scale ev i l s 
such as wars and the atroc i t ies ttiey involve, It may also 
be called s i n , therefore, i t s problem i s nothing other than 
thst of s i n . This i s what i s most perpl^ing , persistent 
and di f f icul t to overcome. And this is v^at has found 
greatest tre'^tment by the philosophers, theologians and 
Saints and this is what creates a dilemma between man*s 
free %dll and God*s goodness and Otanlpotence. There i s a 
room for moral evi l only where there i s freedom of wi l l 
because acts done under compulsion have nothing to do with 
morality. One who does good deeds i s said to be morally 
good and one who commits ev i l ones i s stamped as morally 
ev i l provided he enjcqrs the freedom of w i l l , 
"Wfc may hol'^ that i t was God»s purpose to have in 
man not merely an in te l l i gent fellow-worker, but a moral 
being who shwild be partty the architect of his own charao-
ter and worth", therefore, a man i s better v?ho may do ev i l 
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than a man vho cannot do e v i l . The p o s s i b i l i t y of ev i l 
! • always possible for a moral being, fUrt^er we m^ say 
that the poss ib i l i ty of ev i l i s necessary for a moral 
being. Further we may find that Crod wi l l s not merely the 
pos s ib i l i t y , but the actuality of e v i l . Because the 
"actuality of ev i l Is the only ground we can see on \*lch 
there arises any need or a possibl"'ity for the manifes-
tation and development of some haman virtues , and the 
revelation of some Divine excellence, which we re?ard as 
S3 
among the best". 
S imiar ly for the thelsts "moral evi l must be inter-
preted as a breach of God*s law and as a rejection of God 
himself. I t may involve the eternal damnation of the sinner, 
and in many of I t s forms I t Involves the i n f l i c t i o n of suffer-
ing on other persons. Thus I t aggravates the problen of 
physlc^il e v i l , but i t s own peculiar character consists in 
the fact of s in. How o u l d a morally perfect, a l l powerful 
Ood create a universe In which occur such moral ev i l s as 
cruelty, cowardice and hatred, the more especial ly as these 
ev i l s constitute a reflection of God Himself by His creations 
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and as such involve them inibernal damnation. 
Now i t i s clear that e v i l s are of different kinds and 
raise different questions and of a l l kinds two (juestions 
may be «tked, "what is the terminus a quo an^ ^ what Is the 
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terminus and quem"? 
The problem of e v i l ex i s t s In most acute perplexing 
form for those holding a the ls t ic view. Just In propor-
tion as God Is helrl to be omnipotent, a l l wise, a l l lov-
ing, the blessed and the ortly potentate, the creator, the 
Disposer of events and so on, the existence of ev i l becomes 
an ever deeper mystery. I t Is meaningless to c r i t i c i z e 
and protest against the scheme of things as we find I t , 
If there Is no one responsible for I t , Vlho, we can conceive 
rightly or wrongly, might or should have made i t other 
than I t i s . According to Job, "0 that I knew where I might 
find him ' that I might come even to his seatS I would 
order my cause before him and f i l l my mouth with arguments, 
I would know the words -^ilch he would answer me, and under-
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stand what he would say unto me". 
Thus a l l the problems of evi l merge Into one - the 
S7 
problem of Theodicy: Si Deus bonus est unde Malum, 
After discussing the kinds of e v i l , now we present 
the Various approf'ches to the problem of e v i l , 
(Sreek approach may be divided into many phases such 
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as (1) Pre-Platonlc (11) Platonic (111) Aristotel ian 
(Iv) Stole and (v) Greco-religious approach. 
Pre-Platonlc approach Is an optimistic one. To 
th«T! there wes no evi l as a vhole we see the things 
accordlni? to them, Individually good and e v i l . But God 
sees harmony and In harmony there Is no ev i l r«»ther than 
i t Is another good because I t Is part of the harmony. 
This vas thethelst lc point of view but Atomlsts argued 
that "gorf. of l i f e i s happiness and It ^^ as an Inner condi-
tion or s tate of tranquil l ity which depends upon harmony 
of the soul , a balance of l i f e , an attitude which combines 
reflection and reason". As Detnocrltus says, "Goodness was 
not only a matter of action but depended upon man's Inner 
desire". The good man Is one who does gnod but one who 
wants to do good at al l times such goodness brings happiness. 
On the other hand according to sophists the evi l does not 
exist In I t se l f but everything In i t s e l f la Indifferent, 
Its goodness or ev i l depends on man. To them goodness does 
not l i e In harmony but It depenrts purely on Individual think-
ing of man as Protogoras says* "Man Is the measure of a l l 
things;! Therefore In Pre-Platonlc approach each man had 
his own code of good and ev i l . To them morality wns as 
mer« oonventi-»nal habit. That actuglly there was no moral 
law, no a l l - lnc lus lve principles of right and wrong. The 
result of this position was aoral anarchy and pure Indlvl-
duallsn. 
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(11) In Platonic approach th i s problem Is tackled 
In a different way. According; to ^^ato the world of sense 
Is unreal» f l ee t ing , changing. This Is ev i l . It Is not 
inuslonary but It exists In a form of sensual world. This 
sensual worlfl Is lower than t 'e Ideal world which Is unchan-
geable and %rhlch can be known through reason. "Reason 
therefore, 18 the highest goofi for man". Ch the other hand 
through senses one can know only th i s physlc=^l world, \ghl<* 
Is a shadow af rea l i ty . According to Plato happiness and 
goodness go together and this happiness can be attained 
only in good l i f e and good l i f e i s possible only when reason 
rules the lower will and apoetltes because If one Indulges 
in these lower appetites, he turns avay from highest good 
mrA I t i s ev i l , this evi l can be overcome by surpassing 
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lower desires and appetites. Croodness comes beAause one 
has fflet ev i l and overcon^ i t , and thus he has made a real 
choice and has chosen %rell. Therefore, man i s not determined 
in the universe, but i s able to choose and i s free to deter-
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mine his own f a t e . This approach is follo^red by christian 
scholastics or medieval thinkers, special ly by St . Augustine, 
a great scholastic thinker and precursor of medieval period. 
( i l l ) The another important approach is Aristotelian 
approach. Though Aristot le was influenced by Plato but his 
trend was rational and practical. Beason or true knowledge 
i n his opinion i s good but i t i s treated oray as good and 
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not as the highest good but the "self reallzatlDn i s the 
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highest good**, Man has not only reason but he has fee l ing , 
desire and inst incts a l so , and vhen al l these factors are 
realise'^ In perfect harmony, It i s the highest good. The 
aim of everything in the universe i s t-j realize i t s e l f to 
the fu l l e s t sense. Each thing is different from all others. 
It has certain tslents and a b i l i t i e s and when these talents 
and a b i l i t i e s are realized in a fu l les t sense I t Is good. 
Therefore s e l f realization i s the highest good and this s e l f 
real ization is the eosiplete realization of reason and this 
realization brings happiness. To Aristotle sK^tions conducive 
to the attainment of this good or end are good and r ight . 
And the actions o.^ posed to the attainment of tbis true good 
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are vrong ( e v i l ) . Man i s free to s tr ive for thnt whid) i s 
in him. The ultimate choice is with man. Aristotle says, 
"Virtue as well as ev i l l i e in our power; we are free to 
do that which is good or to do that %#hich i s e v i l . There 
i s no p-^ wer in the un'vf^rse which can force ansrthing on us . 
In other words, virtue i s a disposition or habit involving 
deliberate purpose or choice. The good man, ho held, was 
one who made the right choice an^ thr'sugh the forca of his 
will realized the best. The bad n^an was one who made the 
wrong choice,V The Aristotelian aporaoch was an in te l l ec -
tual one ana we find the echo of this inte l lectual approach 
in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas in medietal period. 
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(Iv) After Platonic and Aristotelian approach v 
came to stole approach vhlch Is midway between early Greeks 
and later Greeks. 
According to them man's h l ^ e s t f»ood l i e s In acting 
In harmony with the universe, Man Is a Part of universe, 
with a definite function to perform for the complete deve-
lopment of the whole universe. As the rulln$[ power In the 
universe Is reason, so reason should rule each man In Indi-
vidual action. To them "^an's will i s det rmlned" and 
"Everything in the universe has i t s beginning and source 
in the wi l l of God. God is the ruler and determiner. 
Everything which has evolved has been the result of God's 
pur pose,••therefore, ev i l can not be conceived without good. 
In short this approgch s e e ^ to be optimistic and thfwgh 
they were purely determlnlsts but when they come to the 
problem of s;')od anfl e v i l , they abandon the complete deter-
minism of their metsiphyslcs, A man, in their opinion, may 
give himself to his passions Btv^ become their slave or he 
may escape from his passions and, r i s e to a moral l i f e . 
Thus he conquers his passions and becomes free. A true 
freedom l i e s in following reason and reallzini? supreme 
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good,** The Stoic conceived "goodness as a harmony within 
the universe ana evi l as An lmas;inary?® •• 
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(v) After Plato and Aristotle men were turning 
towards rel igion and seeking comfort in i t . They we»e 
confused and los t among the many conflicting theories of 
ev i l vyhich had been developed in the past. The time was 
ripe ttien for merging the many rel igious doctrines or 
be l ie f s with one or more of the (Sreek philosophies which 
bad come do\jn to that day, With the r i se of the rel igious 
movefflent in philosophy a sharp dist inct ion was Tiade between 
the principles of good an^ e v i l , l i i ^ t anfl darkness, l i f e 
and death. In many instances they conceived special Ood 
ruling over each realni» as Maniehi^s maintained a dualif-
t i c theory. According to th«n, there w e two ultl-nate 
principles , that of l i g h t , and an evil principle that ctf 
darkness. They are eternal and their str ive i s eternal and 
this world i s the result of the imitual conf l ic t of these 
two principles. In man the soul cooiposed of l ight i s the 
work of good principle vihlle the bo<^ composed of grosser 
matter Is the work of evi l principle. Thus the soul or 
spiritual being i s good am body or material thing i s e v i l . 
On the other hand in Jfeo-Platonic approach th is dual i s t lc 
problem i s tackled fflonistlcally. They agree that in mm 
there are two different r e a l i t i e s , spiritual and material 
and^consequently when the soul is incorporated in the body, 
i t suffers a f a l l from Divine perfection and becomes pre-
disposed to evi l ," ^^ The goal of man i s freedom from body and 
a l l i t s sins and return to God and perfect Goodness.** To them 
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th is Is possible because soul Is a part of the Divine or 
the vorld soul and possesses pure inte l l igence , " i t can 
turn away from God towards body and from the body towards 
God and regain i t s freedom. Thus for Neo-Platonists, God, 
the source of everythlr^ In the universe, i s absolutely 
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good, perfect b l i s s aif^  can not be the cause of evil,** 
Therefore, they presented the theory of Emanation. Accord-
ing to this theory''out of a pure God flow beings, as a itream 
mli^t flow from an ineixhaustible source. And at the far 
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extreme is darkness or matter.* Ihus matter does not exis t 
in I t s e l f or posit ively but i t i s mereily a privation of 
good. The e v i l , therefore, la nothing other than "Privation 
of good". 
After Oreeo-rellgious approach we come to Chriitlao 
approach. Christian approach may be divided in to two, 
(1) early Christians and (11) the later Christians. 
VI. The early Christian thinkers had to face the dilemna 
as to how the existence of ev i l mi^t be reconciled with 
absolute good, perfect ana al l powerful Qbd, They followed 
Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian approach. Early Christian 
thinkers such as St . Augustine and Anselm were the followers 
of Plotlnus and Neo-Platonists, while St. Atjuinas was the 
follower of Aristot le . 
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According to them God i s eternali unchanging arid good 
and Ho i s the f i r s t cause of everything in the universe. 
He i s the creator of the universe. He i s an abiding principle 
in a l l changes, the eternal pattern vhich never changes. 
He i s the unity of all forijs and a l l ideas. Ihe world i s 
created through Divine Emanation and evtfything in the world 
so far as i t Is a part of God, strives to be more l ike God 
t o return to Him, But matter holds them b?>c'' and i t s turn-
ing from God i s ev i l . As Apologists says that God created 
Ban good but he turned from God to the f l e s h , the body. By 
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t h i s , s in came into the world. And he turned towards flesh 
on account of his freedtwi of w i l l . 
According to them God created man with free will* when 
he goes towards God tnrough his will i t i s good and when he 
turns i t away from God i t becomes e v i l . Mhile Augustine 
says, "Man shoulr! turn his back on the pleasures of this 
world ^ i c h are thin and ?ale and direct hjj attention 
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i*JOlly to God \iiho is perfect gorjdness". 
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But Augustine denied the individual freedom. For 
hiffl mankind was free in Adam, but since Adsm chose to sin 
he l o s t freedom not only for himself but for a l l mankind. 
Sow no one i s free, but a l l are boun^ l to s i n , are slaves of 
e v i l . Thus in his thought man i s free and determined at a 
time. To hiffl Adam*s s in became hereditary, with the result 
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that the future of every man Is completely determined. 
But It does not mean th^ t^ evi l i s created by God because 
God created f i r s t man with free will and the f i r s t man 
himself chose sin a^ d by the act of f i r s t man, his future 
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i s sealed and this turnlne; away from God Is e v i l . Thus 
ev i l la privation of the right order in the man's w i l l . 
Now i t i s the grace of God due to i^hich a man can get rid 
of evi l and attain goodness and salvation. Then ev i l i s 
oiHy a lack of good. He explains the problem with a sliBile, 
l , e , everything in the universe i s good, even that which 
appears to be ev i l to us , i s actually good in that i t f i t s 
into the whold pattern of the universe as shadow or darkspot 
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i s necessary for the bea«ty of a painting. 
Evi l , to him, i s a re lat ive term. Vtoere there i s 
good, there Is a poss ib i l i ty of e v i l . If there i s e v i l , 
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good i s must because e v i l \s good in I t s e l f , 
This general idea was carried over i a t o tite period of 
Christian thought known as Sdiolasticism, from the ninth 
to the thirteenth century. By this time Christian Church 
dominated everything «. the State , man's l i v e s , education 
and thought. The thinkers had to confine their thinking to 
the bel ief which the Church accepted. Thus, a l l thinking 
was limited to church doctrines. In most eases men attempted 
to show that the bel iefs of the church were true, reasonable. 
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The posi t ion of Aui^stine Is also held very l a r^# ly 
by the philosophers of ScholnsticlSffl. Believing In a l l -
good God who create/1 everything, they had to explain 
apparent ev i l as actual ly a part of the good as a \*ole 
and thus ac tual ly good. According to Abelard '•the Tight-
ness or vrongness of sn act does not l i e In the act i t s e l f 
but i n the in ten t ion of the actor . And God considers not 
vhat i s done, but in what s p i r i t I t i s done; and the merit 
or pra ise of the agent l i e s not in the deed, but i n the 
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in ten t ion" . The t r u l y sinful man Is one who acts with a 
desire to do wrong. 
This scholas t ic mov«nent, with i t s problems and d i f f i -
c u l t i e s , reaches i t s climax in Thomas Acquinas, Thomas 
Aoulnas t r ied to show that the universe as a revela t ion 
of God i s r a t i o n a l . In k is theory of good and ev i l we find 
the philoso::ihy of Ar i s to t le Joined with the basic pr inc ip les 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y , . God tsa '^e everything, inclu'^lng man, for 
a purpose, and the highest go^d of a l l things I s the r e a l i -
zation of th i s purpose. As one rea l i zes the purpose for 
which he was c rea ted , he reveals God's goodness. Therefore, 
"the highest good Is the r e a l i z a t i o n of oneself as God 
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has ordained". 
Similar ly the highest form of action Is the contem-
p la t ion of God, This may be done through reason and faitifi. 
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Further, he says, " the goodness or badness of a Par t icu lar 
act ion depends upon the aim or purpose of the ac tor . In-
tent ion wil l not make a bad act fi:ood, but i t I s the Divine 
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purpose that wil l make a good act t r u l y good". Evil to 
him, is the pr iva t ion , a l a c k of the good. All things e r e a -
ted by good God, aim at goodness. When they f a l l , evi l 
r e s u l t s . 
In shor t Christ ian scholas t ic thinkers emphasized 
the great gulf between Qod and al l tha t i s less than God. 
Goodness Is created by God and is to be found in adjust-
ment t o God*8 plan or purpose. Evil I s In sot^ e^ way, a t t a -
ch e i to matter , the b-jdy, or the world. But God being the 
so le Creator of the Universe, would not cre'^te e v i l . 
Therefore, evi l n?ust not ac tua l ly be e v i l , but must be part 
of the gre-^t good. They were confronted with the f^ct of 
human degradation, Conseouently "they had t^ t i e t h i s up 
with the body, the s inful will of man \*ilch was in some 
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way l J*e r i t ed from Adam, or the pervers i ty of matter". 
Muslim Approach: After Chris t ian approach we now come 
to Muslim approach. Muslims believe tha t "God i s a l iv ing , 
8 elf-subs Is t i ng , e t e r n a l , and absolutely free c rea t ive r e a l i -
ty which is One, a l l powerful, a l l knowing, a l l beauty, moat 
j u s t , 9 0 s t loving and a l l good. I t I s He, the c r e a t o r , who 
began the process of c rea t ion . There i s nothing t o oppose 
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His v i l l . He i t c r ea to r , evolver and res to re r of a l l forms. 
He i s a lso the cber lsher , sus t a lne r , p ro tec tor , helper guide 
and r e l i e v e r of d i s t r e s s and suffer ing, God i s a l l knowing 
and He I s the best Judi^e", 
In short "God i s a l l good, free from sll e v i l . He Is 
a l so the source of all good. The Quran lays a great s t r e s s 
on the beauty of ac t ion. I t eixhorts mankind to do the deeds 
of h l ^ Value, Man is the best of c rea t ion for God has 
created him i n the most beautiful form, he i i born with 
the Divine s p i r i t breathed in to himj he i s mpde i n the image 
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Of Goa," 
Human perfect ion consists i n the f u l l e s t achievement 
and ass imila t ion of Divine a t t r i b u t e s , for God des i res no-
thins;, but the r e a l i z a t i o n of His l i g h t , the r e a l i z a t i o n of 
His a t t r i b u t e s i n man, God has given man the wi l l to choose, 
decide, and resolve to do good or e v i l , he has endowed him 
%ri.th reason, \*atever ev i l comes frrwi htn^ or to hlra I s 
from his own stwl. His plan envisages man's free use of the 
Divine a t t r ibu te of power or freed-m to choose and take a l l 
Judicious qnd prec^utlonqry me'^sures to su i t d i f ferent s i tua-
t i o n s . In t^e provldenti<^l scheme man's role i s not that 
of a b l ind , denf, dumb and driven herd of goats , so even 
h is free choice of ev i l Is a part of scherne of things and 
no one will choose a way unto God, unless i t f i t s i n t o that 
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fcheme or i s willed by Ood, He Is given th« power t o 
dis t inguish between !»ood -^ n'l ev i l and, the re fore , he alone 
i s responsible for whs»t he does. He i s endowed with freedom 
of ac t ion , but h i s free-^ o^m i s l imited by the f ree cgusgl i ty 
of God. Hla r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s prof^ortionate to his powrrs; 
he has been shown the path of r ighteousness and i t is up 
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to him to accept the path of good or e v i l . 
Being created af ter the pa t te rn of Ood»s nature man 
i s capable of developing from one stai^e to the next higher 
s t age . But th is development involves stru?a;le against the 
Immoral forces of the ext-^rnal world which he Is able to 
meet successfully with the c o - i t e r a t i o n and help of God, 
To r e a l i z e the moral law in his individual and soc ia l 
l i f e , man has often to strus;?le against evi l forces repre-
sented in the person of Satan, But i t I s within h is power 
to r e s i s t and overcome them. Though man i s always prone to 
weakness and suscept ible to seduction by the fore s of ev i l , 
yet his weakness i s r e c t l f i a b l e under the guidance of reve-
l a t i o n , and such men as follow the law of r ighteousness 
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shal l be immune from these l apses . 
"The Quran re fers to several s t an lc tendencies in 
(nan such as t r ide and a concei t in times of prosper i ty , 
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and fa l se sense of se l f suff ic iency". These tendencies 
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often le«d to different forra of wrong-dolns; and, therefore, 
must be counteracted by all right-thinking people. 
This i s the main spir i t of Muslim approach. But the 
problem of cr i ter ion of good and ev i l fo l lovs as a corollary 
to the problem of reason and revelation, and on this basis 
there are two main aPrroachs, viz. (1) MutaJBlllte approadf) 
and (11) Asharlte approach. 
^Utazll Ite approach i s purely a rat ional i s t i c appraoch. 
The Mutazilltes believe that the reason i s more fundamental 
than revelation. It Is to be perferred to revelqtion. 
Revelation merely confirms what is aeeepted by reason and, 
i f there be a conf l ict between the two, reason Is to be 
preferred. They held that reason, and not revelation, i s 
the cr i ter ion or standard of moral judgement, i . e . of the 
goodness aiKl badness of an action. The truth and moral value 
of things and human actions must b(; determined by reason 
because the moral qualit ies of good and evi l are objective; 
these are Inherent in the very nature of things or actions 
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and as such can be kno»n by reason, Thi^ maintained tiiat 
human reason Is competent to know the ver i t ies of the uni-
verse and i s completely free to go searching after the 
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Truth. They interpret good and e v i l Into tiiree senses: 
31 
(1) Gain and Loss : A thing In which there 
Is gain, that i s good and the thing which 
brings l o s s , Is ev i l . 
(11) Merit and Defect i A thing of merit i s 
good but a thing having defect i s e v i l , 
( i l l ) Reward and i\inishment : A thing which i s 
reward*^ble is gOT^  and a thing vrhich i s 
punishable i s e v i l . 
Reason i s the absolute Judge in a l l the three senses in 
Judging as to what i s gODd and what is ev i l , Thvtj^ aoi^  
reason one knows thgt thankfulness, truthfulness and the 
l ike €U^ e right (hasan) and ingratitude, falsehood e tc . are 
wrong (qablh) Shara simply confirms what i s already pronoun-
ced by reason. They believe that things and acts are good 
in themselves and their goodness or rlghtness (husn) may 
be known by reason. This assertion implies that the mean-
ing of the good or evi l i s completely rational. In short 
to them reason i s the source of moral obligation. It not 
only informs **isit is goo<i^ but also coraman'^ s i t . Man i s the 
creator of his volit ional acts . He creats so?% acts by 
%ray of perception and cognition (mubasharah) and some by 
way of invi tat ion (Taqlld). !«teen man i s the author of his 
own acts . I t i s necessary for God to reward hlrn for his 
good deeds and this/be justly claimed by him, as Al-Sharastanl 
IMts f t . "The Mutazl l l tes unanimously maintain that man 
decides upon aid creates h is a c t s , both good and e v i l , 
that he deserves reward and punishment In the next world 
for what he does. In ttils way the lord I s safeguarded 
from assocl3tl->n with any ev i l or %rron^  or any act of unbelief 
or t ransgress ion. For if He created the wrong He would be 
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wrong". 
They believe that wise can only do what i s sa lutary 
(al-SalsJi) an^ good, and that 8od*8 wisdom always keeps 
in view what i s sa lutary for His servants ; therefore He 
can not be cruel to them. He can not bring in to effect 
e v i l deeds. He can not renounce that which i s sa lu ta ry . 
He can not ask His servants to do t h a t which i s inpossible , 
RiPther, "reason also suggests that God does not place a 
se 
burden on any c rea tu re greater than i t can bear". 
According to them, thlngr are not good or ev i l because 
God declares them to be so . Goodness or e v i l are Innate 
in the essence of things themselves. This very goodness 
or ev i l of things i s the cause of the commands and prohi-
Mtiona of the law. As Sharastani says , "beauty and ug l i -
ness are q u a l i t i e s beloiv^lng i n t r i n s i c a l l y to what I s beau-
t i f u l and ugly. The human i n t e l l e c t i s capable of perceiv-
ing the goodness and ev i l of a few things afld no lawf are 
required to express t h e i r goodness and e v i l , e, g, i t i s 
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eomfflendable to speak the t ru th aid despicable to eoianlt 
oneself to unt ruth . This shovs that the e v i l and goodness 
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of things are obvious a id require no proof from the Shariah, 
In short they judge a l l Islamic beliel5by theo re t i ca l 
reason and renounce those tha t r e l a t e to a l l that l i e s beyond 
the re^ch of re>9Son. They t o t a l l y ignore the l imi t a t ions 
a^ reason, 
Aft^artW ApprPacta* 
Asharlsm I s a ph 11 osw)hico-religious school of thouj?ht. 
I t l a id the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or 
orthodox Kalan, as opposed to the r a t i o n a l i s t Kalam of 
N^taz i l i t e s and in opposition to the extreme orthodox c l a s s , 
i t made use of the dialectic-^l nethod for the defence of 
the au thor i ty of Divine reve la t ion as applied to theological 
sub jec t s . 
According to Ashar i tes , God is one, unique, e t e rna l , 
ex i s t en t Being, "Ha posf^esses a t t r i b u t e s such as knowledge, 
€0 
power, l i f e , and w i l l " . They believe that God has a t t r i -
butes which irtiere e te rna l ly i n film and are in ad^'ition to 
His essence. They heli tha t reve la t ion is more funda-nental 
as the source of u l t imate t ruth and r e a l i t y , and reason ipWot^  
should merely confirm w.hst i s given by revela t ion an^ thus 
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t h ^ prefer revelation to reason. lilam Is based on certain 
fundamental principles or concepts which, being super sen-
s ib le in nature, are incapable of rational proof. These 
principles , f i r s t / b e believed in on the basis of revelation. 
Revelation, thus, i s the real basis of the truth and rea l i ty 
of th# basic doctrines of Islam, This faith based on reve-
lat ion, ffla7 be rationalized. Reason must, therefore, be 
subordinated to revelation. They held ttiat ref«?lation i s 
the real authority or criterion to determine v*iat i s good 
and what i s e v i l . "Goodness and badness of actions (husn 
wa qubah) are not qualit ies inhering in the^i these are 
mere accident (a'rad), "Actlons-in-themselves are neither 
good nor bad ( e v i l ) , Divine law makes theaa good or bad 
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( e v i l ) " . 
Good and e v i l , in their opinion, generally are used 
in three senses as are seen in the case of I lutazi l i tes , ( i ) 
In the sense of perfection and defect respectively, (P) In 
the ut i l i taPlan sense, meaning gain and loss in wroldly matter. 
(r?) In the third sense of cwninendable and praiseworthy and 
punishable in this world ani in the next world. 
Both the Ash a n t e s and the Mutazilites agree that in 
the f i r s t and seond senses, mentioned above, reason i s the 
criterion or standard of g^ ood and e v i l . But according to 
Asharltes the third sense must be knovn through revelation 
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and not by reason as I t vas held by m t a z i l i t e s . Revela-
t ion alone accordins? to Asharites decides %*iether an act ion 
i s Kood or e v i l . As act ions by themselves are nei ther good 
nor ev l l j as there i s no qual i ty of good or e v i l seated in 
the very nature of an ac t , therefore there can be no question 
of knowing i t l^ reason. 
On the other h^nd on the question of f ree-wi l l of 
roan, t o choose and produce actions they took up an i n t e r -
fflediary posi t ion between the l i b e r t a r i a n and f a t a l i s t i c 
views. Ttiey made a dis t inct i - )n between crea t ion ( i*a lq) 
and acquisi t ion (Kasb) of an ac t ion . Ood is the creatcar 
(Khallq) of hu-^ atfi act ions a:d man i s the acqu is i to r (Muk-
t a s i b ) . Thus the actions of human beinais are crersted by 
God, the cre-itures are not capable of crea t ing any act ion. 
There is no creator except Ood and the actions of man a re , 
6?? 
t he re fo re . His c n o t i o n s " . 
To them power i s e i the r (1) Original (qadimi^) or 
(11) derived (Uadithah). The or iginal power alone i s effec-
t i v e . Derive^ power can c rea te nothing and the power which 
i s given to '^ an IF derived, the re fore , man can not c rea te 
any th ing ; he can not i n i t i a t e work, because 00*1 crea tes 
in man the powr and the a b i l i t y to perform an act and to 
make a free choice ( Ikh t iyar ) between two a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
between rli»ht and wrong. But th i s free choice of man Is 
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not effect ive in prDiuclns; th« ac t ion . In maklne; t h i s 
choice and intending to do the ac t , acaulres ( i k t l s a b ) 
e i t h e r the merit and reward for r igh t choice or demerit 
and punishment for \4r0ng choice. 
Thus, t3 them there are two causes In voluntary 
ac t ions! (1) Effect of the real cause, God, (11) The 
choice and In ten t ion of man, the acqu i s l to r , "God c rea te 
in man the ^^ower, a b i l i t y , choice, and wi l l to perform an 
ac t , and nan, endo^^d with the derived power, chooses freely 
one of the a i t e rna t lves and Intends or wi l l s to f^o the ac t ion , 
and, corresponding to th is In t en t ion , God ere- tes the act ions". 
I t I s th is In tent ion on the pqrt of man which makes him 
responsible for h i s depds. He c^n not t^ '^ ^e the i n i t i a t i v e 
i n any m^^tter, nor c^n he o r l f i n i t e any act ion. But the 
completion of the act Is p a r t i a l l y due to h i t In ten t ion , 
the re fore , man's f ree ch-jlcf i s an occasion for God»s caus-
ing the action corresponding to that choice. And th i s cor res -
pondence and harmony between the choice mun ajid God's crea-
t i o n , according to the Ashar l tes , is not due to a harmony 
•stebllsheA by Bod previously, but because of His habit or 
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nature to c rea te the harmony whenever human act ion i s done. 
This schor>l of thought believes tha t God i s the only 
real cause of everything; He alone possesses rea l and effec-
t i ve power and th i s Is unl imited; His wi l l i s abscdutely 
;t7 
f ree - not determined by anything. Whatever power, human 
beings apparently possess, i s given by Ood, Man dot;s not 
possess any real and effect ive power, God, being absolutely 
free in His ac t ion , i s not bound to act r a t i ona l l y and 
teleolofijically, fo r , otherwise, His actions would be deter-
mined by so-nethlng external to and other than Himself and 
He would not remi^ln absolutely f r ee . External purpose 
would put a l imi t to God*s omnipotence. He is not bound 
t o do >*)at I s best for His c rea tu res . He does whatever He 
w i l l s . But as He i s an absolutely i n t e l l i g e n t and just being, 
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His a c t l i n s , as a "latter of f ac t , are a l l fu l l of %risdom. 
Modern philosophy wrestles with the sarne problem but 
has intorduced many nev elements in i t s attempt e i ther to 
meet the original d i f f i c u l t y or to put the whole matter on 
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d i f fe ren t l e v e l . The i n t e rp re t a t i ons of problems were in 
many ins tances very d i f ferent from those of mid-^le i^ges* 
It became obvious that reason was very d i f fe ren t from fa i th , 
Conseauently, i t happened many times thnt a philosopher was 
not a theologian. 
With the Renaissance man undertook to free himself 
from the dominance of church anr^  i t s doc t r ines . The human 
mind refused t o be t ied tD the doctr ines and be l i e f s of the 
church but «(spired to search the problem with unbllnded eyes. 
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It Is acurlous f^ct th^t as nien undertook this search, 
they best'^ n to discover inexorable laws and mathematical 
consistencies by vhich every thing in the universe seemed 
to be controlled. They found the things hj^^pening in what 
appeared to them i n mechanical ways« They* therefore, in-
terpreted the entire universe on material ist ic basis. Ilius 
good and ev i l were for them matters in motion, vhen motion 
i s successful, i t generates pleasure, and when i t i s a 
fa i lure , pain re su l t s . But good and ev i l are relative to the 
particular man. That which pleases one man may not please 
other. Consequently, there c^ n^ be no absolute cri terion 
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for good and e v i l . 
To spinosa "Everything which helps man to reach the 
goal of his striving Is i»ood. The highest f^ o^d of man i s 
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the complete realization of his s tr iving. But Descartes 
tried to reconcile the mechanical theories of his time with 
the ideas of God, soul, and freedom. His solution l i e s in 
making a sharp dis t inct ion between SCMI and body, Vne body 
i s governed by mechanical laws but the soul Is free. It 
wi l l s as an Active principle. I t i s free to w i l l , to love 
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and not to love Ood. Further he said that "God is perfect 
and incapable of causing us to error. Bit man does f a l l 
into error and suffer from mistakes. This i s explained on 
the theory that tdie power which Gofi has given to man to dis -
tinguish the true from the fa l se i s not complete. Thus, man 
i s often ^'illty of making Judgments and in such cases he may 
•ii} 
ehoase t h s t wiiich I s wr-mj?, e v i l , rat>^er than ?ood. Thus 
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error l i e s not In Ood»a act ion but In ours. I e lbn l tz taclc-
led the problem In the same -nanner as Descartes . Han, for 
hlra I s , composed of a raimber of raonads well organized, so 
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man rnust be f ree fr-sra external Inf luences , Thus In the 
universe of monafls how Is e v i l poss ib le? Ke thought tha t 
"World Is the best poss ib le world, but I t i s not perfect", 
Qod l imited Himself when He expressed Himself i n f l n l t e s . 
These l i m i t s r e s u l t s In suffering and s i n . But e v i l serves 
to make good r e a l l y good, Man has c e r t a i n Innate p r i n c i p l e s , 
which. I f foll^wefl l o g i c a l l y , led to c r i t e r i a of good and 
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e v i l . 
Recent phi losophic thought regarding the problem of 
good and e v i l has been concerne-l \Ath mqn»s soc ia l r e l a t i o n -
ship . It has been an e th ics of the human group rather than 
that of Divine laws. Conseauently, i t has taken on the t i n g e 
of r e l i i t l v i t y . "Goodness and e v i l become q u ^ l t i e s of acts 
re lated to the s i t u a t i o n i n which these are performed. Accor-
ding t o ^flll "Goods d i f f e r i n oual i ty and that the gODds of 
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the i n t e l l e c t are be t t er than the goods of the senses . To 
Bentham too , good i s the measure of gOTd i n term of the 
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"greatest good of the greates t number". ij^t he does not 
admit that goods d i f f er In ouql i ty . His only c r i t e r i o n i s the 
number of ind iv iduals affected by the acts done by a man. 
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Good and ev i l are deternilned by SDcial fac tor . The emphasis 
i s placed upon tne oonsec^ences of one*s act i n the exper-
ience of o thers . 
The soc ia l and Individual consequences of actions are 
also emphasized by philosophers of pragmatic school as the 
c r i t e r i a of gor>d and e v i l . This i s ca l l ed pragmatic approach, 
According to them "the good i s t ha t which serves the ends 
of the group and the Individuals in the group, A sfood act 
i s one vhich considers the individual as an end in himself 
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and not as a means. But, by so considering each Ind iv idua l , 
a pragmatist considers the welfare of the s;ro o as a social 
u n i t , the u l t i n a t e ineasure of good and e v i l . 
In shor t , we can observes two fundamental pos i t i ons . 
According to some the c r i t e r i a of good and ev i l are "thought 
to be inherent in the aa ture of the univv r s e " . And no one 
can understand good and ev i l without understanding the uni-
verse and i t s nature and i t s c rea tor . To them good and ev i l 
are absolu te , havln?; been establ ished from the beginning of 
time, and are applied in a l l s i tua t ions and at a l l t imes. 
These c r i t e r i a are for ever t r u e , never changing, e i t he r by 
reason or r eve la t ion . 
The other posi t ion Is tha t "good and evi l are r e l a t i v e 
terras, aix^ the c r i t e r i a , are to be discovered by a study of 
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the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n Involved, Time and place play 
a great ro le In determining the good and e v i l . This posi-
t ion looks a t the consecpiences of the p^jrticulqr act i n 
terras of the l i f e of society and determines the e th ica l 
qual i ty of the act In t e r^s of the good of the whole. Thus 
these two l ines of the thought have been followed throughout 
the h i s to ry , that Is e i the r good and ev i l are absolute or 
r e l a t i v e . But now-a-days the r e l a t i v e a t t i t u d e Is the most 
pronounced because in the s c i e n t i f i c and modern age to find 
out the absolute standard for good and ev i l i s too d i f f i c u l t . 
Witb th i s ges ta l t of the problem of ev i l now we come to the 
problem of the present study. 
In the thesis at h sjnd we propose to present the problem 
of evi l in Christ ian and Muslim philosophy with special ref-
erence to St , Augustine, In®n CJhazall and St , T^OT.RS Aqulnas, 
we have chosen S t , Augustine because he is the cen t ra l f igure 
of Chris t ian thouf»ht, ^ t . Augustine w i^s f'^-p^tly influenced 
by Platonic and neo-Platonic thought and l-^ter on he has 
deeply impressed the Chris t ian Thought. Even today we find 
a groat l ap r in t of Augustinlan thought o^ Chr is t ian philosophy. 
Imam Ghazali i s the towering personal i ty of ^'uslim 
philosophy. Qa the one hand he exandned the mnin problans 
ra ised by his predecessors such as Al-Klndi, Al-Farabl , 
Ihn Slna , Ibn Mlskeweii^ and others , and on the other he 
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deeply influenced the different d i sc ip l ines of Muslim thought 
such as pure philosophy, E th ics , philosophy of r e l i g ion and 
Suflsm, Wte find the Ohazalian stamp t i l l today, 'Bie phi lo-
sophy of St , Thomas Aquinas Is the meeting point of both, 
that of St , A u ^ s t i n e and Inara Qhazali. The problems vhich 
were r a i se* by Aui?ustine and caiazali regarding Ev i l , we find 
the elaborat ion and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of these problems in the 
philosophy A(^inas, 
In making the study of these i l lus t r loTS t--ersonalltles 
v;e h«ve t r ied our bes t , to >»o through the i r orlfirJnal sources. 
In the end I wou]^' l i k e to submit tha t t i l l to<iay 
no such comparative study has been T.ade on t h i s probl«n, 
thert fo re , i t i s ray hunble attera-'t in t h i s d i r ec t ion which 
needs a due a t t en t ion . 
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St. iU£;u8tlfii i s one of the k«7 flgur«t In the tranal-
1 
tion fron elassleal antiquity to the middle ages and in 
the scholastic trend in vhlch faith or revelation i s prior, 
superior and preferable to reason and this i s to be used as 
an instruaient to justify revelation as far as i t can. He was 
also ag^eat figure in the sphere of literature, theology and 
philosophy. This great African Doctor dominated the thought 
of the western world for a long time. After the Bible i t 
Is the writings of St* ibigustine which have influenced the 
christian thought when we go through his writings we find 
that the prolalem of evi l has been the eentr-al problem of 
his philosophy. 
He lived through nearly eighty years of the social 
transformation, polit ical upheavals and military disasters 
that are often referred to as "decline of the Roman Btepire". 
His Ufa also spanned one of the most important phases in 
the transition from Roman Paganism to Christianity. The old 
Roman Pagan tradition was by no means dead, although the 
Roman emperors had been Christians since Constantine*s 
conversion, some fort^ years before Augustine was born, 
nevertheles;; i t was during this period that the Roman state 
4.i 
d«volop«d Christianity as th« o f f i c ia l s ta te ral igion. 
Medieval Europe began to take ahi^te vithin the franework 
of the Roman empire. 
Augustine belonged to the vorld of la te HtMoan 
antiquity and i t s cultural and educational system had a 
decis ive and last ing role in shaping his mind. His educa-
tion following the standard pattern of the time, vat al-
most entirely l i t erary with great s tress on rhetor ic . I ts 
aim was to enable i t s recipients to imitate the great 
l i t erary masterpieces of the past. This i s especial ly 
true of the philosophy of the period. I t s stock ot learn> 
ing vas in large part contained in coaqtendia, though vorks 
of Cicero vere s t i l l being widely readi and those of the 
Neo-Platonist thinkers gave inspiration to both pagans 
and Christiana. 
In th is s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , philosophican and theo -
logical background, Augustine was born in Tegasta, nor/t 
Africa, in 353 A.D., of a pagan father and Christian 
mother, Monica who exercised profound influence on her 
son. 
His education began in his native town, Tegesta with 
the state language Latin and Arlthmatic. At the age of 
eleven his parents sent him to Medura for advance learning 
of Latin l i terature and granaar. The pagan atmosphere of 
th« place and the study of L i^tln class lea expalled him frcm 
Christian faith. The effect vhleh Kedura exercised on him 
was wiped away during the four years of Ideal stay with the 
Christian mother and his father who died as a Catholic In 
390 A.D. 
Then at the age of sixteen he went to Carthage which 
was a great port and the centre &t goveriunent act ivi t ies . 
The licentious ways of the city corrupted hln and r«Boved 
hlM froB his Ideals of Christianity and soon he yielded to 
the teoptatlon of marriage but he s t i l l maintained a brill-
lant record of his education. Of a l l the bookSf he studied 
there, Hortensioua of Cicero exercised the great Influei^e 
over bin ^nA turned his mind to the search of truth. 
At this crit ical juncture he c»se into contact with 
Manlchlam and became the follower of this sect. This sect 
used to explain the problem of evil through two ultimate 
prlnelplest (1) Ormasd (11) Ahrlman, i . e . good principle 
Is responsible tot the good and the evi l principle for the 
evil . Because his materialistic young mind had not been so 
profound at this stage and he could not find a sattsfactory 
solution of the problem of evil in Christianity, therefore 
he detached himself from Christianity at least Intellectua 
Uy and this was the f i r s t phase of his l i f e . 
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Hm bseuie • teacher of rhetorloi f irst in hit native 
city» and later at Milan (384-386 A.D.) and devoted himself 
to the study of theologiealaand philosophical questions,uhich 
carried hin fron Haniehianlsni to seeptielsm and vhioh left 
him dit*satisfied« This was the second phase of his l i f e . 
In 3 ^ A.D, he befan to read sonw of the writings of 
Plato and the Hso-Plal^ l ists %ihld) gave stabil i ty to his 
thought* At the same time he ease under the influence of 
the eloquent St« Amborose, Bishop of Milan. Ibv he was in 
a pMltion to grasp and appreciate the problem ot evil as 
presented by the monotheistic theory. This was his intell-
ctual conversion and the third phase of his l i f e . 
After this third phase be came in contact with the 
words of St. Paul which absolutely changed his character 
and this was the fourth phase o£ his l i f e . 
After his conversion in 387 A.D. he returned to 
Tegasts, where, for three years (388-391 A.O.) he passed 
m his l i f e according to aonastic rules and was ordained 
to priesthood. During his bishophood he had to face many 
opponents. First of a l l he had to throw himself into antl 
Donatist struggle. He then, turned his attention to the 
pelagian. 
' l . ^ 
He devoted his great gifts to the developiaents and 
prc^agatlon of Catholle doctrines until his death on S8th 
of August, 430 A,D. when he was receiving the p ^ i t i a l 
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paslasi. 
k sketch of his l i f e and activity will suffice to 
Bake i t plain that with a fev exctptions Augustine did not 
compose purolf philosophical works in an aeadsaic sense. 
This ningling of theological and philosophical thenes may 
appear old and uoaethodieal to us today because today there 
i s a clear distinstion betveen the provinces of dogmatic 
theology and philosophy. But Auf;u8tine did not play two 
parts I the part of theologian and the part of the philMopher 
he considers the natural nanf he thought rather of man as he 
is in the concrete fallan and redeemed mankind, man who i s 
able iMeed to attain truth but %iho is constantly solicited 
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by Ood*s graoe in order to appropriate the truth that saves". 
He was a student of Cicero. And the reading of Cicero's 
Hortensius aroused in him a love of philosophy. He says, '* I 
was delighted with that exhortation, so far oiHy, that I was 
thereby strongly roused and kindled, and inflamed to love 
and seek and obtain and hold and embrace not this or that 
6 
sect, but wisdom i t se l f , whatever i t were? The search for 
wisdom is a leading characteristic of Augustine's thought. 
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H« Identifies visdcai with happiness because his philoiophr 
is praetieali i t is the search for the sapreoe good of the 
hoaan soul. All men desire happiness but the supreme object 
of desire must be a permanent good, because to love what may 
be lost or can parish results not in happiness but in a 
state of constant fear and anxiety. Therefore earthly or 
perishable good should not be the suprnae 3bject of our 
desire but Ck>d alone is peraanent, changeless and eternal. 
He alone is the supreme object of desire and the possession 
of Ood is the indispensable condition of perfect h^piness. 
To possess Ood is to possess the highest good, but know^  
ledge of Ood Is a necessary pre*requisite*, he, therefore 
says ** I desire to knov Ood and the soul, Nothing more 
Nothing at a l l ^ 
Knowledge of the supreme good i s an indispensable 
stage but only a stage in the acquisition of perfect haqjpi-
ness vhieh can oiay consist in the possession of Ood. The 
true philost^her must also be a lover of Ood, because 
through love and enlightened by reason a man reaches his 
final end. To achieve i t a man must not only knov the end 
but he should, in a sense, become that eni and this can 
only be brought about by love. In loving Ood, man becomes 
like Ood. Thus there is a perfect blenl of intellectual--
ism and mysticism in Augustine's thought. According to him 
the true philosopher not only seeks to knov the eternal 
ai 
truth, I .e . God, but h« lov«s Qod and thereby beeones 
6 
assimilated to Hin. 
Aeeording to Augustine, "the supreme goal of human 
eonduet is a religious, mystioal ideal - the mind*s union 
with God in the vision of God. And sueh union i s not possl 
ble in this physieal or imperfect «nrld but only in future 
l i f e . This union is possible throu^ love of %d. love 
i s the supreme virtue, the source of al l other virtues. 
Love of God i s S€lf control and tempernanee as opposed to 
love of the world* It i s , the basis of true love of self 
and others. Fortitude, justice and visdoa guided by love 
of (iod, faith, hope and charity are Interdependent and are 
all essential to conversion. "Without (love) faith profits 
nothing and in i t s absence, hope cannot exist . - - . . . . 
there i s no love without hope, no hope without love, and 
7 
neither love nor hope without faith.* 
St. Augustine envisaged a two-fold ideal, the highest 
good or perfection i s a transcendent g^od, vhidi is not 
possible to realise in the flesh because in the flesh a 
man remalM under the sway of carnal desires. This perfec-
tion consists in the love of G^ d, in the absolutely good 
wil l . A relative perfection may be reached by the perfor-
mance of external works. 
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H« further argu«s that th« kncfvldege and the love of 
tb« highast good or God restores to man the pover to do 
good vorkSf the pover to turn avay from the l i f e of sense 
to the v lU emancipated from the flesh, "Love of the good 
i s synonymous with freedom; only the good will is free , 
some men possess good wLUf others lack i t because good 
8 
will i s a free gift of Ood.** 
Predestination implies Qod*s fore knowledge of man's 
choice bat saeh foreknowledge is in no way prejudicial to 
man's freedon, Man was free to choose eternal l i fe« he did 
not choose i t ) God was knowing that he would not and so he 
decided befsre hand whom to save and whom to not. Man, in 
the person of Adam, had his chance) ha abused the privilege; 
God knew ha would abuse i t ) l»it man was under no coi^ulsica 
to do wrong. Nevertheless i f a man truly loves God, i f ha 
9 
has the good wiU, he will be redeemed. 
He regards the existence of God as self evident. One 
of his main arguments for the existence of God anticipates 
the "Cogito ergo'^uffl", i . e . , "prior to his knowledge that 
God exists, man has incontrovertible proof of his own exist-
ence." He further argues that the certitude of self know -
ledge provides three aspects on which the argument can he 
built. These are, "being, l i f e and knowledge". Of two in 
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animate objects one presupposes the other. An object such 
as a stone can exist without the added perfection of l i f e 
or knowledge but living creature presupposes the fact of 
"being" and a knoning subject that presupposes both l i f e 
and being. Knowledge is the highest of these three aspects, 
siiHse i ts p(Mi8ession iaplies the other two. Rational know-
ledge i s superior to sense perception. 
Aaong the truths grasped by human intell igence, there 
are some that are unique in being eternally and necessarily 
true. They are not reached hf a process of reasoning. Such 
truths then point the way to the existence of an Eternal 
10 
Truth, necessary and unehangingy vihich is Ood. 
To his , man is the highest creature in nature. The 
soul which is isaaortal simple, iomaterial and spiritual 
substance, entirely distinct in essence from the body. He 
rejects the doctrine of soul's free existence, but he ccHild 
not solve the questicMi as to how the soul arose? He hovers 
between Tradueianism and Creationism. He seems at times to 
favour TradueiaMsa, i . e . , souls are generated from the sfllls 
of parents, to explain the transition of sin. On the other 
hand he adopts the theory of Creationism that the soul i s 
infused into the body by a creative act of God. 
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Htt farther sayi that, without an internal ll^ht soul 
is blind and th« Internal l l fht Is QcA who lllOBdnes the 
darkness of our nlnds. This doctrine Is ealled **Divine 
Ulanination". The human mind Is Illuminated directly by 
Godi there is no InterMdlary (Nulla nature Interposltal). 
The universal truths with which our thought i s concerned 
are none other than The DiviiM ideas, and sometime he calls 
11 
them, faros, species, thoughts and laws* 
The ideas have two fold existence. They exist as 
exemplars in the Divine mind and they have another mode of 
being in the world. Mind ean see the Divine ideas lAiieh 
permeate them. It Intuitively seises the inte l l ig ible 
realit ies vhieh underlie the existence of sense experience 
and it is on account of the intuition of the Divine ideas 
12 
that our conc^ts are universal and necessary. 
About the creation He says,"In the beginning Qod made 
heaven and earth ". E;y earth physical universe i s intended 
and Heaven means the angelic spir i ts . Qod created the earth 
i . e . a matter which was absolutely "without form and void". 
But the creation of matter did not precede that of fom in 
order of time but in ftrder of causality. Aetiaally the crea. 
tion of matter and the forms was simultaneous. The forms 
are eternal and changeless, therefore, possess a two- fold 
mode of existences I ( i ) as the ideas in the Divine Mind and 
( U ) as the forms of contingent beings. These tvo aod^ of 
13 
existence are slnoltaneous. 
Ck)d*s aot of creation has a double aspect, i . e . ( i ) 
the act of making which consists In giving "being" to things; 
and (11) that of perfection, In endowing theai with their 
proper forms. He created the world through the *word* and 
lopressed upon mattar a movemant which tending towards HIB, 
Is an Imitation of that Intimata union which exists between 
the world and the Father, 
The creatures also arc of tvo kinds; (1) those created 
in their definite form In the beglxmlng I . e . , tha angels,the 
sky, the stars and the four elcnsnts, f lr«, a ir , water and 
•arth and the soul of nan and (11) those craated In germ, as 
It were ready far some future process of develc^ment that i s 
axis ting In their seeds (Ratlones Causales or semi nales). The 
Hatlones sealnales are hunld cdcln to water and contain with-
in theaselves an actlva principle of development. Thus fOod 
created every thing simultaneously either In actuality or In 
their ratlones seadnales. But he believes In the f ixity of 
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species) man begets man and the oak tree produces Its kind, 
CgMWttgfl gf gftt* 
The problem of "Good and Evil" as It has been shown 
In the Introduction Is one of those persistent problems 
that has always agitated every Inqulstlve mind throughout 
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th« agM of hURV} histoiy. It h«4 agitated tn« prisitlv* and 
tlia n*dl«vaX ailnds waA • t i l l 9wm to hav« baaci agitating 
tba Bind of tiia aodara aian* Sueh qttastloiis« as vt)at la tba 
aaaiara of good and avll in the vorld? Hov ean vm knov 
whether or not an aot la g^ od or evil? Is there in the very 
nature of the universe a Cade of laws which deteralnes good 
and evil or Is i^od t»p evil a setter of the relation of an 
aet to other aetS} and many others have been asked persls • 
tentlf by the phllostiphers throughout the hlst^xry of man's 
thought* A survey of the thlfdclng nen down the ages about 
these questions pertaining to the problem of evil reveals 
two fundamental positions. On one band, seasurM of o^od 
and evil are thought to be fixed and unchangeable I . e . o^od 
n^d evil are absolute. These aeaaures having been establish-
ed froa the beginning of the creation and apply in all situat 
ions and a l l times. The other position i s that good and evil 
are relative temSf and that the neaiures or the criteria 
are to be discovered by taking Into account the particular 
situation involvedf !•«• good and evil are determined \nr the 
re€(aire!mnts dT tiae and place. Between these t%ro extreas 
positions i ,e« , the alMolute and the relative, are atany 
theoriea of good and ev i l , which have tried to follow the 
course of noderatlon in their approach. They arc, however, 
siaply the different shades of the two fundament-il positions. 
They are at variance only with regard to their points of 
eaphasls, Keeping in view these general observations,we should 
explain iUtgttstine*s conception of Evil, 
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Th« problem of evil had b»en| iQ faet | a l i f e long 
preoeeupatiofl for Augnstino. The significance of thia 
problMi firat struck his adnd in his adolescence vhm he 
happended to steal soae pears with a gang of youth. Hav-
ing an inquisitive mind, he VAf set to think whether he 
ha^ done so owing to the goodness of the fruits themselves 
or due to the pleasure of his company only. Ultimately he 
arrived at the conclusion that he eoimitted theft due to 
the attraction of evil deed itself* This observation 
sealed to have made a de<m> imprint on his mind and he grappl-
ed throughout his career, sinee then, vith the problem of 
evil in the world, 
St, iugustine was a theistie philosopher of the 
scholastic trend of medieval Europe, The dominant factor in 
his philosophy having the Christian faith is the absolute -
ness and al l pervading majesty of Ck>d. He believed that 
God i s an Eternal and Transcendental Being, All powerful, 
All-knowing, All good and All-T,daa, Theistie philosophers 
desiring to prove the absolute goodness of God having diffi-
culty in explaining the existence of death, suffering, and 
evil in the universa, Thigr are faced with this seemingly 
perplexing question as to hov can an all-good Qod create a 
world in vhich there is evi l , St, Augustine, being adhered 
to the philoso{4)y of theism had to face the same dil«ifl!a,|.e-
5 7 
If God Is all powtrful Being, R« etust be able to prevent 
evi l , and i f He is an absolute good, He must not create 
evi l . Bat evils are, on the contrary, accepted facts in 
tbe universe. Therefore, i t logically follows that God 
i s not either al l powerful or all*good. Thus, to bring a 
reconeilation betveen a good Ood and and evil world was 
reallf a challenging problem for Augustine. 
To solve this perplexing problem Augustine firstly 
adopted Manicbian's pMltion at ^^thage after coming into 
contact with Cicero's work at the age of eighteen. 
Here he found an easy solution of bis perplexing 
problem in i ts dualistle theory) where good principle is 
responsible for the good, and evil principle for the evi l . 
At that tiisB i t was difficult for his materialistic young 
mind to conceive the existence free from the material 
embodifflent or to move easily on a level of abstration. And 
he was unable to find any satisfactory solution in Chris tin-
ty in the face of the dileo^a. 
But after going through the treatises of Neo-Platon-
ism and i t s postulates concerning the existence and greater 
reality of ^at which i s non»material, he turned his atten-
15 
tion to the nature of the evil in the l ight of Christianity. 
Iri 
To understand the right position of iUigustine's 
eooeeptlon of evil M9 should be clear about the distinetion 
of *CosiBie* and*Maral Evil', because he consistently adheres 
to this distinction. 
The theory which he adopted is Neo-Platonio in 
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character, i . e . , to him "Evil is the privation of good", 
He says, "In the universe, even that which i s called evi l , 
when i t i s regulated and put In i ts ovn place, only enhances 
our admiration of the good, for we enjoy and value the good 
17 
more lAen ve compare i t with the evils**. For vhat i s that 
which ve call evil but the absence of good? e.g. '*In the 
bodies of anicial, disease and wounds mean nothing but the 
alwenoe of health, for when a cure i s affected, that does 
not aean that the evi ls which were present i . e . , the disease 
and wounds go away from the body anddbiell elsewhere. They 
altogether cease to exist} for the vwind or disease i s not 
a substance but a defect in the fleshy substance - the flesh 
i t se l f i s a substance and, therefore, is sofflething good, of 
which these evils are Mcident. Similarly \^at are called 
vices in the soul are nothing but the privation of natural 
good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred 
elsewhere. Vlhen they cease to e^dst in the healthy soul 
18 
they cannot exist anywhere else**. 
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Thus h« tried to solve the dllenma and to explain the 
Coasio and Moral Bvll through the conception of the privation 
of good. 
As regards Cosmic evil he explains i t through his 
coneeption of "Hature", 
To understand his conception of nature^ ve should know 
his conception of Qod and the Creation because nature is 
created hy Qod vho is supreoe good. 
Though the conception of Ood and Creation have already 
been esEplained in section *a* here i t is enough to say that 
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Augustine believes that "Ood is the source of a l l existence. 
Therefore, He is the Creator of a l l things and because He 
i s all good, therefore tiie entire Creation is good. As He 
says, "The highest good than which there is no higher good, 
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is God", consequently He i s unchangeable good, hence truly 
eternal and truly iiaaortal. All other good things are only 
froa Mia. He further says., "Thou our lord, the true God 
PI 
who makest not only our souls and bodies but all things". 
Thus he proves that Ood is All powerful, All-good ani All 
vise etc. Therefore everything which he creates, by the very 
fact that He is the source o£ existence, has a nature which 
is good. In other words, He eamot,since He is perfect good 
create any nature that is not intrinsically good". 
6i> 
Tb«S9 natures are not oo the aqual plane or level of 
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existence. He says, God i s able to make good things both 
great and small» both eelest la l and terrestrial,both spirit 
oal and earporeal* But beeause He is also just, He has not 
put those things that He has made out of nothing on an 
equality with that vhleh He begot out of Hlaself. Therefore, 
no good things vbether great or small ean exist except from 
Godf but since every nature, so far as It Is nature, is good 
It fPilous that no nature can exist save from the rasMit high 
and tue Oodf beeause al l things not In the highest degree 
good but even related to highest good and again, beeause all 
good things, even those of most reeent origin #«ich are far 
froBi the highest good can have their existence only from the 
highest good. Therefore evexy spirit , though subject to change 
and every corporeal entity is from God| and e l l this having 
been made is nature. For evezy nature is either spirit or 
body. Unchangeable spirit Is God{ changeable spir i t , having 
S3 
been made Is nature, but is better than body. 
Tbese natures are not all on the equal plane or level 
of existence. He admits the hierarchic order and when he 
examines the universe of space and time he distinguishes 
between three eategorles of things. First , those beings 
%ihleh exist} that vhich *ls*, mere bodies in the physical 
vorld. Second, that \<hiGh both *is* and 'lives*,the class 
which comprises plants and animals and third which ' i s ' 
*llvet*, and *knovs*, l,e« san vfoo 9bar«6 «xi8tene« with 
flMre pb3r»ieal bodies« «xi9tene« and l i f e with plants and 
afllmels but who alone of oreatad things, by virtue of his 
reason Is capable of knovledge. 
And ajsong things that have l i f e , the sentlents are 
higher than those which have no sensation as anlisals are 
ranked above trees. And aaong the sentlents the Inte l l l -
gents are above those vho have no Intelllgenee, for example 
human being Is higher than animal• 
And among the Intelllgents, the laaortals such as the 
angels are above the mortals, I . e . , men. These are the 
gradations aecoBdlng to the orders of nature, but * accord-
ing to u t i l i ty each man finds In things various standards 
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of value*. St. Augustine attributes to the Infinite wisdom 
of God, %iho desired to create the uidverse In a majestic 
harmony In which things more valuable aiid Important could 
not exist If they could not be compared with the less valu-
able. In short, he recognises * three planes of being (1) 
Body*, ( U ) 'Soul' and (111) •Qod«. As soul controls body, 
so does God control the soul to which He Is In doaest 
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proRlmlty*. 
St. Augustine's doctrine of * Nature* has an Important 
Implication on the problem which In modern philosophy Is 
called the fact-value relation. If a nature has Its 
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existence, i . e . , i t s faotuallty, frcMi a erefttive act of Ood 
and i f at the same time i t s goodness or value is derived 
from the saae source of creation, i t beeo^s quite impossi-
ble to contenpiate a nature without considering siaultane-
ousl7 i t s existence and (goodness. Augustine's attitude 
towards the relation of *faet* and *value* appears also 
when he considers the highest level of reality, i . e . God. 
As he says, "But as He is a substance together with the 
Father and Son, so that substance is together with them 
great, and together with them giDOd and together with theo 
holy and whatsoever else i s said in reference to substance. 
Since i t i s not one thing to Ood to be and another to be 
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great or to be good and the rest . 
Secondly, he says that * nature i s another name of 
three things viz. neasure, form and order. In his words, 
"Spiritual, corporeal, every iseasure, every form; every 
order, bot^ great and small are fron the lord or aod.Th<^e 
three things where they are great, are great good; %rhere 
they are small, are small good; where they are absent, 
there i s no good; where they are great, these are great 
natures, where they are small, these are small nature,where 
they are absent, there is no nature; therefore, al l nature 
i s £;Dod*. Thus i t can be said that every nature so far as 
i t i s nature is good. Therefore, every spirit,though subject 
to change and rnvBty corporeal entity is from God and all 
this having been made is nature. 
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In short| aveiy tAilng which exists has a nature and 
nature i s created by Ood| therefore, everything is good 
though there is a gradation in goodness but nothing i s evi l 
in i t s being. But "in al l these things whatever are small are 
called by contrary naoies in comparison vith greater things; 
e.g*» as in the form of a man» because the beauty i s greater, 
the beauty of the ape in eoeiparlson vith i t is called deform-
ity. And the iaqprudents are deceived as i f the former i s 
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good and the latter is ev i l^ 
Nov i t i s proved that nature i s good, because i t i s 
created by Sttpreme Good. Then "\iyhere i s evil"? Augustine 
says, '^vil , vhieh is nothing else then corrupt Ion,either 
of the measure, or the form,,or of the order, that belongs 
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to nature!!- £ecause they are less than they should be or 
because they are not adapted to those things to which they 
should be adapted, (l)*'as i f anyone should be said not to 
have done in a good measure because he has done less than 
be ought} (2) likewise a form i s called bad either in 
comparison with something more handsome oif more beautiful, 
this form being It fs in comlii^ss or i t is out of harmony 
with the thing to vhieh i t is compared. Similarly order Is 
called bad vhen order i tse l f is maintainsd in an inferior 
degree. Hence disorder is bad. Thus if thwre is any 
form, order and measure there is swse good and some nature. 
Though i t may be corrupted if anyone of them i s less than 
i t should be. But even when eorri^t, so far as i t i s nature, 
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i t i s good ai3d 8 0 far as i t i s corrupted i t i s ev i l . In 
otter vrsrds, an ev i l nature is one in %irhich measure, form 
and order i s vit iated and i t i s only e v i l , in exact propor 
tion to the degree in which they are v i t iated; i f the nature 
i s not v i t ia ted i t would be a l l order, foria and measure, i . e . 
i t would be good even when v i t ia ted , as nature i t i s s t i l l 
g^od and e v i l only in so far as i t i s v i t i a ted . Thus nothing 
ev i l ex is ts in i t s e l f but only as an evi l aspect of some 
actual ent i ty . 
Thus i t follows that there can be e v i l as long as 
there i s some good} i f there is no good at a l l there can be 
no e v i l , i s Augustine says, "So long as a being i s in process 
of corruption, there i s in i t some good of which i t is being 
deprived of« If a part of the being should remain whidi can 
not be ecnrrupted this w i l l certainly be an incorruptible 
being and accordingly, the precess of c^urruption wil l result 
in the manifestation of this great good, theref{a>e corruption 
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can eoiMume the good only by consuming the being". 
There can never be entire corruption, because entire 
corruption of good i s the entire consumption of the entity 
and consequently the entire consumption of the corruption 
i t s e l f because the subslstent corri^tion will have nothing 
to dwell in . Thus, corrt:$tion cannot consume whole good 
without consuming i t s e l f because, **the ^ood which makes i t 
a being cannot be destroyed without destroying the being itself ." 
6o 
Thus he jus t i f i e s tbat"evex7 being, therefore, Is good 
*k great good i f i t cannot be corrupted, a l i t t l e good i f i t 
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can". This conclusion forbids us to say that a wicked man 
i s bad) and i t amounts to say that good is bad because in a 
wicked man there is eertaidly positive existence of good in 
the form of man or being and i t can incur the prophetic Judge 
ments, "woe unto them that ca l l ev i l good and good evil .That 
put darkness for l ight and l ight for darkness. That put bitter 
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for sveet and sweet for b i t ter ." 
In short, we may say that "every actual entity i s good" 
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(Omnis nature, Bonum e s t ) . 
He further says that the corrupted nature of a more 
excellent order i s sometime better than inferior nature even 
unoorrupted; as corrupt gold i s assuredly better than i n -
corrupt s i lver ani corrupt s i lver than incturrupt lead etc . 
"So in cafe of spir i tual beings, rational being even corrupt-
ed through an ev i l w i l l , i s better than an i r r a t i o m l being 
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though incorrupt". Hit i f corruption takes away a l l measure, 
a l l form, a l l order from corruptible things, no nature will 
regain. And consequently "every nature which cannot be 
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corrupted i s the highest good and such highest good i s Ck>d. 
But every being whids can be corrupted has some good. 
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In th« cas* of good and evil the logic;il rule that 
two eontrarlM cannot b« predicted at the sarae time of the 
same thing does not hold* Because good and ei'll are oontrari 
es hat evil springs up frost good and cannot exist %rithout 
good. "For a sum or an angel can exist without being wicked; 
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but nothing can be wicked except a man or an angel". And 
being a man, he is good and being a wicked he is an evil , 
thus "two contraries are so far co-existent that if good did 
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not exist in what is evil* neither could evil exist". He, 
thus9 justifies the existence of evil in things that i t is 
not a positive entity, but merely a privation of a positive 
entity. 
Secondly,"God desired to create the universe in a 
majestic harmony and harmony depends upon the hierarchic 
ordering of things in creation," In bis hierarchic order 
the things more valuable and important cannot exist i f 
they cannot be compared with the less valuable. " God, 
therefore, willed every thing for the best interest of His 
creatures and even socalled evil must be good in i ts own 
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way*. 
Thirdly, he justifies i t througk) aesthetic theme like 
the shadow in a picture, which contributes to the beauty of 
the whole, **Evil i s indispensable to the goodness of the 
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wrld" as the antithesis for the poem. For what are called 
antitheses are amons; the most elegant of the ornament of 
6? 
speech. Th« Apostle Paul als^ makes a graceful use of 
antithesis In that place where he says, "By the armour of 
righteousness on the rijiiht hand and on the l e f t by honour 
and dishonour, by evi l reports and good reportss as 
deeeivers, and yet true} as unknown and yet well knownfas 
dying and behold, ve l i v e i as chasteiwd, and not k i l l ed ; 
as sorrowful yet always rejolclngi as poor, yet maving 
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many rieh; as having nothing, and yet possessing a l l things". 
These oppositions of contraries lend beauty to the language; 
so the beauty of the course of this world i s achieved by the 
opposition of contraries arranged as i t were by elocuenee 
not of words, but of things. In this way^ Giod has set good 
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against ev i l and l i f e against death". 
In short every thing in the universe i s good and 
beautiful in i t s own place. No nature at a l l i s ev i l and 
this i s a name for nothing but the want (absence) of ^ood. 
Bit froa things earthly to things heavenly, from the v i s i -
ble to inv i s ib le , there are soaw thing better than others; 
and for this purpose are they unequal in order that they 
might a l l ex i s t . Now God i s , in such sor t , a great worker 
in great things that He i s not l e s s in l i t t l e thing for 
these l i t t l e things are ti) be measured not by their own 
greatness (which does not ex i s t ) but by the wisdom of their 
Designer, as in the v i s i b l e appearance of a man. If one 
eyebrow be shaved off, how nearly nothing la taking from 
the body, but how much from the beauty, for that i s not 
6? 
conitituted by bulk but by the proportion and arrangement 
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of the meaibers. Thua he explalnf the Cosmic evi l through 
Inf in i te vlsdom and goodness of Qod who ordains a l l and 
whose ways are beyond human understanding. 
After dlseuflslng the Cosmic ev i l St . Augustine 
explains moral e v i l . 
St . Augustine explains moral ev i l on the basis of 
huiaan v l U or freedom of wi l l . He did so by i so la t ing the 
inner faot or the human will and seeing in i t the ultimate 
source of moral e v i l . 
Augustine says that I t i s an admitted fact that Ood 
has given man free w i l l . I t is proved by the oommandments 
of holy scripture because there are so many commandments 
which in some way are expressly adapted to the human wi l l , 
for instance, there Is "Be not overcome of evi l", "Be not 
l ike horses or mules, which have no understanding"{'Despise 
not the chastening or the Lord", "Forget not My law","For-
bear not to do good to the poor" and "Devise not ev i l against 
thy friend", "If I do this wi l l ing ly , I have reward", "Do 
not speak e v i l one of another j* "Do not love the vorld"and 
other things of the same import. Now whatever i t i s said, 
"Do not do this" and "Do not do that" and aienever there 
i s any requirement in the Divine admonitions for the work 
of the wil l to do anything or to refrain frcm doing any-
thing, there i s a suff ic ient proof of free tidll. No man, 
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therefore, %fhen he fllns* ean i n hi t heart blame God for i t , 
but every raan must impute the fault to hlssaelf, Mor does I t 
detract at al l from a saan'f own wi l l when he performs any 
act in accordance with Ck>d. Indeed a work is done and i t 
i t to be pronounced a good one, when a person does i t will-
ingly* then, the reward of a good work be hoped for frcxn 
Him concerning whoa i t i s written, "He shal l reward every 
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man accordingly to his work". Nature with free wi l l owes 
i t s prefer use. If anyone thinks he i s forced to s in and 
thus owes t h i s , that he ought to sin; i s an error, for his 
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own nature compels no one to sin but, i t ( s in) i s a matter 
of free %rill. 
Thus he s tates that '^evil does not arise from a 
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substance but from the perversion of the wlU". 
The wil l i s free to turn away fran the immutable God 
and to attach i t s e l f to mutable g^d , taking as i t s object 
either the goods of the Soul, without reference to God or 
of the goods of the body, " The wi l l necessarily seeks happi-
ness, sat i s fact ion , and defacto this can be fiMnd only in 
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God, the inmatable good J' Therefore, "evil i s the turning 
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away from the immutable good to sRitable good**. 
The human will i s , then, free to turn to God or away 
from God, but at the sasae time the human mind must recognize 
the truth that happiness can be found only in iaeautable good 
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or Ood, and also that the direction of the \d.ll to that good 
Is Implanted by God nnd willed by God, who is the Creator ; 
by turning away from God the will runs counter to the divine 
law, which Is expressed In humsn nature made by God; for him-
sel f the wil l 18 free, but i t 1« at the same time subject to 
tioral obl l fat lons , and to love God i s one's duty. AuRUstlne 
says, "That the only cause of any good that we enjoy is the 
f?oodness of God and that the only cause of ev i l i s the f a l l -
ing 9way from the unchangeable good of a being made of good". 
Sut here a question arises when every created thing 
which i s mutable i s good because i t i s created by Good God, 
as i t is shown, why turning towards that thing becomes evil? 
iftugustlne argues how a man should lead a rational 
l i f e ? VH all certainly desire to l ive happily and happiness 
can be attained through the man*s chief good which is loved 
by him, Man*s chief good cannot be anything Inferior to man 
hiimelf but every man is bound to follow what i s best. If we 
find '^something which is both, superior to man and can be 
possessed by the man who loves i t , who can doubt that in 
seeking for happiness man should endeavour to reach that 
%rhich i s more excellent than the being who makes the endea-
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vour." In other words we can say that human being i s mut-
able and insufficient to himself, " i t can find his happi-
ness only in the possession of what i s more than himself, 
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in the possession of an immutable object". But the possession 
of the etsraal and laiiutabl* object i . e . God, for him, is 
not "purely philosophic and theoretic contemplation of God, 
but a loving union with and possession of God, of super-
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natural union with Him". 
Secondly, there should be confidence regarding the 
good, he enjoys. Ftirttier he says that Man's chief ?ood 
i s the eood erf!" both, body and soul. 
Thus the perfection of a l l our ?oDd things and our 
perfect good is God. Met neither come short of this nor go 
beyond i t . And He i s the object of love; therefore. He is 
man*s chief giod and He cannot be loet against our w i l l . 
The greatest coRimandment, therefore, vhlch leads to happy 
l i f e i s •• Thou Shalt love the lord, thy God with a l l thy 
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heart, soul and mind". For to those who love the lord 
all things, issuing fram His are c^ ood. Hence Paul says,"l 
affl persuaded that neither deatti nor l i f e -«>- .« . not tbin^ 
present, not things future shall be able to separate us 
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from the love of God", Thus, according to Augustine we 
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can "unite to God by love in subjection to Him". 
How i t is c lear that why the perversion of the wil l 
towar-ls fflutable things or ffood becomes ev i l . In short ve 
can say that man»s desire i s to l i v e happily and be ca n 
attain this happiness only tqr chief good mnd chief ^ood Is 
only God who i s inmutable, therefore, that happiness which 
i s attained by chief wood or God can never be l o s t , while 
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on the other hand mutable goods are not eternal, therefore, 
they can be la s t ; that's 'iiy If a man turns towards such 
mutable giod he looses his eternal happiness which iMMSoraes 
evi l for him. Thus, "the principle of morality i s love of 
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Cted and essence of ev i l i s a fa l l ing away from God". The 
cause of good thini»s i s in the Divine goodness whereas the 
cause of ev i l i s i n the created w i l l , which is to turn away 
from the imputable good." 
Nov in this ease that i f man*s actions are not always 
what they should be, bis will i s responsible because he 
makes his decision freely and i t i s in virtue of this free-
don that he i s capable of doing ^ i l . The ({uestlon then 
arises as to How could a perfect God endow us \dth free 
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choice. I . e . vith a wil l e n a b l e of doing ev i l *? or who was 
that put this in me? etc . In short, wi can ask whence comes 
this evi l will? 
If i t comes from Ood, why not God is ultimately the 
source of this ev i l? 
Aufustlne simply says that wi l l i s ??r)Od, which does 
come from God, for without i t man would be unable to act 
rightly because the concept of righteaas action would have 
no meaning. But to be able to act r ightly carries with i t 
inevitably, the poss ib i l i ty of acting wrongly?-^ In real i ty , 
we can say that in the world of bodies there are msiny thinj^s 
which we can put to bad «se , but this i s no reason for saying 
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that they are evi l and that God should not have ^iven them 
to U8, because eoi^ldered In themselves they are good. As 
hands are good and useful things but the man who co'^iaits 
criminal and shameful acts with them makes bad use of them. 
A human body with oat feet would obviously be very iaperfect, 
but a person who uses his feet to go to wrong places and 
injure another or to disgrace biraself, makes bad use of 
them and same may be said of the w i l l . "In i t s e l f wil l i s 
good, because %rithout i t no one could lead an upright l i f e . 
I t comes to usy therefore, from God and we should find 
fault with those iJtio use i t badly, and not with Him \,to 
gives i t to us". 
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"Free wi l l is the medium g:n>d", i t s nature i s gDod, 
but i t s effect can be good or bed according to the way man 
uses i t , now "the use to be made of free choice is under 
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the control of free choice i t s e l T ' , I t is res lstable be-
cause i f i t Is not res ls table i t has been created to func-
tion under necessity and in that case the fault would have 
been on the part of the Creat')r, which i s extremely absurd. 
"Reason, the source of fill knowledge knows i t s e l f ; memory, 
the stor^ouse of a l l recol lect ions , renembers i t s e l f , free 
w i l l , the master of every thing e l se - for It i s a l l at i t s 
free disposal - i s also master of i t s e l f . Hence i t rests 
with free w i l l , and free wi l l alone, to put to ev i l use the 
66 
good that i t i s " . 
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On the o ther hand, t he p o s s i b i l i t y of e v i l u se of f r e e 
win was the necessary condl t lDn for the t^Dodness and happi -
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ness brought about by I t s s;oori u se . l\lhen oixr w i l l c l i n g s 
t o tha t Inmutable and u n i v e r s a l giod i n arder t o find i t s 
Joy i n i t , i t possesses the ha^py l i f e , which i s raan's 
supretne ajood. 
"Turning away frow the Sovereign Good, and t u r n i n g to 
secondary ^ood: t he se a r e , i n b r i e f , the two f r e e a c t s which 
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decide our e t e r n a l happiness or misery" . 
But he re a npiestion l i e s , as t o bow d:>cs i t ria,jptn 
tha t the ^ d l l chooses s in? God i s the cause of every th ing , 
t»o He is t he cause of the ac t whereby f ree choice tu rns away 
from t h e supretM good to f a s t e n on lower ijojds and s i n c e 
t h a t ac t i s uncues t ionab ly a s i n , God i s , t h e r e f o r e , the 
cause of s i n i t s e l f . Or i f t h a t a c t does not co.:ae from God, 
v*5ere d o ^ i t cofne from'- "The only hones t answer t h a t can 
be made t o t h i s c u e s t i o n i s tho t we do not know anyth ing 
about i t , not to be s u r e , t h a t we do not know where the 
r e a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l i e s , hat r a t h e r because we cannot J^ now 
a t h i n g which i s no th ing" , ( S e i r l Grim non p o t e s t quod 
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n i h i l e s t ) . 
Every ejood comes from God; every na tu -e i s c e r t a i n l y 
?ood; t h e r e f o r e every n a t u r e cones from God. This s t r i c t 
conc lus ion app l i e s to s e n s i b l e as -well as to i n t e l l i g i b l e 
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thint^s, 'AJhenever we see a being in wiilch 'ne«isur'^, order 
and number are to be found l e t us not h e s i t a t e to acJknow-
led?e that Ciod Is i t s author. But i f we s t r i p t^'at betns; 
of the order, measure and number i t ha s , and remov*- them 
a l toge the r , absolutely nothing will remain, A3 loni?. as a 
rudirnent of form reiiaios, however crude and imperfect i t 
may be, there i s s t i l l a seed of goodness and l i k e a land 
of fsatter i t can be fcrou;?ht to i t s perfec t ion, step by step 
If an adambration of being is a ce r ta in sood, the complete 
deprivat ion of good i s by def in i t ion eouivalent to an u t t e r 
des t ruc t ion of being, Conseeuently, i t beco^s oui te in-
cons is tent to imai?lne a pos i t ive cause l i ke God at or igin 
of the act whereby free will turns away from Him. I t i s 
t rue that He has made the v l l l master of i t s e l f and capable 
of adhering to the sovereign good or of turning away from 
I t , but once so •^.s'^e b? God, i t w*>s in i t s power to separate 
i t s e l f from God, I t was i t s duty not to ''o PO. 
In s imi lar way he t r i ed to explain the orii^inal s in 
of Adam, "Mam's faul t - for tha t is what i t was not the 
natural and necessary f-ill as of a f a l l i a ^ stone but ra ther 
the free f a l l of a \ d l l l e t t i n g Icself go". I t was sin to 
tDtt#i the t r e e not because the t ree was bad as " every 
crea ture of Qod Is !»oofi" and accordinsjly every t r e e also 
w i^lch Go<i planted in Paradise 1? assurc^lly s'ood, r-^ an did 
not , there fore , striwe af ter an ev i l nature when he touched 
the forbidden t r e e ; but by deser t ing what was b e t t e r , he 
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committed an evi l edeed, oince the Creator i s be t te r tnan 
any c rea tu re whidi He has msde, His command should not have 
been deser ted, tha t the thing forbidden, havever good,mi:?ht 
be touched; s ince the bet ter having been deser ted , the ^ood 
of the creature was s t r iven for which was t*»ucned contrary 
to the co^Trand of the Creator. Sod did not plant an ev i l 
t r e e in Paritdlse; but He Himself \^ as be t te r who prohibited 
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i t s b«»lnj» ttwched, 
Secon/lly, 'He had *iade the prohibi t ion i n or^er to 
show tha t the nature of r a t iona l s jul ou^ht not to be in 
i t s own power, but in subjection to Clod, and tha t i t guards 
the order of i t s salv itlon through obedience, corrupting 
i t throup,h disobedience, hence also He cal led the t r e e , 
the touchin*-; of which hU foi-bade, the Tree of Knowledge of 
good BOA ev i l (Gen ir?> because when man should have touch-
ed i t i n the face of the prc*iibit ion, he would experience 
the penalty of s i n , and ?•> vnuld inow the difference bet-
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ween the «f:ood of obedle'')ce and the ev i l of disobedienc© , 
Now the question a r i s e s what i s the csuse of t h i s 
inverse turnini^ of the wi l l ? whether i t has an e f f i c ien t 
cause or not? 
If there i s an ef f ic ient cause, i . e . i f there i s ?^ ny-
thing which i s the cau«e of ev i l w i l l , i t e i ther (1) has 
or (P) has not a w i l l . 
If i t has a will I t Is e i the r (a) ^ood DT (b) bad. 
(f j If I t has a good wi l l I t can never make another wil l 
had because i t I s good In i t s e l f 
(b) If i t has a bad \ d l l , consequently i t can aake an-
other wi l l bad and thus i t wi l l lead us I n t J an i n f i n i t e 
regression. So no ev i l will can be the cause of f i r s t evil 
w i l l . 
If I t were since e te rn i ty i t must h^va been ex i s t -
ing in some nature. For i f not , then i t could not e r i s t 
at a l l . If i t existeri in some nature i t must h^ve been 
ln.1rln(» I t since e t e r n i t y , other-^se i t coul'l not be an 
evi l v l l l . But i f i t had been injuring slnee e t e r n i t y the 
n'^ture must have been corrupt s ince the very be^lnnin,» , 
which csn never be, because every nature at c rea t ion is 
wholly good. Now i t I s hereby proved tha t the ev i l will 
1? not from entern i ty and anything that has a wil l cannot 
be caused, 
(2) If i t i s supposed tha t any thing i s the cause of 
evi l v i i i \^lch has no w i l l , t h s t thins? is ei ther 
(a) Superior, (b) I qual , or (c) Infer ior to i t . 
(a) If I t were superior to I t , i t must have a wil l or 
ra ther a =TOod \ ^ l l and conseruently can never be the cause 
of ev i l w i l l . 
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(b) If tha t were i n f e r io r to i t even, then that being 
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i n t r i n s i c a l l y ood could not ma e i t bad. 
So i t is the turning af the ^111 from a super iar 
thin^ to an in fe r io r thin? ••; l e t Is contrary to t re order 
of nature i^x)^ not the in fe r io r th ins I t s e l f t'n«t \m>w the 
v i l l e i r U , jus t JJS faul t of lux iry and avarice is not the 
beauty and ?old but thte \d.ll (Heart) thqt loves s-nsual 
ple!^5?u^e, and in jus t i ce to the neglect of tf«mperance of 
. iustlee. 
Another ^"^mple Is that 'two men al i*e in physiciil 
and mortal conpt i tu t ion see the sa.me corporeal beauty; one 
ytelf^s to the temptation and as excitef? to have an i l l i c i t 
enjovrcent f a l l s away from chas t i t y . While the other stfc^-
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f a s t l y maintains a modest r e s t r a i n t of his fedll'. 
Again the question ar ises when tht. si^^it was the 
same and the seers were i den t i ca l ( in evtry respect) what 
m96e the will of the former to commit e v i l . 
Now one can only think that the wi l l of the former 
fflis^ht have turned evi l and the ^dl l of the l a t t e r remained 
unmoved beci^use each will was made out of nothing and con-
seouently hs^ the capacity of remaining g>od throuejh r e s i s -
tance or to be defi led by the temptation* the foraer tnpiin-
tatned the r e s i s t ance and the l a t t e r ^Id not . 
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Thus th\9 m\l can hnv^.- nn efflelfent e?»j9e, I t i t -
self i s 8 defec t , dirdnlshlai^ the -txjd of n^iture, as I t 
turrjs from the h l * e r t-5 tlie lower '»nd s D It t u s t have 
only a def ic ient oause. 
T^ 1^5 f'xe the cause of deficiency or of e lac- ^f 
being is li'i:e l:>')iing far a pos i t ive cause for s i l ence or 
carkness. Silence Is se re ly r-ji sbserioe of sD i^nd; darkness 
i s simply aa aba*«niee of ligt"it; in the seme vay *« niinftt ssy 
t^-at sin in our *?111 Is ^eri^ly na ^^bsencf of tns iDve far 
"bd. Our will i s ch^nsijpgble because i t w^s created froai 
notMn? and i s therefor© Imperfect and l i a b l e t> be 
de f i c i en t . 
This deficiency i s notblns; other than privg iDn of 
Kood. ''•til i s not 11 >e t r ee becsus© " s POod t r e e Cr> mot 
87 bear ev i l f r u i t s (Matt 7»1B). But i t i s l ike a s o i l from 
which both soTts ^f t r e e s (>T od and b«d) can »?->« ^^ nd be-
cause the v l l l i s the raeaiam (of) »->od, v*5lch can be put 
into bad use 11. © bodily org., s such as hsnfis, eyes e t c , 
through eyes we cnn see both good and bad p i e t a r e s . In 
ttiis way Mj^ustine t r i ed t o explain ev i l as the priv-stlDn 
of sood. 
8*' 
The problem of ev i l as i t i s presented by St . Aagastine 
la essent ia l ly theological, in nature because St, Augustine's 
faith rests upon the revelation of the Holy Scriptures and the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ. Augustine, t*ierefore, always 
has a scriptural reference ready at hand. 
The probl^D of ev i l i s , for Augustine, a purely optimistic. 
He b e l i e v e in the ultimate goodness of the universe. God 
in his onini^n, coaid have omitted evi l altos;et^er from the 
scheme of things, but He preferred to use i t as a means of 
serving the good; the glory of the universe i s enhanced by 
the presence of ev i l Just as darkness adds the beauty of 
moon l ight . In order to have God*8 goodness along with 
His omnipotence, Augustifw employes several devices of the 
thecAogical optimists. He ascribes to ev i l a relative 
s tatus . He states that ( i ) ev i l i s necessary to the good 
as a black spot i s to a beauty of a picture, ( i i ) he defines 
ev i l as a privation of the good. I t i s actually an absence 
oi good, as the blindness i s nothing Init the absence of 
s ight , ( i l l ) He shi f ts the responsibiUty for e v i l «i^ 
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to m^, because there i s no ev i l other than moral e v i l 
and tbe source of mor^l ev i l I s the perversion of free wlU 
and free wil l in i t s e l f i s good which i s creatid by (Jod, 
At one time or another he adopted each of these mutually 
complementary solutlans of the problem of e v i l . 
Au<?u<?tlne t r i e s his best to present a theolosrieo-
i l i i los^phlcal SDlution of the problem of E v u in the llpiht 
of his O i r l s t i an fa i th with the help of scholas t ic reason-
ing . 
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AlTGhazqll, the philD?:^her and the tbealDgian, has 
bten Jufli'ed by many to be the fi;reatest among Muslims a f te r 
the f^rophet. He is Cfertdnly one of the g rea tes t minds in 
the h is tory of Islamic philosophy and theology and undoubt-
edly ranks with the grea tes t thinkers of the r^orld. Long 
before Descartes, he enunciated the method of doubt as a 
f ru i t fu l process of phi losophical enquiry and ,;ropoun;ied a 
theory if causation aul te s i i i l l a r to that of HaTje, In his 
general a t t i t u d e he approaches Kant and Schleirraacher. 4-rof. 
D, B, Macdonal^. in his "Development of l^uslim Theology -
Jurispr^idencf and Consti tutional Theory" pays a glovdng 
t r i bu te to him in these words, "The g r e a t e s t , c e r t a in ly the 
most sya^athet ic f igure in the h i s to ry of Islam and the only 
teacher of the af te r generations ever put by a Muslim on a 
"1 
l eve l with the four great Imams. ** His l i f e and thoasjht had, 
i n fac t , played a card ina l role in determining the sp i r i tua l 
values of Islawiic Society, In his own person he took up 
the l i f e of his time with a l l i t s problems. He l ived through 
them and drew his philosophical and theological thought or 
84 
system fron his experience, "Everything that he thought 
and wrote came with weli5jht and r e a l i t y of personal 
experience". 
He has been ranked by many as "the equal of Augustine 
3 
in t^hilosophical and theological importance" but unfortunate-
l y nei ther Muslims nor Chris t ians h^ve t r i ed to understand 
them in a t rue h i s t o r i c a l perspect ive . In our personal 
undertaking? we corwern ourselves to maVe a comparative study 
of the problem of Evil in Augustine's and Al-Ohazali 's 
system of t h o u ^ t . 
Before s^ oinj» i n t o det-^ll of Al-Ghazall 's views on 
problem of £ v l l , I t seems des i rab le to have a c l ea r unr^er-
standing of the h i s t o r i c a l background of his thouf?ht, i . e . , 
p o l i t i c a l , I n t e l l e c t u a l and the re l ig ious condit ions of 
the a!»e in which he l ived and influenced the people. For 
a thinker not only moulds an environment accordinfi; to his 
own idea l s but he himself happens to be affected by the 
soc io -po l i t i co - r - l i g i o u s conditions of the age. More-
over i t wil l in many ways help us to understand and 
appreciate the sif»niflcance of Al-Qhszali 's thoughts. 
So 
"Before Al-Ohaz^all and even in his own davs the 
di f ferent sects of Islam came to logger heads between them-
selves and b i t t e r fiethts were fought. The followers of 
d i f ferent sects used to be deadly enemies of the followers 
of the other, one group could not t o l e r a t e the bel ief of 
4 
another under any circumstances". 
The s^iistory shows us how un-islamic elements came to 
be assinrtlated by the Muslims, "Rie un-islamic elements 
vhlch entered the t r ad i t ions of Islam acted hif^Hly injur ious-
ly in sha ' l ag the re l ig ious foundati :^ of the Muslisns, Gree<' 
philosophy BW'^ science intoxicated the l a t e r Mutazi l i tes -ind 
the philosophers. And the Shlas and the Sufis were engrnour-
ed by the s u b t l e t i e s . Thus the seeds of ^ipbel ief and scept-
icism were sowi throuF,h these agencies and insp i te of the 
many effor ts made to check the t i de of un-isL-jiiic tendencies, 
they continued to wor• on the minds of the people v?ith ?^reat 
vli^our even in the tirae of Al-Ghazall himself. I t became a 
fashion to pose as a philonophtr In order to have an excuse 
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to neglect religion.•> 
Islamic thoughts developed under the impact of Gree 
philosophy. Muslim philosophy may be divided into four main 
schools v iz , MutazlllsTi, Asharlsm, Suflsm and the Philosophers 
fHU' ma). 
SG 
The Mutsizllltes studied the worvs of Euclid,Pythagoras, 
Oalen and o thers . In metaphysics they were influenced by 
Pla to and A r i s t o t l e , ^he views of Greek Philosophy came to 
them in the beginnln^^ ti^rough t r an s l a t i on , Accordinp, to 
thera the orily source of t rue knowledge is reason but t n t i r 
i n t e rp re t e r s i^ ave a rellsflous and mystical colour to t h e i r 
philosophy and the Mualiis being re l ig ious minded accepted 
them as such. 
The masilm philosophers liVe Kindl, Farabl , Ibn Sina 
and others accepted Ar is to t le as a re l ig ious man through 
the booi- "The Theology of Aris to t le" . Plotinus proved 
that in the opinion of Ar i s to t le human soul i s incapable of 
knowing God through reason; God can be known throuejh ecstasy. 
Muslims read such mystical views, and through t h i s mystlcsT 
tendency they t r i ed to harmonize the philosophies of Greei* 
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masters with the tenets of the Quran, 
These philosophers believe that s ince God is one, and 
from one only one proceeds, and many cannot proceed. There-
fore God f i r s t crf^ate^ the Ag^nt I n t e l l e c t , who, in turn, 
created the Second I n t e l l e c t and f i r s t heaven, and the Second 
I n t e l l e c t produced the th i rd i n t e l l e c t and second heaven and 
so on. 
About man they believed tha t man cons is t s of bcx^ y 
=»n<i soul. Body Is material and perishable and d iv i s ib l e 
v.>hlle SDul i s s p i r i t u a l , imnjortnl and i n d i v i s i b l e . The 
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body belongs to th i s physical world ( rhalq) and soul be-
longs to transcendental world (Amr), I t s yesrnini^ for 
the Agent I n t e l l e c t i s due to t h i s reason. 
In thPir view there is causal connection in the 
universe and t h a t , the hie:her affects the lower. They 
establ ished di f ferent graces of c rea t ion . They placed 
God at the top, material elements or bodies at the bottom. 
Soul was place' ' in between God and body. Thus soul al -
ways ma'es an ef for t to be more nc?>r and ne-'ir to God from 
whom i t has emanated. 
To a t t a i n His nearness, knowledge of God is e s sen t i a l 
thus knowledge is more important than ac t ion . This knowledeje 
cornea throusjh the philosophy but a l l men camot comprehend 
the true philosophy because a l l the individuals are not 
equally sound. Hence there is need of r e l i g i o n ( reve la t ion) 
for the mass. The goail of relietlon l i k e ths t of philosophy 
Is to seek the t r u th , Therefcre in fundament .1 matters 
philosophy I s in no way di f ferent from re l i g ion . That i s 
why a l l Muslim philosophers t r i ed t o reconci le phil©»oj>hy 
with rel l?, ion. 
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Very ear ly the Muslims took the Quran as the only 
t rue guide to humanity that promises success in th i s world 
and the ',rorld to come. But af ter concuest and the expan-
sion of the Muslim empire, new problems emerged. To solve 
them ra t iona l ly they took help from the philosophy aad the 
Greek works were t rans la ted i n to Arabic, In these studies 
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l i e the roots of relis^ious and moral c r i s e s in Islam since 
the philosophers began to i n t e r p r e t Islamic doctr ines under 
the guidance of Greek philosophy and espec ia l ly neo-Platon-
isffl. 
According t o Mutazil i tes the problem concerning God 
and soul can be solved through reason. On the other hand 
Asharites re l i ed on revela t ion. On s t i l l another s ide 
there were sufis who developed the i r philosophy out of 
yearning of the human soul for the d i rec t apprehension and 
nearness of divine Being, i , e , God, 
The Mutazi l l te school has a r a t i o n a l i s t i c tendency, 
they believed in the competence of human reason to know 
the d i v e r s i t i e s of the universe and to search out the t ru th . 
The orthodox theologians and common people, on the 
other hand, were of the belief that 'Truth ' could only be 
found through the Prophet, According to them the nature of 
8fl 
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sj^ od and evi l i s determined throu«»h the coratiandiients of Ood, 
The orthodox ?roup accepted the Aaharlte theology against 
heresy and d isbel ie f . The Saljuqs v*io were orthodox sunnis 
helped the orthodox group. Ittzam-al Mulk, the ^rand-vlz ler , 
was an Asharlte and under h i s auspices A9harite theology 
f lourished. The Asharlte defeated the Hu taz l l l t e s and then 
ID 
turned to combat the philosophers. 
The sy?t«a presented by Abul Hasan Asharl is known as 
Asharism, He maint'ilned tha t "theology could not be bu i l t 
on a purely ra t iona l bas i s . Faith in the Quran and the 
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Hadith (Sunnah of the Prophet) was necessary." According 
to hlra God is the ortly Creator and -nan cannot c rea te any-
thing, God gives man the choice an*^  the power. Then He 
crei?tes actions w^  ich correspond to power. Only God can 
i n i t i a t e and acquis i t ion (Kasab) belongs to man which means 
that h is actions already created by God in him, correspond 
to the power and choice. Man i s the Locus C^hai ) of h is 
1^ 
act ion, Man, therefore, i s responsible for his deeds -
good and e v i l . He fur ther maintains that there Is no l imi ta-
t ions on God. 
The c r e d i t of es tab l i sh ing powerful system of meta-
physical theology and s c i en t i f i c foundation of scholas t ic 
Kalam goes to the su i t ab le and or iginal mind of Al-Asharl. 
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Al-Asharl*s prr>poun/?ln^s were occupied by the orthodox 
theolofi!l«»n8 as m f»lft or blessing from OofJ, 
Then the Saljuqs who r u l d over BaRhdsd and were 
orthodox >?u3lln!9 stopped a l l f ree thlnkln? in reli!»loua 
matters. The Asharlte school of theology was fortunate 
to claim among i t s defenders personal i t ies l i k e Baqi laol , 
Imam Harmayn e t c . In the l a s t Instance i t s progress was 
accepted s t i l l f a r the r by the successors of Tu«^hril Beg, 
He conquered Baghdad (A.D. 1066) and del ivered the Caliph 
from the S h l ' l t e con t ro l . His successors founded the 
r'-nowned Madarsa of Hayshabur, in Baghdad to spread Asharlt-
doctr ines . This marks the turning point in the Asharlte 
bid for f i na l v ic to ry . I t was, however, mainly through 
Al-Gha?ali th«it the Asharlte system became the most popular 
system in the Islamic coun t r i e s . The Asharlte .doctrines as 
modified by him established themselves f i n a l l y in the whole 
Islamic world, 
AS regards Sufisra, before Al-Ghazall, i t passed 
through three main stages of development. 
At the f i r s t s t age , Sufis were asce t ics and q u i e t i s t s . 
They laboured under a t e r r i b l e consciousness of s in . This 
wold seemed t o them f l e e t i n g and d e c e i t f u l , <eeping man 
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away from heavenly b l i s s . They were t e r r i b l y afraid of 
the world to come. At the second staf?e of development 
wtiich la known as the theosophlcal staije, they Introduced 
the dcxjtrines of t o t a l forgetfulness , emotional elements, 
Tauhld, Hal ( s t a t e ) and Maqarn (stage) and ecs tasy. At the 
third stage Pantheism came to the forefront . Pantheism 
o b l i t r s t e s the d i s t i nc t i on between the Creator and the 
c rea ture and contends that there i s only on© exister jce,al l 
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e l se being a ffl<?nifestatlon of that exis tence. 
The breach between Suflsm and the orthodox Islam took 
place gradually. At i t s f i r s t sta^e of devplooment Suflsni 
was not very dif ferent frtna Islam, In t h e i r conduct they 
cut themselves off from society and devoted on re l ig ious 
exerc i ses , pur i f i ca t ion of the hear t . And at the t h i r d stspe 
t 'anthels t ic tendencies became evident but l a t e r on there 
appears a d is t i i ic t ion between Suflsm and Islam, The external 
s ide of Islam was neglected by raany so-cal led suf ls and the 
Shaikh was added to the s^uthority of the Quran and i^rophet. 
But a group of thinl^ers grew up to reconci le the view of 
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theologians and Su f i s , 1,?=•, Shar l 'a t and Tar loa t . They point-
ed out that both were necessary, i . e . Sharlat and Haqioat, 
These are two aspects of the r e l i g ion and supplement each 
other. But the gl l f between suflsaa and Islam s t i l l reTi^^ined 
wide t i l l Al-Cihazall recorwHed the two. He :re,1ected all 
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sects and systems and adopted the Sufi mode of l i f e , 
H I a L 1 t 9Li 
Al-Ohazali was born at Tus In 460/1D58 vrhen he was 
young his fa ther died. His f a t h e r ' s Sufi friend brought him 
up. He studied Theology, cannon law, sc ience , phlloso'Jhy, 
logic and the doctr ines and pract ices of the Sufis , He 
l ived in Sufi atsROsphere and passed h i s l a t e r l i f e as a 
follower of Imam-al-Herrnan, Throuajh the Imam he stood In 
the Apostolic succession of Asharlte t eachers , being the 
fourth from the Aisharl himself. There he remained t i l l the 
death of Imaffl in 478. He was appointed as a teacher in 484 
in Nizatsia Academy at Bai^hdadf and there he was struck: by a 
mysterious d isease , Kls physicians said tha t his taalady was 
mental and could only be mentally t r e a t e d . He went to Mecca 
in 48B, "This fl iajht, for i t was so in ef fec t of Al-Ghazll» 
was unintel l i f^ible to the th ologiani of the t ime". 
He was wandering in the labyrinth of h i s time. Since 
h is youth he had been a scept ica l nn6 ambitious student 
playing with rel igious influences yet unaffected by them, 
Bit the hollowness of his l i f e was ever present with him and 
pressing upon him. As a r e su l t of h is scepticism his r e l i g i -
ous bel iefs gave way and l e f t him with the course of the 
time. At lAs t , the s t r a i n became too great and he touched 
for two months the depths of absolute scepticism. He doubted 
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the evidence of the sensesi he c^uld see plainly that they 
often deceived, for example, shadr^ wa move but man's eyes 
cannot perceive the movement. He doubted ttie primary Idea 
of the mind. Can a thing be and not be? "Perhaps he could 
not t e l l , " Uhen senses can deceive us there i s no proof 
trf the val idity of mind. May be there i s something behind 
the mind and transcending i t . He also doubted revelation 
ecstasy and l i f e after death etc , mius he, for two months, 
became sceptic and the thought no reasoning could help him. 
He had nothing from which he could begin. But at l a s t he 
got mercy of Qod and His l ight that followed i n , and there 
was no need of reason for i t . in this way this grace of 
God saved Ohazali and he regained the power to think. 
At that time the people \ino gave themselves to the 
search for the truth might be divided into f-iur groups (1) 
Scholastic theologlar», who were similar to the theologians, 
of a l l times and fa i ths . (?) Ta»limites who held that there 
should be an inf a l i i able teacher to led man to the truth, 
(3) Philosophers who based their views on logical and rational 
proofs, (4) Sufis who maintained that those whom Qod loves 
can directly comprehend perceive God loves can direct ly 
comprehend and perceive God in ecstasy. Ciiazali f e l t that 
he could ^ go back to the unconscious faith of his 
childhood. He began with scholast ic tlieology but found 
no help th«r«, because there was no coiroon ground on v<hicb 
to meet h is problems. They were defecient in the necessary 
knowledge of the subjec t , were \dthout a s c i e n t i f i c basis 
and !•'el pies s ly had to consult some author i ty . Al-Cibazall 
studied t h e i r thouj^ht and metho'ls and concluded t h a t the 
remedy of ailment yms not in scholas t ic theolo(?y. 
Automatically, then, he turned to Philosophy, He was 
aware of the weakness of the theologians of not making a 
suf f ic ien t study of primary ideas and laws of thouljsht. He 
studied the works of d i f fe ren t philosophical schools and 
almost others to meditating and working over his r e s u l t s . 
He considered himself t o be the f i r s t Muslim doctor to 
understand such a task wltii the r e q u i s i t e thoroughness and 
perfect ion putting pa r t i cu l a r s t r e s s on understanding %rhat 
i s to be refuted, Bit there i s a confusion between h i s 
a t t i t ude when he was inves t igat ing truth and the a t t i t u d e 
when he was wri t ing. He divided the philosophers of h i s 
time into th ree classes (1) F i r s t , m a t e r i a l i s t s , who did 
not telleve In the Creator but to them world is e t e rna l , (g ) 
Secondly, Deist who accepted the Cre-?tor and to them 
creature is l i k e a machine and "has a c e r t a i n poise ( i t l d a l ) 
In I t s e l f which keeps i t running. I t s thought i s a part of 
i t*8 nature and ends with death". They, the re fore , did not 
bel ieve in l i f e a f te r death but acce|»ted God and His a t t r i -
butes , Fln?illy, contrary to the above two, there are 
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t h e l s t s whose teachings Ghazall deals with in greater d e t a i l . 
But vhl le expressing his ideas about the i ropoundings of the 
t h e l s t s , his tone la of a pa r t i san ra ther than a seeker. In 
the l i g h t of his personal experleices he warns others and 
thus his experiences lead man towards the sense of apology. 
To hire Ar i s to t l e was the f ina l master of the Greek 
school. He 'divides the philosophical sciences in to s ix 
pa r t s v i z . , ma them?? t i c s , l og i c , physics , metaphysics, po l i t i c a l 
economy and e th i c s . He a'^ralta always those t ruths of tnathe-
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matlcs, iogle and phjrsics that cannot be r e j ec ted . 
He c r i t i c i s e d t h e i s t philosophers on the following 
grounds (1) F i r s t l y , they re jec t the resur rec t ion of the 
bod^ and physical punishment but to them there i s only 
s p i r i t u a l punishment, (S) Secondly, they held tha t Grod 
knows universals only not p a r t i c u l a r s , (3) Thirdly , they 
mentioned that the world is e ternal i . e . i t ex i s t s from a l l 
e t e r n i t y , (4) F ina l ly , i n his opinion the e th i ca l system of 
t he l s t s rooted in Sufism. In every period there have been 
s a in t s who segregated themselves from the worldly t i e s . 
fhff are witness t o God and i t i s through tiielp ecs tas ies 
that we der ive our knowler^ge of human hear t for good and 
e v i l . Philosophy therefore gave him a l i t t l e l i g h t . The 
answers of a l l the questions do not l i e In reason only nor 
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i t can unfold every mystery, yet Al-Ghaiali had ^^erhaps 
l ea rn t a ' lod de^jl from philosophy. Kla heightened re l ig ious 
i n s t i n c t could not be sa t i s f i ed by anything. Si.itLlarly 
Ta»llreltefl could not provide bins a firm stable base because 
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they had nothing except accustomed formulae. 
Now before him there was the path of sufisra. He took 
up a careful study of the works of Sufis such as Al-Harith, 
Muhasibi, Junayd, Shibl l and Abu Yazid Bistaoi which reveal-
ed tiiat he could understand Sufism through ecstasy and com-
ple te transformation of moral being. He fur ther real ized 
tha t such an understanding consisted more i n feel ings than 
in knowledge. 
By t h i s time he had set up three points (1) His firm 
bel ief in God, (?) His bel ief in ma ' s rescue in the l i f e 
hereaf te r by detacMng from th is world and turning towards 
God, (3) His bel ief in Heaven nni Hell as a B:re^t fac t . 
These bel iefs infused in him a greater urge of knowing the 
truth and he completely devoted himself t o the matters of 
the other ^^rld. Morewver h is search of the t r a n q u i l l i t y 
of soul kept him in a s t a t e of s p i r i t u a l conf l i c t for six 
months from the middle of 488, Owing to the same urge he 
abandoned a l l and wandered far from the Baghdad as a suf i 
leaving aside everything for the peace of his soul . This 
per iod, apart from being a great e ra , marked an era in the 
his to ry of Islam. Tbla flls?ht of Al-Ghazali also marked the 
end of the rel?n of mere scholast ic ism, and the Introduction 
of the element of the mystical l i f e in God the attainment of 
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t ruth by the soul In d i r ec t v i s ion . 
Further he perfomed re l ig ious exercises of sufis for 
two years in Syria, Then he went to Jerusalem to the taab 
of Abrsihssj al-Hebron, Mecca and Hadlna and vrLth th is his 
l i f e of f t r l c t retlrcTjent came to an end. 
I t was dawned upon him that the path of the sufls i s 
the only t rue pqth to know God, T t e i r e th ics i s un-^lterable 
by lntel l i?!enee, wisdom and science. Their path is God and 
complete purifying of the hear t from a l l . The secre ts are 
revealed upon them. They receive jjuldanee from ani^els and 
Prophets. They sh i f t from the s t a t e of esctasy to the prooti-
mlty of God. 
He asm back to h is nat ive tovn Tus In the l a s t days 
of his l i f e and se t t l ed down to study and contemplation. 
There he l ived with his d i sc ip les in Kbanquah or monastery. 
He '^led in 1111 A.D, In Tus and was burlerl there . 
!rs 
Before (^escribing the CDnceptlon of ev i l In Ghazall 's 
syateflj, i t will be bet ter to make a brief survey of his 
metaphysics i . e . God, soul , world and af ter world, 
Godt Al-Ghazall c lose ly follower? the Qaranic concep-
t ion of God; God i s s e l f - s u f f i c i n g , a l l powerful, a l l know-
ing , a l l compassing, e ternal and the only Real i ty . He is 
the Absolute S i s ta iner . Ruler, Destroyer, Hestorer,Recorder 
Exalter (Al-Hafl), and Honourer (Al-Ma'lzz). He i s the 'Ath-
holfler (Al-Mani), Deferer (Al-Mu-Akhirhlr), Alvat.cer (Al-
Mukaddln), Contractor (Al-Kabld), Spreader (Al-Basit) e t c . 
Thus, Al-aha«all believes In Personal God, For the 
knowledge of God, he says, knowledge of the se l f is necessary 
He ouotes the t r a d i t i o n "He yfno knows himself knows God" 
that is by contemplation of lis beinp; and a t t r i b u t e s , raan 
arr ives at some knowledge of God, 
Man's r e l a t i on to God is tha t of dependence. He needs 
Allah 's forgiveness and pat ience, Allah is watcher and 
reckoner over him; but He is a lso a fa i th fu l protector and 
guide, from Him comes a l l "sustenance in the widest sense". 
He does everything d i r e c t l y , hence no angels or Intermediar-
ies are needed i n the scheme, and a l l i s by His w i l l . He 
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leadeth astray whom He wi l ls and ^uldetb ar i»ht whom He 
w i l l s " . Each one cnn but hope thnt Ood wil l i^ulde him Birl«;ht, 
submit himself to All «ih In absolute fes r end t r u s t t ha t Allah 
wil l not cause him to forget and be of the losers in the f i r e . 
For him, Allah was w i l l . He saw everywhere around him 
the touch, the wor'-f-ing of Allah and man was akin to Allah, 
spec ia l ly so fa r will i s concerned. Therefore he passed 
beyond Tanaih 'Voio ergo Sum' (I will therefo e I ex is t ) was 
the basis of Al-CSiazali's psychology, Allah had tereathed in-
to tian of h is s p i r i t (Sura XV ?9; XXXVIII 7P) . The soul of 
man therefore is d i f ferent frcMU anything e l s e in the world; 
i s a Djawahar Huhani, a s p i r i t u a l substance created but un-
shaped, not subject to dimension or l o c a l i t y . From i t s ex i le 
he re , i t see'-^s the Divine and therefore our soul yearn 
back to God, In a tra^^itlon too i t i s recorded, thsit God 
created Adam in his own for^i, therefore the re i s a r e l a t i on 
between the s p i r i t of man and that of God as there i s a 
r e l a t ion between body and soul . Just as 9 0ul rules over 
the body, so God i^overns over the universe. As we cannot 
see sou l , in l i k e manners ^re carniot see God in our waking 
s t a t e in t h i s ^.n^rld, 
Al-Gha^ali says tha t I t i s the guidance and gr~^ce of 
God through which we can have the knowledge of God. He 
fur ther says that the knowledge of soul and the world also 
leads us to the knowledge of God, 
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H« further a ays, "All actions are by the will of Allah; 
only good act ions are by His (?ood pleasures. When Qod reculres 
anjrthln^ of a c rea tu re , He ?,lves hla the a b i l i t y ( 1 s t i t s , a ) 
the re to ; t h a t is the basis of the v a l i d i t y of the iB^osl t ion 
of the task 
Al-Ghazall discusses In d e t a i l the d i f ferent a t t r i -
butes of Ood, here for example the a t t r i b u t e of pr;5Vidence 
i s presented; there are different decrees of rfecosjnitlon of 
Ood's provldanee^ owing to the d i f ferent defrrees of percep-
t ion in people f^isputes must a r i se In tracing effects to 
causes. For ins tance , I f a man erases to take any i n t e r e s t 
in worldly mat ters , conceives a d i s t a s t e for comnon pleasures 
and appears sunk in depression, the doctor >dll say, " th i s 
i s a ease of melancholy and requires such and such a 
prescr ip t ion ," The as t rologer will a t t r i b u t e i t to some p a r t i -
cular conjunction of opposition of p lanets , "Thus so far 
t h e i r wisdom reaches" , says the C^ran, " I t does not occur 
to them that what has r e a l l y happened in t h i s that the 
Almiphty has a concern for the welfare of that man, and has 
therefore commanded His servants Vne planets or the elements 
to produce such a condit ion in him thst he msty turn away 
from the world to His Baker. The doctor, physic is t and 
sstrolof:T?fr .p» ;a^ t Jess r i^ht each in his pa r t i cu l a r branch of 
knowledge but they ^o not see that I l l n e s s i s , so to spesk, 
lai 
a cord of love by which God draws to Himself the s a i n t s 
concerning whom He has s^ld "I was sick and ye v i s i t ed Me 
not". I l lness i t s e l f is one of those forms of experience 
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by which man ar r ives a t the knowledge of God, 
From these remarks we may be able to understand the 
exclamation such as "God i s holy", "Praise be to God","God 
i s grea t" . Greatness of God cannot be compared with the 
c rea t ion ; we cannot say tha t the sun is greater than I t s 
own ll«fht. I t ra ther 'neans t ha t God's greatness i s immeasur-
ab le , i t transcends our cognit ive f acu l t i e s and we can only 
from a very i^lm and imperfect Idea of I t , Thus "God Is )?reat"' 
mewns tha t "His !»reatness fa r exceeds a l l our powers of 
comprehension". 
The above writings of Al-Ghazall show that God is 
beyond our comprehension, we can tnow Him only through His 
Agents, signs ref lec ted in the universe, 
Soul^ The soul of man is e s s en t i a l l y d i f ferent from 
other c rea tu res . As wri t ten in the Quran that "God breathed 
in to man of His s p i r i t " (ruh) (XV S9; XXXVIII 72) or "We 
wil l show them our signs in the world and in themselves 
that the t ruth -rsay be raj^nifested to them". Soul i s a 
s p i r i t u a l sub»tance(Djawahar-l ruhani) i t i s i n v i s i b l e , 
i n d i v i s i b l e , i t has no corporea l i ty . I t belongs to the 
s p i r i t u a l world, not t o the physical world. There i s some 
"sparV of the Divine**, due tD t h i s , I t turns tov.Trd» the 
primal f i r e . There Is liv#ne8« between the soul of man and 
God, •*ln essence, oual l ty ^n-) ac t ion , a i t man's SDUI has 
another a t t r i b u t e s also 11; e those of ;^ nim<5ds, some of 
Devil, sora*» of angels , some are essen t ia l anil so^ne are 
acc identa l . 
The outward shape I s ca l led body and the inward 
en t i ty the hewrt and soul . The soul i s higher than body or 
we can say tha t soul is a kin«i and d i f fe ren t senses of 
f acu l t i e s of the body and pas?ions are i t s Kinedora, l^e 
s p i r i t of raan rules the body as God ru les the vorld. But 
sometliH? lower facu l t i es dominate the hlpher ones as the 
anifflsl power on angelic power. 
The essence of each c rea ture i s to be iSOU«*t in that 
which Is h l j ^es t In i t •aind pecul iar to i t , Tiius the horse 
and the ass are both burdet>>bearini; animals, but the super-
i o r i t y of the horse to the asJcons l r t s in I t s bfing adopted 
for use in b a t t l e . I f i t f a l l s in t h i s , i t becomes dej»rsded 
to the rank of burden-bearing animals. S imi lar ly with msn 
the h i ^ e s t facul ty in him is reason which f i t s him fo r the 
oontesaplation of God. If th is pr€d3i!d nates in hi si, j^i-sen he 
dies he leaves behind hl»?i a l l tendencies to passion and 
resentment, and becomes capable of associa t ion with angels, 
Heiason tJa-es bim s u p e r l ^ to a l l . As wri t ten in the Quran 
"To 'Ban we h^v© subjected a l l t h l n ^ in the eartti'*. 
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"Th© ratlon?il soul In tian abounds in marvels, both 
knowledge and power", Thnuath his f ive senses , be knows the 
external world and through his heart he knows unseen world 
of s p i r i t , "His hear t i s l i l e a mirror which r e f l e c t s the 
unseen world," 
He i s higher than other c rea tures due to h i s reason. 
So He holds also d i f ferent rank-s among hi j^er crea tures v iz . 
man, through his power. Souls di f fer from corr j^on folk in 
three ways (1} what others only see in dreams, they see in 
the i r waklns5 moments (•?) •while o the r ' s throui»h will only 
affect t h e i r own bodies, these, by will power, can move 
b-vdies extr-nneous t o theraselves, (3) The knowledge which 
others a^QUire by laborious learning comes to them by 
TV 
i n t u i t i o n . 
I t i s a fact tha t happiness i s necessar i ly l inked with 
knowledge of God, Therefore "the his:hest function of soul i s 
the perception of Truth; in t h i s , accordingly, i t finds i t ' s 
specia l de l igh t " . 
The rea l greatness of soul l i e s in his capacity for 
e te rna l progress. If he is subjected by his passions as ang^r, 
sorrow, sex and bodily needs he becomes weakest among c rea t -
ures and loses HI? grace, ftat i f he develops h i s angelic 
powers, he rs^ises himself from the rank of beast to tha t of 
angel. 
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World» Al-Cftiaxali's world was frawed on what i s 
commonly cal led the Platonic system, (1) the heaven and 
e a r t h , according to C»iazall are the works of God, God 
created them out of nothing by His will and comraandsand 
i^uldes then throue;h His wi l l . He says "Be" and i t i s . 
Every crested thino; i s produced d i r e c t l y by him, Al-Ghazali 
c l a s s i f i ed eitistenee in to three modes (P) (1) Alam-al Mulk, 
(?) Alam-al Jabaru t , (?) Alam-al Malaltut, "The f i r s t ex i s t s 
by the power (audrat) of God - One part procee^^lng from an-
other in constant change; th i s i s physical vorld or the 
world of senses, (?) Second exis ts by God's e ternal decree, 
without development, remainins in one s t a t e with wit addi-
t ion or diminlt lon. The t h i r d , Alara-al Malakut, comes bet-
ween these tvio, i t seems ex te rna l ly to belong to the f i r s t 
but in respect of lod which is from a l l e t e r n i t y (al-qudra-
a l - a z a l i y a ) , i t is Included in the second, ^ e soul belongs 
to the Alam-al Kteilakut, is t?ilea from i t and re turns to i t . 
In sleep and in ecs tasy , even in th is world, i t can come in-
to contact with the world from which i t i s der ived". These 
three worlds are not separate in tinae and space but they 
stand in close kinship to one another. 
This world provides us a knovleds^ of God's wor'- and 
throusfh i t man »»ets knowledge of God, Man l ives in t h i s 
world "1th his senses and when they depar t , he l i v e s in the 
next world with his e s sen t i a l s^ttribute. 
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Man requires two things In th is '^'orld v i z , the 
protect ion and nurture of his soul and (?) of h is body. The 
knovle<?^e «nd love erf God are the proper nourishment of the 
soul vrhlle food, clothina; and dwelling place are very simple 
needs of man*s body. Jus t as a pilErlis on h i s way to Mecca 
ta les care of hi? camel, but if the pilgrlui spends his whole 
time In feeding and a'lorning h is camel, the Carvan wil l 
leqve him behind, and he wil l be perished i n the ^^esert. In 
l i k e manner a man has t o take care for knowledge and love 
of God instead of tnkini? care only of his body. 
WB should know the dece i t fu l character of the world as 
i t wi l l not always retnain but i t is s l ipping away from us 
ffloment by moment, l i k e a shadow which seems s t a t iona ry but 
i s ac tua l ly always moving. Secondly, " i t presents i t s e l f 
under the guise of a radiant but i?nmoral sorceress ,pretends 
t o be in love with u s , foundles us and then goes off to our 
enemies, leaving us to ^ie of chas»rin and despair . Jesus 
saw the world revealed in the form of an ugly old hag. He 
as' ed whether they had died or b' en divorced; she said that 
she had s l a in them a l l . "I marvel", he said, "a t the fooH 
who see vhat you have done to o the r s , and s t i l l de s i r e you" 
The Prophet has said that on the Judgment Day the worlfl will 
appear In the form of hideous witch with green eyes and 
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project ing t ee th" . 
loi; 
Th«7, vho wil l seriously eootemplate ^be past during 
which the world was not in existence and the future during 
^ i c h i t wil l not be in existence,wil l see that i t i s l ike 
a journey in which the stages are represented by years, 
months, days and moments. It i s not a permanent abode." 
World, f i r s t appears as mere t r i f l e s . Prophet Jasui 
said, "The lover of the world i s l ike a man drinking sea 
wateri the more he drinks, the more thirsty he e;ets t i l l 
at l a s t he perishes with thirst unquenched". The Prophet 
said, "You can no more mix with the world without being 
contaminated by i t than you can go into water without 
getting wet". 
Life a^ter death i The conception of heaven and h e l l , 
reward for the good action and the punishment for the ev i l 
one, are based on the belief in l i f e after deatii. 
Al-(%azali interprets i t in the following way. 
Al>Qhazali says, man has two souls , animal soul 
and a spiri tual soul. Death i s for animal saul. Spiritual 
soul i s indiv is ib le , and by i t man knows God. 'Vhen animal 
soul perishes spir i tual soul s t i l l remains. "Death, 
according to the Prophet, "is a welcome gi f t of God to 
the believer". 
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Human soul Is ouite d i s t i n c t from body. I t p e r s i s t s 
xdtb I t s e ssen t ia l a t t r l l w t e s , t^lcb Is Independent of the 
body, such as the knowledge and love of God, There fore , the 
Quran says , "He who is blind in th is l i f e , wi l l be blind in 
the next l i f e , Bm^ astray from the path". 
This soul returns to tha t upper woi»ld due to i t s 
or ig in , i t was sent down into th i s lower sphere against i t s 
will to acouire knowledge and experience as wr i t ten in the 
QaTBii "Oo ''own from hence, a l l of you; there will come to 
you Ins t ruc t ion from Me, and they who obey the ins t ruc t ion 
need not fea r , nei ther shal l they be grieved". Every sinner 
thus ca r r i e s with hlra into the world beyond death the ins t ru-
ment of h is own punishment. The Quran says , "Veri ly you shal l 
see h e l l ; you shal l see i t with the eye of certr^inty" and 
"hel l surrounds the unbelievfTs". I t does not sqy "will 
surround them , for i t is r-)and them even now". 
Al-Qhaaali has established on Islamic pr inc ip les that 
the Sufnan Bonum, the complete or the ul t imate end of a 
man's endeavours in th i s T^orld is the v is ion of God which 
will become possible in the l i f e hereaf ter 
According to him the perfect and d i r e c t knowledge of God 
which wi l l Const i tute the highest b l i s s I s the nature of 
the v is ion of God, 
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"In t h i s world the believer has the conceptu^kn-jw-
ledge of Ood* He cannot perceive Him a i r e c t l / . In the next 
vorld? the d i rec t knowledge of CJod wil l become p o s s i b l e , I t 
will not be only d i r e c t but a lso per fec t " . Ood can be con-
ceived only in t h i s x^forld. Therefore the knowledge of th is 
world i s not complete or perfec t . 
The vis ion of God selves the pleasure without pain, 
wealth without poverty, perfect ion without defec t , Joy 
%dthout sorrow, glory without dl88;race and knowledge ^d.th-
out ignorance. 
For the vli?lon of God, the knowledge of fiod a.ra love 
of Ood are essent ia l condi t ions . The -^Irect, Imffledlate and 
complete knowled^je of God Is not oosslble in t h i s vorld but 
i t i s only possible in the n®ct wOTld, Only conceptual know-
ledge of God i s poss ible in t h i s world. This knowledge leads 
to the vision of Ood and will reach i t s culmination in the 
v is ion of God in the next l i f e , Man will r i se af ter death 
with the same f acu l t i e s and Ideals which he had when he died, 
"The perfect ion of v i s ion wil l be in d i r ec t proport ion t o 
the coii|}rehen8lveness of his knowledge, God Is one but 
d i f ferent persons will see Him d i f fe ren t ly because of the i r 
knowledge being d i f f e r en t , " No one will be without some 
knowled»»e of God, "no he^rt will pass on absolutely purse. 
I t %.d.ll be purged by God by punishment or srace before i t 
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becomes worthy of the v i s i o n of Ood. 
l O f l 
Accordtfif ta Al-Ohazall d-eods of men will b« exa?nlned 
an^ •valUAte'! In the next VJrld ind th« places In heaven and 
h©ll will be aaiot ted accoHlnf ly . 7h*?r© will b« r!1fferent 
g-r^ idea of heiwen and li«vll for 'nan. 
He divides men with respect t'^  t ^ e l r s p i r i t u a l trades 
in Hell and Heaven Into f-^ ur main c lasses vlss,, the docked 
(Halikun), the rc-deeitted (muadhabun), the saved (najun) and 
the sierltorlous ( fa izun) . These grades are furtner d i v i s i -
ble in to varlsiua grades. The most exalted in rank siaong this 
«jroup will be pr ivi leged to see God face to face, 
Knowledte, love and the vision of God are r e l a t i v e 
In the sense that no one can achieve a perfect ion In th^n. 
Every aen possesses t^ea to a decree. Therefore, t* ^'Ir will 
alvavs rei^aln In him « y«»«rlnf for God even aft«r He has 
rwealed Hl-nself to Him in the next world. His v i s ion will 
»lv<? s a t i s f a c t i o n and joy» bat the yearnlnej to know more of 
HlBi wi l l remain; I t v l l l bring continued increase of know-
l e d ^ , wi l l cont inual ly product? new s a t i s f a c t i o n and new 
joy. This will be b l i s s Indeed." 
"Ttjus mm is capable of exis t ing on several d i s t i nc t 
planes^ from the aniraal to the sn!?ellc, nn6. pr sclsely in 
t h i s l i « s his danger i , « , of fallln?^ to the very lowest. 
Neithtr animals nor sna;els c^n chanffc th I r appointed rank 
and place. Bit man -nay sink to the animal or soar t o the 
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ans le , and t h i s i s the meaning of h is undertaking tha t 
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"burden" for v^ilch the Quran speaks." \4i\in th is aieta-
physlcal background of Al-Ohazall l e t us now discuss the 
conception of evi l in the coming sec t ion , 
£ 2 & S L f i f i t & l i 2 Q Q.t ^1. l i t 
Imam Al-Gha«all was a great theologian, a pnfound 
philosopher and a highly accomplished Sufi . As a theologian 
he did not deviate even an inch from the fundamental views 
of the recognized theologians of his age. He affirmed the 
a rb i t r a r iness of Divine a c t i o n , . , . God catmot be unjust in 
what He does, and cannot be wrong in thought what He decrees , 
"Fair seeming things are f a i r through His revela t ion and 
foul seeming things foul through His v e i l i n g , there are two 
a t t r i b u t e s which pe r s i s t in past e t e rn i t y as they existed 
in p re -e t e rn i ty" So that foul and f a i r are things 
whose nature , CJod has prescribed in p r e . e t e r n i t y . The 
c l inging of hear t t o God and l iv ing a l i f e of absorption in 
Him was the ideal before Al«Ghazali and also the supreme 
good for him. B.very tiling that seemed f a i r or foul was 
3? judged by th i s standard", 
Now with the considerat ion of t h i s conception of Ideal 
or the highest or supreme good, we have to examine the 
conception of ev i l In Ghaza3i*s phi losophical systems. 
in 
Evil may be eateworized in to four kinds such as 
metaphysical, phys ica l , natural and moral. But Imam Qiaz^li 
discusses mainly the moral ev i l vihich he c a l l s as "Stiar". 
Al-Ghazali, In accordance vdth the teachings of the 
Quran, believes t ha t ^od is omnipotent -''o Him i s due the 
primal origin of every ttiing. I t i s He, the Creator '4io 
began the process of c rea t ion and adds t o c rea t ion as He 
p leases . 
On the question of Khair ((?->od) and Shar ( e v i l ) , M-
Obarali finds himsf^lf on the horns of a dllenMa, On the 
one hand God is represented as the disposer of every thing. 
He is the unmawed mover of the material world and 
the only e f f i c ien t causes of a l l c r ea t ion , ^ a t e v e r hsqppens 
In the heavens or on the e a r t h , happens according to a 
necessary system and predetermined plan, iMot even a leaf 
can move without His decree. His law i s Supreme every -
where, \kiom so ever God wishes to ?uide. He expands His 
breast to Islam but whomsoever He wishes to lead astray 
He makes his breast l i g h t and s t r a i g h t . And on the other 
hand, m&n i s shown t o be responsible for h i s act ions and 
for deserving place eit*)er in he l l or in heaven. This implies 
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er)mplete moral freedom. Al-(»)azall seeks to reconci le both 
these tendencies on the basis of analysis of the human mind 
or human nature , freedan of w i l l , u l t imate end, knowledge, 
causation and gr^^oe e t c . 
1 1 2 
H u m g n S f l t \ l £ S » 
According t o Al-Ohsizall man has ^ot two farms,'•Khalq" 
34 
(The physical form i . e . body) and Khula ( s p i r i t u a l form). 
Khulq i s the s p i r i t u a l cons t i tu t ion oftnan. I t i s the 
essence of man which abi 'es in h i s physical body and controls 
his organic and physical functioning. From t h i s the actions 
proceed spontaneously and eas i ly without much de l ibera t ion , 
h e s i t a t i o n and r e s t r a i n t on h i s pa r t . I t Involves (1) a 
possession of act ion whether good or bad, (b) power over 
the action i . e . the actions are voluntary, (c) knowledge of 
the ac t ion , and (d) a s t a t e of the self which is equally 
inclined towards good or bad. 
The s e l f f u l f i l s the bodily nee<fj though the motor 
P6 
(Muharrika) and sensory C^dinica) powers, Ml these powers 
are under the control of the self and ti ey regulate the 
body. All the bodily organs have been fashioned to obey 
the sel f . Thus Al-Cliazali holds that mind has supremacy 
over mat ter . Hind i s the source of a l l a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s 
a dynamic force which fashions matter according to i t s 
needs. Even the growth of the bodily organs is due to t^e 
inward yearning of the s a i l . 
In the se l f of man, there are six powers, v i z . , 
appe t i t e , anger, impulse, apprehension, i n t e l l e c t and wi l l . 
These basic po%*er8 have t h e i r or igin in c e r t a i n pr inciples 
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In the nature of raan. Appetite Is derived from the beast-
ly (al-Bahimlyya) gnd answer from the feroclnus (as sablyya) 
The l a s t mentioned power Is d l s t l n ^ l s h e d from tha t which 
rebels against i n t e l l e c t . I . e . , the satanlc (ash-shaytanl-
yya). These six powers can be categorized i n t o four e le -
ments of human nature v t z . , (1) the sage, (?) the pig, {^) 
the dog, and (4) the dev i l . The sage in him is the ' A q l ' , 
the pig Ash shahva, tiie dog i s al-Ghadab, the devil i s the 
brute \Aiich uni tes these two animals to rebel against Aql. 
But the fundamental elements in the inner cons t i tu t ion of 
raan are reason or wisdom (Aol, Hilcna), self asser t ion 
(Oiadab) and appet l t lon (Shahwa). In?llviduals partake of 
these powers in d i f ferent proport ions. 
Appeti te , anger and apprehension are cordon t o man 
and animals. The se l f of man possesses two ar">ditlonal cruali 
t i e s which dis t inguish him from animals and enable him to 
a t t a i n the s p i r i t u a l perfect ion. They are Aq l , ( In t e l l ec t ) 
and Irada ( w i l l ) . 
Aql and Shayatanlyya (Devil) are contrary forces in 
the human self tha t work through the Shahwa, and Ghadab for 
construct ion and des t ruc t ion respec t ive ly . Aql, because 
of the Divine element in I t , f ights these forces and t r i e s 
to cont ro l and diver t them in to rl?»ht channels so as to 
make them useful for the self . vJhen Aql has checked the 
evi l tp-ndency ?=!nd subdued and hamonlzed the animal forces, 
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i t s s t ruggle ceases and the stdf Is enabled to persue I t s 
progress unLnpeded towards I t s go?jl. I t i s t h i s s t a t e of 
se l f vhlch Is described by the Quranic phrase as i%fs a l -
Mit«alnna (the t r anau l l sou l ) . But if these forces i n s t i ga t -
ed by Shaytanivya, rebel a^a i i s t 'Aql ' and overcome i t , the 
ev i l tendency fetes stronc; and gains complete ascendency 
over them; v^^lle the Divine element becomes weaker t i l l i t 
Is almost completely become dead, %hen the ev i l tendency 
becomes stroneier anfl stronger cont inua l ly Inc l t ln? them to 
gra t i fy themselves even at the expanse of the ^ood of the 
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se l f . 
But the s t a t e , v^hen the Divine elenent is continuous-
l y s t rut^ ' l ing with the human evi l tendency, which is denot-
ed by the Quranic expression as Nafs al Lawwama ( the 
admonishing sou l ) , i t is the equilibriusi between them a l l 
that produces resu l t s i^ich conduce to the r ea l i za t ion of 
the ideal for ins tance , if "Shahwa" i s control led and kept 
in moderation, qua l i t i e s such as chas t i t y ( I f f a ) , t r anqu i l i -
ty (Hadw), p i e ty (War'a) e t c . follow, i f Ohadab Is con t ro l^ 
ed, qua l i t i e s such as courage (shujaa) , generosity (karara) 
fo r t i tude (sabr) e t c , are the out come. Both (Jhadab and 
Shshwa are subordinated t o the Divine element, Quali t ies 
such as knowledge ( l i ra) , wls^ o^m (hikraa), fa i th (yaqln) e t c . 
r e s u l t . If both Shahwa and Ohadab become predominated, 
qua l i t i e s of the Devil such as treachrry (raakr), decei t 
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(Du kha) , cunnlngness (h l l a ) e t c . resul t and i f Divine 
element transcends I t s bounds, qua l i t i e s such as over lord-
ship ( ^ b u b i y y a ) , despotism (ist ibad-bil-ur: iar khull iha) 
appropriations or clal?^s to special pr ivi lege (takhassus) 
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e tc , follow. 
These elements of the nature of man are sub.iect to 
the r^lrect Influence of forces in the cosmos, and which 
are created to help or hinder the i.?orking of the universe. 
^/Inen the heart operates In the divine d i rec t ion i t receive 
good ideas which i s ca l led "al Taufiq" (Divine aid) but if 
the hear t operates in the i^posi te d i rec t ion i t receives 
the iffipact of the other forces known as a l -khidhlan, the 
forsaking. In t h i s way the hear t of man i s between the 
40 pulls of the anpelic and Satanic inf luences . 
By na ture , however, the hear t i s equally suscept ib le 
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to both the influences . The Divine element i s ffiided by 
Al-'Aql, I . e . reason and the satanic ele^ient is led by 
Ash-Shahwa l . e , appet i t ion and Al-Ghadab (Self a s s e r t i o n ) . 
But if appet i t ion and self asser t ion per'neate into the 
flesh and blood of man, and i t i s through them tha t ev i l 
rules and the heart beco-nes the abode of Satan, But if 
appet i te and hunger are ruled and brought under the subjec-
t ion of reason, the heart becomes the r e s t i n g place of 
angels. The Devil has many gates to enter the heart but the 
angels have only one, i , e , reason. The avenuesof the Devil 's 
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approach to the hc^rt are appetltion and se l f assfrtion, 
and thalr innumerable offshoots, for exaosple, envy, greed, 
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malice e tc . 
The alnd must be concentrated on God anct spiritual 
things, because "the concentration of the mlnS on God and 
spiritual things will greatly promote good ideas and check 
bad ori»s"» Ideas are naturally and necessari ly followed by 
inclination. Han cannot intervene (but s t i l l action are 
free), 
Al-(%azali further c lass i f i ed actions Into three types 
with reference to human reason and villi i 
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(1) Natural, (?) Intentional, (3) Voluntary. 
(1) iktmral ^Uoa ( Ai-fii-a-tabi-it 
The displacement of %rater is natural action and 
obviously unaffected by human wi l l . 
(8) |fltfi^t49flaL AffUgfl (Al«fll«al«Irada) 
If a drawn sword i s moved towards one*s head, 
his hand wil l be raised in self protection. This i s the 
exapinple of intentional action. Intentional actions are 
due to l^e consclousn^s of the evils to be avoided. They 
are not blind responses but conscious processes. When a 
sword is drawn, i t s percception comes to th* mind and the 
knovlede;e of the danger to be avoided is aroused at once. 
This gives r i s e to vo l i t ion and the vo l i t ion causes movemetot 
11 «» 
The nataral as \<ieH as intentional actions are both 
involuntaiT and necessary. The difference between the two 
is that the intentional action is precede?! by perception 
and knowledge, vihile in the natural action perception of 
object is not present. 
(3) VgmfltarY Agttgfl (Al-f i l -a l - Ikht iyar i ) 
All actions in which an internative i s possible and 
reason makes a choice, are volantary aotitans, for «ceynple, 
cotatTiitting suicide and most of our actions in our daily 
practical l i fe* In this respect we can say that things 
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presented to the isiad are of two types (1) those our in t ros -
pection or observation pronounces without deliberation as 
agreeable or disagreeable, N6 alternative is presented to 
tiie mind and ( i i ) those about which our reason hesitates to 
pronounce such a Judgment, Here an al ternat ive is presented 
to the mind and i t has to raake a selection. The &xmnpl9 of 
the f i r s t i s that of the novement of a needle towards our 
eyes. Here we know that the averting of the danger i s 
advantageous aM therefore we do not hes i ta te . On account 
of th is knowledge our will is at once formed and our power 
is roused to act in order to avoid the needle and eye-lids 
are at once closed. Though this action i s happened with 
intention, yet i t was without hesi tat ion and deliberation* 
Our actions where we have a choice are voluntary actions* 
In these eases reason hesi tates and jud^ent is with eld 
un t i l ve know whether the astlon uhich Is t^ be executed 
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la agr«eabl« or not and ve need to deliberate unti l the 
Inte l l ec t decides in favour of acceptance or reject ion. 
This, however, Is complex process during which the 
Satanic eleiaent in man tr ies to repel I t s Influence. The 
Inherent strength of the inst incts of appetltlon and se l f 
assertion, and tendencies formed by previous acts are 
factors ^ I d i ofien disturb the balance of this conf l i c t 
but when the i n t e l l e c t decides fln^^lly, It Is followed by 
the will to execute the actions. And the actiiwi w i l l be 
executed unless there are any external hlnderances In the 
way, e .g . sometimes the source of this wil l Is to shake 
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off th i s inert ia . 
In voluntary actions too wil l Is produced by knowledge 
as I t Is produced in the f i r s t kind of action, Therefore 
wil l ing or not wil l ing to do anything or knowledge of objects 
i s aust or essent ia l . 
Kmwledge i s one of the corner stone of AI-(9iazall's 
ethical system. Morality and good conduct are not possible 
wlthcMt knowledfee. 
In te l l ec t i s found In a l l men though differing In 
intensity and scope. In i t ia l ly i n t e l l e c t I s s 
potent ial i ty for the development of knowledge under 
conditions of experiences and In-tutlons. This know-
ledge has tvR) aspects, v i z . formal knowledge and 
existent ia l knowledge. The former Is the knowledge of the 
form in whldi the various objects of experience and Intution 
1 1 ! ! 
are apprehended. It is the knowledge of self evident 
principles• 
(1) Existential knowledge is the knowledge of the objects 
and events given in experience and intuition. It is of 
two kinds vljs,, phenoraenal and spiritual, T^ e knowledge 
of spiritual real i t ies , e .g . , God, soul etc, i s the h i ^ e s t 
form of knowledge. This knoidedge depends upon intuition 
(Hukashafa) but i t comes differently to different people. 
To some i t coraes through a good deal of self cultivation 
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(Mttjahlda) while to few i t i s revealed directly. 
Formal knowledge i s innate and eocistential knowledge 
i s acquired but both occur together, IRie highest develop-
ment culminates in the :^nowledge of the spiritual real i t ies . 
Theoretically the e is no limit to the possibil i t ies 
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of the devf^oi^ent of intel lect and knowledge, 
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Kno«iedfe serves a two-fold parpibse. It i s , f irst ly , 
an apprehension of objects and their significance; and 
secondly, a guide to conduct. Accordingly, intel lect or 
reason is considered to have two aspects v i s , , theoretical 
and practical, 
( i ) Theoreticalt- It goes from the concrete to the 
abstract, from the particular to general, froa the diversity 
to the unity, embracing wider and s t i l l wider fields under 
one principle as i t advaiKses, It too takes up towards the 
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transeed^tal worW and receives knoidedg* fro® i t such 
as knowledge of Qod, His attributes, His actloia, His angels, 
the mysteries of creation etc. Intuition i s nothing hut 
theoretical reason working at a higher plane, 
(11) Praotleal reason (al«A<|l<»aBll) Is the hand laade 
of thooretloal reason. It receives from theoretical reason 
i t s ennobling influence. But i t s active function l i e s In 
the domain of human conduct. It gives direction to volun-
tary individual acta. An Individual act of a saint or a 
patriot or an artist is guided by ideals coincelved by 
theoretical reassn, which influences the practical reason 
in most of i t s decision In individual act , Moreover, in 
opposition to reason which works for construetian there i s 
in the self a satanlo element \^lcb worlcs for destruction. 
Therefore, i t is essential that stll human faculties should 
remain under the absolute sway of practical reason, for 
when i t loses i t s supremacy over them, there follows the 
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wreck of human character. 
Sciences are of two kinds, Sharlyya (religious) and 
A^i^ya (Int^leetual) , 1!hese are the mearis to the puri-
fication of the self , which i s further a iaeans to the 
realisation of the ultimate end, the individuals begin 
to see in their laws not only the commands of God but also 
the true treys to the attainment of eternal happiness % i^ch 
become fard "ayan"," 
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Xlffl«a3L»}&iaoii0.a indudea the koovledge of Xbadat 
(oaa*a relation to God), adat (man** relation to man) and 
tha knoiAedge of good and bad ^ a l i t i e a of the soul, la 
reality the knoiAedge of these ^ a l i t l e e alone ia firdayan* 
The knowledge of these qualities is neoessary to lead one 
to the ultioate goal« llhis knoidedge alone is ilia-al* 
maoala* It Is the science of the various good QU^aities 
of the Sfilf l ike patience (Sabr}« thanl^fulttess (Shaker), 
fear (I^avf), hope CHaja)t and ahstenslon (Zuhd) etc* 
Ila»al*Makashafa is the end and the oulmination of 
iliB*al-HUi0>ala« It i s the highest end of man in this world. 
All huoao activities are directed to some end. 
Philosophers and divines in all times and all ages have 
been striving their utmost to disvooer and determine seme 
such end in txrder to realize the greatest happiness and 
0(»iplete satisfaction. This cherished end tsust be olt laate, 
beyond which nothing may be desired. This end. should define 
orientate the quality and character of man's behaviour 
endeavouring to attain i t , 
Al^Ohasali cal ls this end as 8a*aiaat (blessedness). 
He uses the term, however, for the end as well as for the 
means, Alodiazali considers the end and the means ttiat 
lead to i t as one entity, for anything which promotes the 
realisation of the ultimate endl in any sense becoraes part 
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of the end. "To l^ eep the dlstlnctlDn, he oual l f les the 
ultimate end as ^-Sa'ada, al-Ukhravisra or as Sa*ada al 
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Haqiqljra. But any means to the attainment of as>Sa*ada 
al Haqiqlya i s i t s e l f i s Sa'ada". 
ikl-Ohazali holds that the i^a'ada of evexything consists 
in the real ization of perfection to the nature of that 
particular thing. Pood and drink are Sa'ada of the animal 
nature whereas the apprehending of the essence of things i s 
characteristic to man alone. The perfection peculiar to man 
consists m his developing the hi.^er facult ies and appre-
hending truths l^ means of pure reason. Without the aid of 
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sense perception, these hii^er facul t ies never diminish 
and never lap«^e any painful consequences rather these 
facult ies always serve as fountains of pleasure being useful 
and beautiful i n ^ e highest degree* 
As Sa'ada al*Haqiqiya, %A)ich i s called Sunenum Bonum 
by other philosophers, i s the real isat ion of the v is ion of 
God in the next world. This will consists of seven elements. 
Life without sorrow, honour without disrespect, and knowledge 
without ignorance - aH these are to be ettfrnal without 
diminishing. This everlasting b l i s s , the coo^lete end or 
ideal wi l l be achieved by one's love of God and demonstrated 
by one*s conduct in this world. But the i n t e m l t y of love 
to'^ards Ood i s conditioned Iqr one's knowledge of God. 
Thus i t means that knowledge i s the highest Sa'ada, the 
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•upp«ae end in th i s worlfl, fgr I t leads ta perfect l^ve, 
when I t Is soaet>t as an end In i t s e l f I t i s absolutely 
But the highest Sa 'ada , Al-£»Tia«all wr i t e s , "consis ts 
in the apprehension of the true nature of I n t e l l e c t u a l 
t ru ths free fr(»i senseless iasagination. Ue de l ivers reason 
from I t s bondage and begins to study not only the heaven and 
earth vlth thought-fulness and deep observation but s l s o 
h is own soul and the wonders created there in and thereby 
reaches the perfeetlr»i pecul iar to hlra. He achieves Sa 'ada, 
tha t i s , the achlev^ent of perfect ion by soul i s the hlsjhest 
63 Sa»%da \.*ilch I t not possible In t h i s world, 
SCfifttfii an ^ill» 
yben a maji understards the fu l l s igni f icance of an 
ob.1ect and the d e s i r a b i l i t y of seeking I t , an yearninj? Is 
aroused In hla to achieve tha t object by adopting appro-
p r i a t e means. This yearning Is Irada, 
Now we have to see whether t h i s Irada can be ful« 
f i l l e d with his will f ree ly or I t I s determ:lned by other 
forces , MUtaellltes say tha t ^an possess power (qudrah) 
over his action and he is re«l author of h is ac t ions , there-
fo r e , h i s will is f ree to do or not to do anything. But 
according to Asharltes man has the determined freedom. 
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Origin of ac t ion , they say, Is In Ood but campletlan of 
act ion Is In taan. They put forward the theory of acquis i -
t ion (Kasb). 
In Oha«all*s system we find tha t to blm the process 
of freedoa and determlnatl(xi of wil l recognised to be 
beyond asaii*8 complete control} but his reason i s f ree to 
•nake a decis ion and his will Is to accept the decision of 
reason as eood and to implement the correspondIni? ac t ion . 
In such a ease , jnan would be f ree to do what he des i res but 
the complete control of h i s des i re would be beyond his power. 
Thus Al-Ohassli t r i e s to reconci le between freedom and 
determinism, 
Al-Ohazall bases his arsument fo r the freedtws of will 
on his conception of the world as cons is t ing of three r e a l i -
t i e s , v l f . , physical (idam al-Mulk), the mental (AIQJR a l -
Jabrut) ,and the s p i r i t u a l ( Alam al Malakut). 
"The lower i s the material world where the absolute 
necessity of God's will is a l l in a l l . Secondly i t i s the 
st«?:e of the sensous anr! the phys 'cal world where the re la -
t ive s^rt of freedom Is recoi?nlfed. Last ly coRes Qod '^o 
54 Is absolutely f r ee" . 
Man possesses sora© degree of f r r e w i l l , t he re fo re , 
human character i s capable of improvement, withcwt tMs 
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p;>s8iblllty I t would eease to hav« any aeanlng and a l l 
I f ^ t rue t lons , exhortat ion, eaue^tion an*? sel f d lac lp l ln* 
would be of no purpose a t a l l . Thouj^ h he admits also the 
l imi t s beyoni which humsn effor ts cannot change one's 
charac te r , for i n s t ance , man only re ia^a tes and d i sc ip l ines 
bis passions but cannot root them out , nor, of course , I t 
i s des i rab le tha t he should do so , fo r '^dtbiMit theaa l i f e 
wDuld be not only imperfect but alsa impossible. 
Al-Qhaz^ll discusses the nature of character under 
56 
three h^adst 
(1) That ii^ieh i s wholly e v i l , i t i s overpowered by 
passiorw and obejrs the i r d i c t a t e s gladly, Ttie l i s ^ t of 
reason i s almost shut t o i t . I t makes no d i s t i n c t i o n bet-
ween hififher and lower s<»lf, for the lower se l f has b«com« 
the ideal to i t . This a t t i t u d e of hufnan soul Is designated 
by the Quran as ao-lfafs al Anaaarah, the insinuat ing se l f , 
(?) "That which Is unset t led and wavering In making the 
choice between ijood and ev i l aral i s constant ly subject to 
an inner strugji?le on th i s account. I t i s capable of doing 
both good and e v i l . I t fee l s the c lear d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the lower and higher se l f , but finds i t s e l f t o t a l l y unable 
t o cope with the powerful impulses of the baser se l f which 
bursts forth occasionally. This a t t i t u d e is named by the 
Quran as fiafs-al Lawwarrsa ( the repro-^ching s e l f ) " . 
] 2 i ] 
(?) The f ixedly g-yod and illuffilned cansclDuness, I t has 
received the l l ^h t and therefore always acts according to 
the d i c t a t e s of reason. This i s the stgpje where the d i s -
t inct ion between the tvo selves vapurs away for the higher 
w '^dch is the t rue sel f ^nd has now become the master. This 
free-'om Is not absolute , yet I t is the paramount iraportance, 
for I t I s so^**l<*i^'it to affect the necess??ry cisauvre in 
56 biMan charac te r . 
Thus the above different character* p r w e tha t there 
la freer^om In action to man because t h r o u * th is freedom 
of wi l l raan can change h is charac ter . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of man for his act ion i s s t ressed by the Qarnn i n unequl-
vocnl t e n « , for i n s t ance , "Every souJ i s pledged for I t s 
own deeds, Lo,Allah i s swift at reckoning," 
Nowhere in the Quran has the r e spons ib i l i t y for human 
action been a t t r ibu ted t o God, Secondly, whenever the 
r e spons ib i l i t y for any undesirable act has been ascribed 
to Ood by way of inference from his omnipotence an'l omni-
sc ience , the Qursn has denied the v a l i d i t y of t h i s inference 
mrvi has condemned i t as a product of sheer ia:norance and 
fancy, "Tbey, who are i so l a to r s will say ? Had 411ah wil led, 
we had not ascribed Cunto Hi?») c r t n e r , ne i ther had our 
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fa ther nor had we forbidden ou^ht". 
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Naw If man I s responsible far h is a c t s , h« aust hav« 
full free'^ora of wi l l ing and doing those a c t s . Thus I t shows 
t h s t ^an has fre©4!«« of w i l l . 
But the dllraima conies when man can make or mar himself 
he Is f ree to choose; while on the other hand "God stands 
as the Disposer of everything, Nothlno; happens without His 
wi l l , VJhoB He wllls^ He jsuldes a r l ^ t and whom He wi l l s He 
leads a s t r a y , He wishes and decl^^es what He chooses. All 
tha t happens in heaven and earth are froa Hlra," To under-
stand th i s apparently f?ouble tendency vdth regard t o the 
freedoa *>n^ determinism of vdll or In other words the res-
pons ib i l i ty of action a t t r ibu ted to "Sod and man a lau l tane-
ously, we \f have t o turn t o another as ,^c t of th i s problem 
v i z . , the theory of causat ion, 
Al-Ohazall, l i k e Hune, seven hundred years befor«, 
holds the sequence theory and re jec ts the eff iciency theory 
of causat ion, Al-Ghazall denies that "a thing can proiace 
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anything". There is no power in the cause to produce the 
e f fec t . There is no causal conriectlon between th ings , they 
are not connpcted but con.lolned, * see on«? thing preceding 
the other over and over ae;aln and throuejh habit berln to 
think tha t they are connected. There i s nothing; as a cuase 
which produces ef fec t . The only fact is ths t antecedents 
have consenuents. 
U"s 
God alone Is the e f f ic ien t cause but the Ignorant 
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have misunderstood and misapplied the word power. 
As to the orderly succession l e t I t to be understood 
that the two events are conjoined l i k e r e l a t i o n between 
the condit ion and the conditioned. Now c e r t a i n condit ions 
are very apparent ^ni e^n be knovn e a s i l y even by man of 
l i t t l e understanding. But there are con'!ltlong which are 
understood only by those who see throuf>:h llrrht of I n t u i t i o n . 
There I s divine purpose l lnk ln? the antecedents to 
the conseouents and manifesting I t s e l f In the ex is t ing 
orderly succession of events without l e a s t breach or I r -
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r e « ^ l a r l t y , \* cannot say tha t l i f e has been ewused by the 
body though body Is the condit ion of l i f e . In the same way 
we must Iniae^lne the orderly succession of events in the 
universe, 
"Veri ly , says the (Jiran, "WB did not c rea te the 
heavens and the earth and what Is between them In spor t j 
we did not c rea te them but with t r u t h . But most of them 
do not know". 
God created l i f e , knowledge, wi l l and action anrj, on 
the other , He created an order ( a system) as external to 
these thlnf»s. These Items must conform to the order which 
I s external to them yet Imposed upon them, th is order of 
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sucesslon Is obligatory and necessary and I t Is the r e s u l t 
, 63 
of Dlvln© planning (al-hlkmat a l - a z a l l y a ) . 
JG.-Ghazali, as we have seen, denies cause in the 
sense of power of e f f ic ien t forces x^en applied to things 
oth6r than God, The ef f ic ien t cause is only one. According 
to him there i s only one e te rna l power wt^ich is the cause 
of a l l created things an ' th;^t is Grod. 
From one point of view man himself i s the author of 
h i s ac t ion , from another i t is God, On the one hand we 
see tha t "the r e l a t i o n of man's act ion to h is power and 
wi l l i s l ike the connection of the conditioned with the 
condi t ion. And on the other we observe thsit the r e l a t i on 
of man's actions to the Divine powers i s liVe the connec-
t ion of the ef fect with i t s cause. But by common usage 
anything which is v i s i b l y connected vith power, though i t 
be only the abode or channel (Mahal) power, i s regarded as 
"Cause". God as a c rea t ive power i s the r ea l cause of 
man's act ion but ma:! i s the apparent cause of actions for 
i t i s through him that the manifestation of uniform 
succession of events takes p lace . One who a t t r i b u t e s a l l 
his action" to God has found the truth and has reached the 
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real source. 
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That \n hav« the apparent paradox that man I t 
65 determined in his freedom. The Asharltes use for this 
kind of determined freedom the word "Kasb". 
When f i re burnsi I t burns out of necessity (jabr); 
i t i s completely determined, God* on the contrary, i s 
vholly free , Man*s position l i e s mlr^ vay between these two. 
He I s not dateroined as f i r e , nor as free as God. "Kasb" 
(acquisition) i s neither against freedom nor against deter-
minism. For those who have ins ight , i t i s the sum of these 
two. "God's action i s Ikhtiar, but that of man Is not 
l ike that of God, because man's will is formed after hesi-
tation and deliberation which Is Irapossible in the case of 
God, Deliberation i s due to Iqck of knowledge, God's 
knowledge is perfect. He nee^ s^ no deliberation "for His 
Ikhtiar, i . e . choice. I ts ( f i n i t e mind) freedom wil l be 
neither complete agreement with the ide??l of goodness but 
i t wi l l exclude subordination to the forces beyond I t s e l f 
and I t wi l l give opportunity for choosing aJid serving the 
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good". 
The word cause is used In the Quran In different senses, 
"The angel of death who i s given charge of you shall cause 
you to die; then to your lord you shall be brought back. 
All take their souls when they die" Have you considered 
%ihat you saw. "So you did not slay themj i t was Allah who 
slew them and thou, didst not smite when thou didst smite 
i;ii 
but i t was Allah vho smote that. He might confer upon 
the believers a good g i f t from Himself, Whatever good 
befalleth thee (0 , man) i t i s from Allah and whatever of 
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i l l befalleth thee I t i s from t h y s e l f . 
legation affirms Ood as the real and ef f ic ient cause. 
Affirmation establishes man's free wi l l fa i th fu l ly execut-
ing divine order. 
The above verses show that the word 'Cause' s igni f ies 
creative power and must be applied to God alone. But man's 
power i s the image of ('od's power to him. The word has been 
applied only in i t s secondary sense. God 11 alone the real 
e f f i c i ent cause and the word must be applied to Him in i t s 
roDt sense, i . e . power. The existence of a l l other things 
depends upon Him. Everything i s in His grip. He i s the 
eternal and the everlasting. He i s the manifest and the 
hidden. He Is the f i r s t and the l a s t . He i s the eternal 
and f i r s t as compared with a l l created things. They have 
•nanated from Him. One after another i s an orderly succe-
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ss ion. He i s the las t from the view point of the speaker. 
In the spir i tual progress of nan He i s the l a s t stage 
to be reached. So He i s the f i r s t in existence and the 
l a s t in experience. 
All act iv i ty mental or material begins and terminates 
i n Him, who is the f i r s t cause, the mover and fashioner of 
i:n' 
th« universe, 
Therefcjrei those acts are good which ultimately 
terminate In the f i r s t cause or the mover of the universe, 
I . e . God, which i s the ultimate eni of man. If the actions 
terminate in things oVner than God or against the wish of 
God, they become e v i l . 
According to Al-C»iazall, ev i l s are the unethical 
aspects of the natural propensities of man, "The love 
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of this world i s the root of a l l the e v i l s . If the self 
i s to attain i t s perfe-^tions, these propensities must obey 
the dictates of reason. But i t often happens that they dis -
obey reason and transgress their proper l imit and bring 
the se l f to humiliation and gradual decay. I t i s th is trans^ 
gression which takes the shape and colour of so many e v i l s . 
Evi l s , Vtien are the wrong development of human propensities 
irtiich ttct as v e i l s between man and his goal. For example, 
when knowledge or reason is rightly developed and becomes 
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perfect, i t i s wisdom. I t has two parts. First part v i z . , 
theoret ical , Is directed to higher regions. It can dist in-
guish the true from the false in Jud©nent, the right from 
70 the wror^ in tenets and good from ev i l in action. I t i s 
the knowledge of abstract and universal truth which holds 
good for al l times, i . e . the knowledge of God." 
The second part v i z . , pract ical , i s directed to lower 
regions. It controls appetltlons, se l f assertions and 
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their niaierous offshoots and helps to from a l l personal 
and social virtues . 
But when this wisdom develops wrongly, I t manifests 
the ev i l s of Daha (craft iness) , Humq (stupidity) and junun 
(mania) e tc . 
Daha (craft iness) l i e s in selecting means wliich are 
not straight forimrd, and are apparently but not actually 
go->d for realizing one's motive. A low and unfair motive 
i s Jarbaza (decelt fulness) . 
Humq (stupidity) i s to adopt the wron^ method for the 
Realization of ends and jumin (mania) i s the derangement of 
the power of imagination, A majunun i s ever in for a prepos-
terous end, wandering away from whnt i s natural and reason-
able. Humq consists in conniting choice of errors in the choice 
of 
/means, but Junun i s mistaken aboilt the end i t s e l f . 
When self assertion Is r ightly developed i t bngets 
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following V irtues. 
Kibr-al Nafs ( se l f respect) i s the mean between pride 
and se l f abasement. I t helps man to understand the right 
valuation of events. 
Ihtimal (endurance) i s the mean between rashness and 
eowardice. I t means remaining calm in d i f f i cu l t and painful 
cireumstanoes. 
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Hiia (forbearance) I s the mean between cruel and 
heartless revenge on the one hand and lack of self respect 
on the other. I t makes a man dignified. 
Thabat (firmness) i s to be stout of heart and unflinching 
in courage, 
Shahama (gravity) Is to devote oneself eagerly and 
constantly t s good acts for the real izat ion of goodness 
and beauty. 
Maqar (weightiness) is the mean between pride and 
humility. I t i s to bear oneself with propriety and good 
demeanour. 
Bat self assertioni i f developed in excess of reason 
and appetition, beco";^ rashness (tahavawur) and i s mani-
fested in the following evi l s , 
Badhdcha (lavishness) i s to spend on vani t ies , l ike 
• elf-adori»!ient| etc, for ostentation, self glorif icat ion, 
or boasting, 
Badhala (meanness) i s not to have the heart to spend 
money even when i t i s one*s moral duty to do so and yet te 
boast of one*s large heartedness. 
Sighr-al Nafs (self abasement) i s to have no confidence 
in one->self and to thijnk one-self Inferior and unwor^y of 
self assertion. 
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Infirak (shaaelessness) ! • to I w o a l l «elf respect 
and r&aaln ursnoved even at the grossest insu l t . 
Uhen appetitlon Is rightly developed and In right 
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relationship vith reason and courage, i t i s iffah (chastity 
or temperance) vhich begets virtues such as ( i ) Haya( Modesty), 
and IQiajal (shyness) are the mean betveen l icentiousness 
and prudery. Some hold that i t i s a feeling of humility 
aroused by consciousness of his in fer ior i ty . Vlhen a person 
meets another superior to him, th is consciousness acts as 
a protection for the soul and helps one to avoid e v i l . 
(11) I^ Jsamaha (forgiveness) i s to forego certain 
rights wi l l ingly In favour of others. It i s the means 
betveen complete reraandation and over Insistence on one's 
r ights , 
( i i i ) Sabr (patience) i s the struggle of ttie se l f 
against passions and appetitlon, and keeping oneself away 
from low and unlawful pleasures, ( iv ) Sakha, (v) Husn-at-
taqdir (ab i l i ty for good estimation), (v i ) Inbis at (cheer-
fulness) , ( v i i ) Damatha (gentleness of disposi t ion) , 
( v i i i ) Husn al-Haiyat (pleasing appearance), ( i x ) Wiara 
( p i e t y ) , (x) Zarf (gracefulness and v i t ) , and (x i ) Musada 
(helping others) e tc , 
(b) But If this appetitlon i s developed in ^ c e s s of 
reason md s e l f assertion, the following ev i l s arm produced. 
y.if> 
U a^ahft (fhameleasnesa) la to Indulge In vice shamelesaly 
and without fear of disgrace or dlshontjur, 
Rlva (hypocrisy) Is to hariker after securing the 
praise and respect of people, although one may not deserve 
them. 
Shakaaa (barbarity) Is to be remorseful and sullen with 
men and behave with them In a repulsive Planner. 
Has ad (envy) Is to fee l unhappy at the sucess and 
happiness of deserving people and to desire their downfall 
e tc . 
(c) The deficiency of appetltlon produces these ev i l s i 
T'^ f^lmniliWth (effimlnacy) i s to fee l an excess of shyness 
so that one is constrained and cannot talk and act freely, 
Hatka (d Is (gracefulness) Is to indulge in vice and 
not care to elevate one* s s e l f wltti virtue, 
Shamatah (wicked glee at another's misfortune) i s to 
f e e l happy over the failures and d i f f i cu l t i e s of people to 
blame th«n for their fault etc . 
To keep the golden mean between knoifledge, appetitlon 
and se l f assertion and to maintain between them right 
proportions the most needed thing i s Justice. Justice 
requires that one should f u l f i l one's duties. Everything 
should be placed in I t s proper place, I . e . , Inhabitants 
divided into trades or classes each with definite duties 
assigned to i t . 
Thfls the ffwr cardinal v ir tues , according to Al-Ghazall, 
are visdora., Courage, temperance and just ice . Al-Ghazali 
followed Plato closely and has pointed out that in al l 
voluntary actions i t i s the functiDn of reason to direct 
to hold the balance between appetition and s e l f assertion 
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and keep them under i t s sway. 
Besides these ev i l s there are nany other ev i l s related 
to the bo<^ and the world, 
Man has been endowed with the sexual inst inct for the 
propagation and oreserv^tlon of his race, but the e x c ^ s 
love of the wife may distract him from God. "The lustful 
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glance is the root of the ev i l ," 
The other i s Pride, "It i s subjective and objective". 
The subjective pride is a habit of the se l f , and the objec-
t i v e pride i s the action resul t i g fron this habit. There 
are two evi ls of pride, the refusal to accept truth and the 
contempt of fellowship. The worst pride i s that which does 
not allow one to acc^ire knowledge an^ accept the truth. 
There are three causes of pride. One 1? in the man who i s 
proud, the other i s in the attitude towards the person In 
relat ion to whom one i s proud. The third i s related to some 
1 ;i -^  
third object outside the other two, the cause \«hlch la 
In the proud man la vanity or self-admiration, l*en one 
admires oneself on account of knowledge e t c , | one regards 
oneself superior to others. The cause which i s in the person 
in relat ion to vhom one is proud i s rancc»ir and envy. Ihe 
cause which Is outsl'^e these two Is hypocrisy. So in fact 
there are four causes such as vanity, rancour, envy and 
hypocrisy. "Humanity i s the mean between pri'^e and d i s -
honour. God lovei moderation in action," 
Evil of th i s world are many but the greatest of them 
i s the love of Wealth, love of hono-jr etc. This love Is often 
accompanied with suffering and misery. I*alth and "Jah" 
are desirable only as n«ans and not as an end. 
One HRist understand one's end on this earth and realiz© 
t^rnt the true salvation l i e s not in th i s world but in the 
next world in the love of Qod, 
Love of God: But what i s the essence of love and 
what are i t s causes and conditions^} especial ly \iHiat i s the 
meaning of the love of the creature for Allah? Love i s 
natural turning to an object which gives pleasure. It 
springs from perceptions and varies with them being either 
from sense perception whose seat is in the heart. The 
pleasure through i t i s the most complete and •bsolute. 
1 3 ! ) 
A man loves by nature f i r s t himself far the conti-
mianee and perfection of his se l f . Then he loves another 
than himself because that other serves the saroe purpose 
and benefits him. Thirdly, he loves a thing for I t s own 
saVe not for any happiness that It brings, but the thing 
I t s e l f Is his happiness l ike the love of beauty simply for 
i t s e l f . So If It stands fast that Allah Is beautiful H« 
must certainly be loved by him. To him His beauty Is 
revealed. Beauty of mental and moral <|ualltles can be 
loved. But l a s t l y there Is often a secret relationship of 
souls between the lovers an*? the beloved and It suff ices , 
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I t follows, in the absolute sense, there Is Allah only. 
Al-aha«all explains how God holds al l the causes that 
Inspire man to love. Therefore, He alone Is worthy of love. 
1*10 love ob,1ects other th?n God do not h^ve the real knowled?»e 
of God. The real knoVleds^e of God i s the source of the love 
of God, 
Since man loves the se l f he laast lov<!> God liio is his 
Creator and also the Creator of wh t he desires in the 
matter of his preservation and perfection. Man cannot 
achieve anything without His grace and blessing. 
Man cannot t^ike a single step without the help of 
God, He Is guided by spiritual forces. These forces i n f l -
uence man tiirou^h his reason. The influence, conditions, 
circumstances e t c . , which help man to walk in the path of 
1 K 
Allah, are cal led tawflq, the gif t of God. Tawflq mani-
fes t s I t s e l f in /different forms such as (1) Hldaya ( the 
guidafKse of Ood). No v i r tue i s possible without Hidaya. 
This i s the source and fountain of a l l v i r t u e s . One may 
have the des i re to d-> good in order t o r e a l i z e the e te rna l 
b l i s s . But i t wi l l be of no avai l unless he knows what i s 
good and what i s bad, Hidaya points out c l e a r l y what to do 
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and what not to do. 
"And i t may be th t you d i s l i k e a thing while i t i s 
good for you and i t may be that you love a thing \*ille i t 
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i s e v i l for you, and God knows while you do not know" and 
" i t may be tha t y->u d i s l i k e a thing while God has placed 
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abundant good in i t " and "Vho i s more erring than tbev who 
follow t h e i r des i res without any guidarwe from Sod", 
Hidaya has three stages* the f i r s t sta^je i s at tained 
when the d i s t i n c t i o n between good and evi l becomes c l ea r , 
8? 
And we pointed out to him two d i s t i n c t paths . "To so-ne 
t h i s d i s t i nc t i on i s much c lear by means of reason ond to 
some i t comes through the Prophet and "cer ta in ly the guidance 
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has come to them from the i r Lord", If one does not follow 
i t . I t i s one's own f a u l t , the pursui t of aupet l tes and 
Passions blinds a man from seeking to the r l»h t path. The 
second stage is achieved when man is cont inual ly helped by 
God, This i s achieved by hard work in the way of Allah, 
by good conduct, piety and knowledge, "And those who follow 
1U 
th# r igh t direct! :)na, He shal l Increase them In guidance 
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and give them piety. The th i rd ataf^e of guidance Is tha t 
of Prophethood, This I s the highest stgge vihen the mean-
ings of s p i r i t u a l t ru ths become c lear as a day. This Is 
the absolute guidance. 
(2) Rushd ( the d i rec t ion) Is tha t blessing of God 
(Canaya-al-Haqiqiya) which helps man to r e a l i z e his end. 
If the end i s good I t strengthens him according to h is 
c a p a c i t i e s , If the end i s bad I t weakens him. This help 
or deser t ion Is from within. For ac t ion , Bushd i s more 
important thsn Hidaya. 
Tasdid ( the s e t t l t ^ ar ight) I s a gulr^snce which makes 
the body obey the will In order to r e a l i z e the end, Tasdid 
makes in te rna l and external circumstance accord with the 
w i l l , t o help man in his acts In te rna l ly through h is ins igh t 
and external ly by providing su i tab le condit ions wherein he 
may achieve the desired end with the means at h i s d i sposa l . 
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"Vhen I strengthened thee with the Holy s p i r i t " indicates 
tha t there a l ights something from God in the hear t of man, 
which urges him to do good and absta in from e v i l . There is 
sooething ins ide the man which chec' s him vrithout being 
f e l t . 
The specia l grace of God shal l cone t o him i n due 
course of time gnd he will a t t a i n the highest f e l i c i t y 
1'.1! 
of th« knowledge of God through Ilm-al-Mukashfa more or 
leas according to h i s capnclty snd meri t , for God i« Just 
and merciful . Let TiaJi do h is part and r e s t content t h a t 
God wi l l do His, The question of Grace In the Philosophy 
of Ai-Ghazall Is irrevocgbly bound up with human e f f o r t s . 
Nettling hovever t r i f l i n g can be acquired without human 
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v o l i t i o n , God favours those who endeavour In His way." 
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St^iori A 
St, Thomas Aquinas was a t h e l t t . He occupied a dla-
tlngulabed posltltm In the his tory of Chr is t ian phllosaphy 
and re l ig ion in the mldf^le ages. He wss firmly convinced 
of the truth of repealed r e l i g ion . He was s incere In his 
be l ie f that the teachlni? of the Church i s In accordance 
with reason and a l t h ^ g h , a t t imes, some revealed t ruths 
raay be supra reason, but they are never contradictory to 
reason. 
This great philosopher and Theologian was bron in 
1PP5 A.D, in I t a ly , In 1P44 A.D,, at the a^e of nineteen 
years , he received the degree of Master in Philosophy from 
Naples Wnlverslty. Though his parents did not 11 e to give 
him a r e l ig ious education yet he , according to his ovm choice, 
studied Domini c i^ w courses In philosophy and theology. 
In 1P62 A.D, he s t a r t ed teaching at the University of 
Pa r i s . Then he spent almost ten years in Doralnleian monas-
t r i e s in the v i c i n i t y of Rome lec tur ing in Theology and 
Philosophy, In 1P68 he G<^me back to the Universi ty of » ar ia 
and taught there t i l l 1P7?, "There he was enga<»ed in three 
d i f ferent cont rovers ies : (1) Against a group of cons rva t lve 
Theologians who were o r l t l c i l of his phi losophical innovations 
(11) Against cer ta in radical advocates of ArlstotellanlsTi or 
Latin AverosiST! and ( i l l ) Against some c r i t i c s of doralnleian 
\'ib 
1 
and Franciscan an^ ^ the i r ri!»ht t o teach at Universi ty", 
In l^P he was sent t o Naples In or'^er to erect a 
"Domlnlc«n Studiclan Qen^  r a t e " vihere hf= continued h is 
professor ia l a c t i v i t y u n t i l 1?74, where l ope Gre?roy ^ 
sufrmoned him to attenr! the council but he diec! on the Timy 
at th© Cis terc ian monastery of Fossanuova betvjtcn Naples 
2 
and Rome on Harch 7, 1?74. 
His philosophy i s a r e s u l t of re thinking of Ar i s to t l e -
nism. I t a lso re f lec t s some of the thiricin)^ of The Greek 
Corar.entators on Ar i s to t l e ard of Cicro, Avicena, Avoros, 
and ^amonipds besides s toic ism, Neo-Platonis'^ and Augusten-
lanism. He was not subservient to the author i ty of Ar i s to t l e , 
As he himself says , "The object of phlloaophic-sl study i s not 
to know one's oolnlon of Ar i s to te l i an rhtlosophy but the 
3 
t ru th of th ings ," He VBS ?I Catholic f i r s t an^ an Ar i s to te l ian 
afterwards. His philosophy I s a c^iiplete reconstruct ion; 
therefore in ce r t I n fundamentals he is raore Platonic than 
4 
Ar i s to t e l i an . " Thus Aquinas had a very r e a l i s t i c anrl 'dynamic 
approach in Philosophy, He believes tha t man*s opinion 
l l ' - i i ts the c i r c l e of h i s thought in philosophy and tha t the 
rethinking and reconst ruct ! 'n should continue t i l l the t ruth 
of c e r t a i n concept I s found out, Conseifuently h is ihilosophy 
i s not a r e s u l t of dart ing and swetpin? concepts based upoh 
the opinions of othfrrs but i t i s a rethinkinf? of the Arlstote-
I4i) 
11 an Philosophy, 
Aquinas ba l l eves thgt "God and angels are pure forms 
5 
without matter but man is not a pure s p i r i t , he possesses 
a soul or form which i s united with a material body. In 
this sense he ado^jted Ar i s tDt le ' s d e f l n i t i a n of soul as 
6 
the "form or ac tua l i t y ^f an organic body". The union of 
matter and form gives r i s e to concrete indtvldu-^l existence 
or substance. There i s a sca le of exis tence , a chain of 
being, in the universe. At the lower end -)f wMch are the 
Inorganic substances, whilst at the summit i s God, a purely 
s p i r i t u a l Being, There i s a lso a h le rach ica l order in 
non-living objec ts . In the lodestone the forn seems to 
display ce r t a in a c t i v i t i e s over and above i t s function of 
conferring being of a de f in i t e kind upon the matter which 
i t forms. Uhen we ascend the s ca l e , we reach a point at 
which form manifests power* and a c t i v i t i e s apar t from the 
7 
matter In which i t i s r ea l i zed . The l i v i n g plant has a 
n u t r i t i v e soul , and animal has a sens i t ive soul and the form 
i s able to organize the matter t o a fur ther decree of per-
fec t ion but p l a n t ' s v i t a l a c t i v i t i e s are exercised on the 
mater ia l l eve l v<hlle animal has sense organs and i s able 
to receive the form of gn object whlthout i t s matter and 
hlgheranlmal i s capable of forming mental images too. 
But man i s a cre^^ture viho can transcend immediate percep-
1W 
t ion by the use of reason. Because human soul i s the 
highest and noblest of forrrss, i t excels corporeal matter i n 
i t s power by the f ac t that i t hgs an operation and a power 
i n which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power 
8 
i s called the I n t e l l e c t . 
Soul I s simply that by which we l i v e . As soon as the 
9 
f i r s t slpn of l i f e appears, soul Is present . He accepted 
10 
the pr inc ip le v i z . , "the uni ty of Form", Only one subs-
t a n t i a l form cqn be rf-alized In the matter of 3n object as-
the buaian soul 19 the subs tan t i a l form of the body, vhich 
i s i n t e l l e c t u a l soul . This i n t e l l e c t u a l snul contains the 
sens i t ive a«l n u t r i t i v e soul; I t means that I t contains a l l 
i n f e r i o r forms and I t s e l f alone does, whatever the imperfect 
forms do in other th ings . Thus St . Thomas Aquinas represents 
"the powers of the s a i l i n ascending h le rach ica l order as 
vegeta t ive , s e n s i t i v e , a p p e t i t i v e , locomotive and i n t e l l e c -
t u a l " . 
1? 
"He i s a de f in i t e opponent of material ism". In r e s -
pect of sense-perception he follows Ar is to t le c lose ly . He 
adal t s that sense is necessary to i n t e l l e c t "Nihil es t In 
13 
IntellectUQUod non prlus fUerlt in sensu". He further 
says , that sense i s not a material facu l ty , i t receives 
the fora of an external object without i t s mat ter . Tb him, 
t o believe tha t l i k e l a fnown by l i k e i s an error of GSreek 
I'.'^  
t h inke r s , who thought tha t the form of the object knoyn 
must be i n the knower In the same way as i t existed in the 
object . Acjuinas re jec ts th i s and says nothing corporeal 
can affect that which i s immaterial "i^Lhil corporeum imprimere 
14 
potes t i n rem incorporeum". He also stBers c lear of ••sub-
16 
Jec t ive ideal ism. 
He fur ther distJnguishes between sense In p o t e n t i a l i t y 
and sense in ac tua l i t y . In the former case , the actual ob-
j e c t i s external to the soul , i n tiie l a t t e r , the sensible 
form in the object and the soul are one, "The d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the knover and the object known has been p a r t i a l l y 
16 
transcende'^ i n the act of knowing. 
He recognizes fivp external senses arranged i n hiera> 
chical order. Vision i s the highest because i t i s the l e a s t 
material touch, lliese senses are imperfect due to matter . 
There is also a G»n on sense which is able to discriminate 
between the reports of d i f ferent senses and r e l a t e them to 
the object perceived which i s tiirough mental images (Fhan-
tasmata) . At the sense level other powers are v i s , , 'Aes t i -
mattva* and v i s . , ' cogn i t a t lva* . Former Leads an animal to 
recognize the u t i l i t y or the harmful proper t ies of an object . 
And the l a t t e r implies a kind of Judg«nent and choice. But 
in human being i n s t i n c t directed by i n t e l l i g e n c e i s the v i s , , 
co(»nitatlve, t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r re«5Son, %us in th i s 
I4 ; i 
hierarch ica l arrangement of the powers of the soul we f ind, 
we are brought ly staeses ta the very threshold of reason. 
The higher powers of sense In t h e i r operation foreshadow 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t e l l i gence . As he hloiself says , 
"The cognl ta t lve nrv^ T^moratlve powers In -^ lan owe the i r 
excellence m t to th^st which i s proper to the sens i t ive 
pa r t , but to a ce r t a in a f f in i ty and approxlmity to th# unl-
17 
versal reason, which, so to speak, overflows Into them". 
Human soul has the power of thought which i s not exer-
cised through a bodily organ, "Like the soul of the b ru te , 
the human soul i s the form of body, but unlike the former, 
s ince i t does not need a bodily organ, and what can function 
per s e , can e x i s t per se , i t i s a s e l f - subs i s t ing s p i r i t u a l 
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substance". 
Angelic in t e l l i gences are pure forms, above the human 
soul , knowing immaterial things i n t u i t i v e l y without any 
process, Man occupies the in te rned la te posi t ion between 
lower forms of animals and pure form or s o i r i t u a l exis tence, 
l . e , angle. Here he di f fers fr">m Ar i s to t l e regarded man 
as "a l i t t l e higher than the dogs and c a t t l e while he lays 
emphasis on his kinship with the angles". 
About the crea t ion of soul he says that soul and body 
were created simultaneously by God who infused soul i n t o body 
15 
19 
from without. 
In rtspect of Individuality he regards "matter as the 
principle of individuation because Form is universal and i s 
PO 
coonon to a l l members of the species. 
He further says that soul is i?nmortal» To prove the 
ifflmateriality of the soul , he based his argu-nent upon the 
fact that the essence of a material body consists of exten-
sion in three dimentlons. Extension i s due to the presence 
of the form of corporeality, "All matter i s clothed with 
the form of corporeality so that i f anything i s incorporeal, 
21 
i t must be imoaterial". Secondly he develops another view, 
due to Averroes, which depends on the doctrine of "indeter-
22 
mlnate dimensions". But later he was not sat i s f ied and 
he Says one cannot define a particular, one can only Point out 
to a l l . 
He furthrr argues that "matter taken in I t s general 
meaning Is not the principle of individuation l»at only 
* materia signata* - I . e . matter in a determinate sense, 
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In other words, matter under determinate dlraenslon". The 
term •materia signita* seems to have been borrowed frtsn 
Avicenna who ca l l s i t 'materia demonstrata* • Thus the d i s -
t inct ion of corporeal things i s due to 'matt^ria s igni ta* , 
e.g. Plato and Socrates are both men by virtue of possessing 
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th« form of humahlty but Plato Is dlitlngulshed from 
Socrates by h i i tJat^rla s ignl ta , I . e . In disposit ion, tam-
perantent and character they are different personalit ies". 
"The soul eventually, depends upon cert9ln features of 
the individual's envlroment, his use or misuse of free wil l 
and hit oo-operation with the Creator through the Means of 
26 
Grace**. Man's fUlly developed personality, however, Is 
largely due to the individual's own effort and the enviroo-
fflental influences brought to bear upon him. His original 
disposition can be modified thrnigh eixperlence, training 
and education and as a creatures possessing free wi l l they 
can build up for themselves certain qual i t ies of character 
which can be furthc^r refined and developed through the Opera-
tion of Divine Grace Soul's individuality i s due to the 
<juantifled matter of the bor»y. But in the case of hum?jn 
soul, Ood Is the a^nt j^ho adapts each soul to a particular 
body, and i t Is because of His e f f ic ient causality that the 
soul becoses the soul of a particular body, thus '*the human 
souls are individuated according to their bodies, but not 
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as though the individuation were caused by their bodies". 
To him the "rational soul survives the death of the body 
28 
and Is Immortal". Because man has a 'natural craving' or 
complete knowledge. And In this mortal world partial s a t i s -
faction Is possible , through the exercise of reason. After 
i;)2 
death the redeemed soul achieves the perfect ion of knowledge 
in the Beat i f ic vis ion of the Blessed T r i n i t y . "Soul with-
out i t s body i s not t r u l y a human being. Reason dematvls a 
f ina l resur rec t ion of the body so t h a t the scxxl can enjoy 
once more tha t perfect ion of being for v4iich i t c r avM. 
The intermediate posi t ion ^f man, between corporeal 
nature and purely s p i r i t u a l exis tencei i s the key t o the 
understanding of the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t e l l e c t . Therefore 
"the human soul , although i t i s uni ted to the body as i t s form, 
a 
has a being elevated above the body and not depending on i t " . 
Human knovdedge in th is present l i f e i s based on data 
recelvef" through sense perceptlDn ami stored up by meauui of 
imagery. Abstraction i s the outstan^inf? feature of the oper-
at ion of thnuf^t , md through abs t rac t ion the mind, s e t t -
ing aside a l l the ind iv idual iz ing condit ions of objec ts , 
can r i s e to the considerat ion of the un iversa l . Universals , 
however, have no ax^stence apart from the concrete things 
i n which they are r ea l i zed . Thus Aquinas takes h is stand 
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as a "Mor?erate Rea l i s t " . Universals are obtained by abs-
t rac t ion fron sense p a r t i c u l a r s ; and because man la a body-
soul , a process i s necessary. 
Man has to gather knowledge from Individual things by 
means of the senses. Human i n t e l l e c t i s in p o t e n t i a l i t y
i : .5 
ragard t o things I n t e l l i g i b l e i5iid i s f i r s t l i ke a clean 
t«5blet on w«ilch nothing I s wr i t ten . 
The human I n t e l l e c t must understand through composition 
and d iv i s ion . I t f i r s t grasps sonie'thing about i t s objec t , 
then i t un(?erstands the propert ies an !^ accidents and the 
various re la t ions of the essence. He denies th^t universal* 
may be innate or discovered by the mind vdthin i t s e l f | but 
he says an iversa ls ar« derived froa sense images by th* 
process of abs t rac t ion through the agency of act ive i n t e l l e c t . 
He makes a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between knower and the 
object known in po ten t ia l knowledge. Thus he r e j ec t s the 
33 
subject ive idealisffl* 
As i t is said tha t man Is a s p i r i t u a l being with a 
material body and t h i s nature of man r e s t r i c t s his thought 
i n two ways. His i n t e l l e c t i s only potent ia l ly capable of 
knowing, and a process of learning I s necessary by which 
p o t e n t i a l i t y I s transformed i n t o a c t u a l i t y , arid he i s l imited 
to what i s abstracted from data accunulated by sense percep-
t ion . Aquinas does not accept th t human i n t e l l e c t can 
a t t a i n knowledge of Divine Essence in t h i s present l i f e . 
He fur ther says tha t we can know t h a t God e x i s t s , but not 
what He i s . 
,1 ^ 
Aquinas rejects the a Priori form of proof In favour 
of th« a posteriori and argues from the effects of God*s 
oflaslillty to His existence. As everythlngf In m3tlon nist 
be moved by another. If the mover also i s in motion, then 
I t must have been set in motion by some other mover* There-
fore, ve must grant a f i r s t mover vhich I t s e l f Is unmoved, 
fhls First mover I s God, Secondly be proves the existence 
of Qod on the basis of causality l i k e Albert the Great and 
Avicenna, Vl» find a causal s e r i e s . Thus i f there Is no 
f i r s t e f f ic ient cause, there can be no laiddle term nor a 
f inal effect which i s not possible. Therefore f i r s t e f f i -
cient cause i s God, Third proof springs, from the ideas 
of the possible and the necessary beings far the existence 
of God. He argues that all beings are contingent beings 
therefore, we must assume a Being existing necessarily, and 
th is Being i s (H>d. Fourthly we find different grades of 
perfection exist ing in nature in a series so that the most 
perfect Being, God, must e x i s t . Again he says that we see 
that a l l objects are ordered to some end, i t demands a pur-
posive inte l l igence directing a l l things to ^ e i r appropriate 
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ends, such a supreme I n t e l l l ^ n c e i s Qod. 
In short Divine Nature i s such that "it i s wholly beyond 
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the grasp of any f in i t e intelligence.*' He can only be des-
cribed by the negative method. These five proofs show only 
that God exists and not wh^t he He i s . But Analogy, however. 
1;) 5 
does give ua a poii t lvi i knowledge of God. On the basis of 
our experience of the world of f i n i t e existence we a t t a i n 
the knowle^^ge of the I n f i n i t e F i r s t cause. 
He fur ther says , "No d i v e r s i t y ex is t s In the Divine 
Nature and God i s none other ttian i^ls go')dii0ss, wisdom, 
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t r u t h , j u s t i c e and a l l His other a t t r i b u t e s . 
To know God In HH Essence I s "a reward of the redeemed 
sool m heaven". Beatif ic v is ion I s bond up with his view 
concerning the supreme end of man. Like Ar i s to t l e he a lso 
"accepted that l i f e proper to man I s a l i f e In accordance 
with the exercise of h is highest f acu l ty , tha t of I n t e l l i -
gence and I t i s In the complete f r u i t i o n of h is I n t e l l e c t u a l 
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des i res that each indtvidual will find h i s good". No 
created good can sa t i s fy the human soul anci wordly things 
cannot give him perfect happiness. He beTieves'*ln the p r i -
macy of I n t e l l e c t over w i l l , and the re fo re , to him, happiness 
cons i s t* In an act of understanding s^d the supreme end of 
man l i e s In the knowledge of God, the •Susiraim Bonura*, tha t 
I s t o know God In His Essence, and such is the completeness 
and perfection of th i s act of understanding and love tha t I t 
merits the name of v i s ion . But the I n t e l l e c t u a l v is ion for 
man Is not possible in th i s present l i f e but i t I s only possl-
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ble by grace, and he can see "God as t h o u ^ seeing an ob-
40 
Jec t ref lec ted In a mirror". This capaci ty i s l o s t due to 
Inii 
the Psai . 
Now w© cgn ssy thfjt the object of I n t e l l e c t i s being 
and universa l t ru th but I t i s impossible to j?chieve I t s 
object i n one slnsfle ^ct of i n t u i t i o n l i k e angels because 
man's nature l i e s i n between animal qn-^  the separate i n t e l l i -
gences» lait i t ( I n t e l l e c t ) can a t t a i n i t s object thrtwgh the 
laborious path of l ea rn ing . Therefore Aquinas makes careful 
anr^  systematic analysis of the human ac t , 
*The nature of the human wi l l i^ to i n c l i n e towards 
universa l good but in p r a c t i c e i t i s always concerned with 
p a r t i o i l a r good*« And the wi l l remains f ree to choose or 
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re jec t them. 
He fur ther d is t inguishes between the psychological or 
subjective aspect of an ac t ion , the order of i n t en t ion as he 
c a l l s i t , and the prac t ica l ^nd objective^ the order of exe-
cution. Every voluntary action i s performed in order t o 
a t t a i n an en<i or a good but t h i s end i s the l«59t the order 
of execution and f i r s t in i n t en t ion . Thus moral act ion i s 
very complex and consis ts of the in te rp lay of the i n t e l l e c t 
and the w i l l . The f i r s t s tep i s taken by i n t e l l e c t , though 
no human act can be apart from the w i l l , v o l i t i o n can be 
exercised only with regard to an end which has previously 
been presented to the i n t e l l i gence , CUr wj.ll necessar i ly 
lo? 
tends to thlni; which i s universally good and such a good 
i s happiness, but i f the thing i s good only fr;»n certain 
point of view we can reject It too and being deficient i t 
may be regarded as not g30d. If the good or end i s approved 
by the w i l l , in t e l l e c t may judge that the end i s one worth 
s e e i n g . If the attalrtnent of the end i s possible , indivi-
dual decides that he wil l pursue I t . then he makes use of 
h is cognitive powers to find suitable means for carrying out 
his desire. Ndw the next step for the wi l l i s to give assent 
to the empliyment of the means. Ibere may be considerable 
delay before the final consent of the wil l i s obtained since 
the consideration of the means may be every ti complicated 
process of deliberation involving much detailed planning. 
The %<hole of seouence so far belongs to the orders of inten-
tion. 
Now we come to the order of execution. The agent makes 
up his mind to employ the means due to the nature ref lec-
t ion . He follows his decision by putting into ef fect the 
action or series of actions he had chosen. If the action 
i s successful and the end i s achieved, the process ceases 
and man fee l s happy at the sat i s fact ion of his des ire . 
With this background of ttie conception of Crod, nature of 
scHil and analysis of the voluntary action of Tho'nas Aquinas^ 
we shall discuss probl«a of e v i l . 
l : » ^ 
Thomas Aouinas as a t h e l s t i c phllosopi^ier Dellevet tha t 
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"Every, th ing , t h a t In any way i s , l a from God. God Is th« 
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f i r s t «t«mplary cause of a l l t h ings . I t i s also said 
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"The Lord has oiade a l l things for Himself". I t means In 
wi l l ing t h i s universe , God did not wi l l the e v i l . But now 
the question a r i s e s ; did not God forsee the e v i l i n the world, 
and i f He foresaw the ev i l s in the world and yet ^dlled the 
world; did not Cod wil l the e v i l i n the world? Now i t be-
comes a t h e l s t i c problem, tha t i s , the be l ief In God who i s 
both cMnnipotent and goM, InctMnpatable with the fac t of Ev i l , 
i . e . , how cnn a l l ?0Td God create a world i n which there i s 
e v i l ? 
In solving th is perplexing question, Aouinas agrees 
with Augustine, »that ev i l I s the o^rlvation of good*, because 
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"evi l i s neither a being nor a good" as Dlnnysl, 0, says , 
"The being and the perfection of any nature i s 
good, therefore evil cannot s ignify ai:^ being, 
or any form or nature but i t s ign i f i e s only some 
absence of siood or goodness of perfection in being 
or in action, a i t i t does not mean t h a t ev i l i s not 
a f ac t , i t simply sh-jt;^ th=!t i t i s l i k e a wound in 
beln^ or defect i n act ion. I t i s important by vi r tue 
of what i s lacking. And this lacking i s the priva-
t ion of afood.*' 
1,.f i 
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Thii pr ivat ion i s two-fold. Mne pr iva t ion as a r e s u l t 
(Privatum esse ) , anr' t h i s leaves nothing, but takes a l l away, 
e . g . , blindness takes away s i ^ t a l toge ther ; darkness takes 
away l i ^ t e t c . In t h i s pr iva t ion , there can bo no •edium 
i n r e s t ^c t of the proper subjec t . 
The other i s pr iva t ion i n process ( p r l v a r i ) e . g . , 
sickness i s pr ivat ion of hea l th ; not t ha t i t tnkcs health 
away a l toge ther , but that i t i s a kind of road to the e n t i r e 
loss of hea l th , brought about by death. And since t h i s so r t 
of privat ion leaves sc»aethlng, i t i s not always the immediate 
contrary of the opposite h a b i t . I t i s i n t h i s way that e v i l 
i s a pr ivat ion of good, as Simplicius says in h i s commentary 
on the ca t egor i e s , "For i t ( e v i l ) does mt take away a l l 
good, but leaves some. Conse<|uently, the re can be son^thing, 
intermediate between good and e v i l , " And t h i s intermediate 
thing i s pr iva t ion . This pr iva t ion has the nature of Evi l . 
Evil i s not nature . 
But some c i r t i c i s e that every difference which const i tutes 
a species i s a nature . And e v i l I s also a difference cons-
t i t u t i n g a species in the fielr! of moral, i . e . bad habi t 
d i f fers i n species from a good h a b i t , therefore evi l s i gn i -
f ies a nature . Secondly, ev i l i s being and a nature because 
i t a c t s , for i t corrupts good. 
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Bat Aquinas argues tha t "f»o->d and ev i l are not cons t i -
tu t ive differences except i n moral na t te rs which receives 
t h e i r species from the end, vihich i s the object of the w i l l , 
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the source of a l l morality; t h a t i s the sjood i s i n i t s e l f 
but evU i s the absence of the due end. Thus, therefore , 
the ev i l which i s cons t i t u t ive difference i n morals i s a 
ce r ta in good Joined to the pr ivat ion of another good. Just 
as the end proposed by the intemperate man i s not the priva-
t ion of the po^d of re:?3Son, but the del ight of serwe against 
the order of reason. Hence ev i l I s not as such a cons t i tu -
t i ve difference. 
He fur ther argues that a "thing i s said t o act in 
three-fold senses (1) Formally, as whiteness makes white, 
and i n tha t sense evi l corrupts good, for i t i s i t s e l f a 
corrupt ion, (11) In another sense, to act ef fec t ively as 
painter paints a wall wt^iite, ( i l l ) As a f i n a l cause, as the 
end i s said to come to effect by moving the e f f i c i en t cause. 
But e v i l in these l a s t two senses does not a f lec t anything 
of i t s e l f " . Therefore ev i l i s not a pos i t ive en t i t y but 
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only absence of good. 
And th i s pr iva t ion or absence i s possible only in being 
or i n act ion. Pr iva t ion of good i n action i s ca l l ed moral 
e v i l , Ac^inas l i k e Augustine considers only these two types 
of e v i l . F i r s t we win discuss the ev i l In being. 
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A(|alnas says tha t being In I t s e l f i s fpod beciwse a l l 
beings emanate fr>m universal cause - God. Thus contingent 
beings owe the i r existence t o the necessary Being or f i n i t e 
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being mist proceed from God }Jno i s a l l good. Therefore 
being cannot be ev i l i n themselves, Eut ev i l i s found In 
beings, because there are d i f ferent grades of beings or 
goodness. F i r s t type of being or goodness i s Incor rup t ib le 
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vhl le other Is co r rup t ib le . As Augustine a l so says " tha t 
one can misuse the v i r tue ( the great good), i . e . , bodily 
5? 
goo* and other c.o'^'^.s can be used wrongly. Evil thus , 
cons i s t s , namely. In the f?!ct tha t a thing f a l l s In goodnei«V 
But he Ju s t i f i e s evi l as a c o r r u / t l s n in be'nf^s by the 
argument that God or another agent makes \rfiat I s be t te r In 
every single pa r t , exc-pt In r e l a t i o n to the vhole and the 
%rtiole i s — a l l the bet ter and more perfect ; i f there be 
something i n i t vhlch can f a i l i n goodness and which we do 
sometimes f a i l without God preventing i t , as f i r e connot be 
generated i f a i r was not corrupted, not would the l i f e of 
l i o n be preserved unless the asses were k i l l e d . And "the 
cause of t h i s Inequal i ty i s nothing other than Divine wls-
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dore, i . e . God. 
Secondly i t I s s'ood because "the subject of ev i l I s 
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good." As Augustine also says, "evi l ex i s t s only In good". 
Because evi l indica tes the absence of t^ ood but every absence 
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of Rood I s not evi l as the absence of the swiftness of the 
roe - - i n raan I s not ev i l but the absence of good, tqken 
as pr iva t ive sense, i s an e v i l . And the subject of p r iva t ion 
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and of form i s one and the same. The form, which maVes a 
thin? actual i s a perfect ion and a good. Hence, every actual 
being; i s a good, and potent ia l being i s a lso good because i t 
has the p o t e n t i a l i t y of being good. Similar ly the subject 
of evi l i s good because i f there i s no go^d there i s no 
(|Uettion of e v i l . 
Now i t Is c lear that the ev i l cannot exis t i n I t s e l f 
l»it i t Is poss ible only i s beln?. or go-^ d i n the form of p r i -
vation which i s corrupt ion. Here question ar ises "whether 
evi l corrupts the whole goid or a part? Aquinas says Evil 
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cannot wholly consume good because i t i s pr ivat ion of good, 
i f there i s no go >d how c?n p r ive t ! m be possible as the 
lAlndness consumes the whole sight but the othf»r goods of 
body or being cannot be consumed. He fur ther argues that 
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"there are threefold good". One kind of goo'^ i s wholly des-
troyed by e v i l and t h i s i s the ^ood opposed to evi l as l i g h t 
i s wholly destroyed by dsrkness. Another kind of good Is 
nei ther wholly destroved nor diminished by e v i l . This type 
of good i s the subject of e v i l ; as the goodness of man's 
being, the blindness of man cannot injured the goodness of 
raan's being. There i s also a kind of good which i s dimini-
shed by ev i l but is not wholly taken away. This good i s the 
11) 3 
aptitude of a subject to 83me actuality as though thera Is 
a privation of good In form of blindness In man* s being. 
Augustine also says, "Evil Injures In-as-tsich as It takes 
59 
away good. 
Again flfuestlon arises vhy does ceriuptlon or ev i l 
happen? What Is the cause of It? 
Aquinas answers that '*lt nust be aald that every e v i l , 
m some way, has a cwase because that anything f a l l s short of 
I t s nature and due dls>osltlon can aome only from some cause 
drawing I t out of I t s :>ro;Jer disposit ion. But only good can 
be a causet because nothing can be a cause except In as nuch 
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as I t Is a being, and, every being, as such. I s good**. 
As a material cause of ev i l there Is nothing rather 
than good. As a formal cause, there Is no cause, because 
the subject of ev i l Is good, but there Is only privation of 
order to the proper end. ''Evil, however, has a cause by 
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way of an agent, not directly but accidentally". 
In other words Evil has different causes In things as 
sometime I t i s caused by reason of a defect either of the 
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agent or of the matter and soetlmes by the power of agent. 
For exagple on the f^ rm of 'f ire* there follows the privation 
of the form of air or of water; the f i r e Is more perfect In 
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•trength lo I t Impresses i t s own forai more p^-fectly and 
It thus, corrupts the contraries, VIJB,, air and water. 
This evi l Is due to the perfection of f i r e , iMat i t Is acciden-
t a l because here the aim Is not the privation of air and 
water, therefore I t i s only accidentally. 
Sometimes I t i s due to the defect In the proper ef fect 
as f i r e fa i l s to heat, this happens due to the defect of 
action or by the indisposit ion of matter. Thus, i t can be 
said that i t has no direct cause, but only an accidental 
cause. 
Sometimes the corruption of something can be referred 
to God as a cause because "some agent, In-as-imich as i t pro-
duces by i t s power a form which i s followed by corruption and 
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defect, causes by i t s Dower that corruption and defect". 
But these are good for the order of the universe. Secondly, 
due to the order of jus t ice He i s the author of ev i l which 
i s penalty, but not of the ev i l v^lch i s f»u l t . 
Evil can have an accidental cause, /md i t i s irapospible 
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to reduce evi l in any 'per se cause* , or i t cannot be the 
f i r s t cause because we uphold tw^ f i r s t principles, one good 
and the other e v i l , we find the error from the same cause, 
MB oust c->me at l a s t to one f i r s t common cause though the 
contraries have particular causes because there cannot be a 
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highest e v i l , as the f i r s t principle nf good i s the highest 
and perfect good, siLthough evi l lessens good, yet i t never 
wholly consumes I t , The go>i always survives, while perfect 
ev i l cannot and I f there i s no good, no question of ev i l at a 
a l l because i t i s privation of good and not the negation of 
good. That i s why. It Is sadd "If the wholly evi l could be 
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I t would destroy I t se l f* , 
In Af^lnas view "evil in the majority of cases i s abso-
lute ly false". For thlnsis which are generated and corrupted, 
in which alone there can be natural e v i l , are a very small 
part of the whole universe. Secondly the order of the univers 
requires that there should be something; that can and soffle* 
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times do f a i l . 
Thus he tries to solve the dilemma that of the compatcK 
b i l l t y of evil with God, on two grounds. First there i s no 
evi l that sixists in I t s e l f because e v i l can exist only in 
good; i t means I f there Is any evi l f there must be good. 
Secondly he treats God as an ar t i s t and the universe i s a 
%r>rk of art. 
Now comes the evi l in action. Before discussing the 
evi l in action i t ^All be better to understand the nature 
of man because, i t i s his only voluntary actions th?,t; are 
subject to moral Judgements, that i s , they are subject to 
I b i i 
Boral e v i l . 
To Aquinast man has an intermediate posi t ion between 
the non- In te l l igen t matter as brute on one s ide , and angels 
vho are pure incorporeal s p i r i t on the othor; h is i n t e l l e c t 
cannot a t t a i n i t s object of knowing of universal t ru th being 
through s ingle act of i n t u i t i o n l i k e angela, but he acquires 
through laborious path ^f learning, Slmlljirly his wil l can 
not make an i r revocable choice or judgement between good and 
e v i l , l i k e angels, who by a s ingle act of free will are 
e i the r incl ined towards Ood or turned away from Him, But 
man* s will by i t s very nature incl ines towsirds the univer-
sa l ^oor^, but in prnctiv*. i t i s always concierned with the 
pa r t i cu la r go^^s, which being unsatisfact!)ry cannot de te r -
mine i t . So choice i s nade af ter a great swinging. 
Man, who i s composed of body and mind, conceives the 
good and has to develop h i s v i r tues by the help of concrete 
choices i n which the go jd i s determined by spec i f i c ends and 
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individual cirbu:nstatice8» Thus, thrxigh the constant repe-
t i t i o n of an act he develops h is moral h a b i t . 
Secondly, man i s fre^ to Judge and to choose v/hlle a 
brute has no such freedom. Though sonetlmes a man acts due 
to fear , ignorance and force but such actions have nothir^ 
to do with morality because they are non-voluntary ac t ions . 
I b 7 
Only conscious afl'^  free acts of a normal a<:!ult can be the 
subject of morality or we can say tha t I t Is h l r voluntary 
actions that are subject to moral Judfjenents. i<fe apply rea-
son to determine the /?05dness or badness of an act ion. He 
fur ther sagrs t h a t good and e v i l of an act ion as of other 
th ings , depends on I t s fu l lness of beinf» or i t s lack of 
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fu l lness . Every action Is good so far as i t has br ing, 
vhereas i t i s lacking i n goodness in so far as i t is lacking 
i n something that i s due i t s fu l ln ss of being; and thus i t 
i s said to be e v i l , for i n s t ance , i f i t lack the measure 
detertalnrd by reason, or i t s due place, or something of the 
kind. In other words, if good were not d e f i c i e n t , there would 
be no e v i l , but the action done i s a deficient good, which 
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Is good in a c e r t a in respect , but ev i l absolute ly , 
A moral act ion derives i t s pri'nqry goodness fran i t s 
su i t ab l e object anri such action i s cal led "good In i t s 
genus, e .g . to make use of Mhr,t i s one's own". Likewise 
the primary evil in moral actions comes frora I t s object , 
for ins tance " to take what belongs t o another". Though i t 
i s correct tha t the things (external things) are good i n 
themselves as Augustine also says "evi l i s not i n things 
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lait i n the s i n n e r ' s use of them", Ixit sometimes, they have 
not a due proportion to th i s or tha t act ion. 
The whole fUllnesf of perfect ion does not come only 
11.8 
from substantial fom or the object that gives i t I ts 
species , but sometlraes I t derives from supervening acci-
dents or circumstances as shape and colour In man e t c . . 
If m any one of these accl<^e«t8 be out of due pro; ortlon, 
evi l Is the result . Similarly the fullness Df the goodness 
of an action does not depend on only in i t s species (or 
object) but I t consists also In certain other clr cum stances 
such as Its due circumstances. Therefore, If "so^nethlng be 
wanting tiiat i s requisite as a due circumstance, the action 
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will be evi l". 
Sonet lines It happens th'it an action which Is good in 
I t s sppcies or in i t s circumstances in ordained to an ev i l 
end ea* vice-versa. However an action i s not good absolutely 
unless i t i s ROod in all these ways; "for ev i l results from 
any single defect , but ajood from the complete cause" as dlo-
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nysuis says? 
Thus the ij-jodness of an action can be divided into 
four kinds. F ir s t , that consists of i t s genus, s ince, as 
much as It has of action and being, so much l|M I t of good-
ness. Secondly, that derives fram i t s species; thirdly , 
that depends on I t s circumstances and fourthly i t has good-
ness from Its end, to which I t i s comparer) as to the cause 
of I t s goodness. Thus "an action may have one element of 
goodness and be wanting in another. In this way an action 
H)!t 
t h a t 1« irood m i t s spedfts , or In circumstances, riay b« 
directed to an evi l end and vice versa . S t i l l I t Is r a t 
simply a good ac t ion , unless i t combines a l l the elements 
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of good. 
To remove th is camplexity of moral ac t ion , Aqulnai 
divides i t in to two p a r t s , v i z . , i ormal element and material 
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element. Formal elemait r e l a t e s to the end, towards which 
the act i s directed anr' the ra-jterial one r e l a t e s to the means 
that are adopted to s^ttaln tha t end and the circumstances 
tha t are connected with the choice of the means. If a l l 
these are good the action is goodj i f a l l these are e v i l , 
the action Is e v l l | and there is no problem. But there are 
sorae actions wl^ jich may be mater ia l ly good and formally ev i l 
and vice c^rsa. For examole, when "Saul persecuted the 
Chr i s t i ans , he probably sinned mater ia l ly not formally, 
Uhen Caiaphas spoHre the truth without knowing i t he said well 
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mater ia l ly but i l l formally. Thus in judging the action, 
regsird must f i r s t be given to ttie end the agent des i res and 
w i l l s . According t o A r i s t o t l e , one ^ o s t ea l s to coa d t 
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adul tery i s even more an adul terer than a th ie f . 
Thus, voiuiitary act can be fu r t er divided in to two 
p a r t s ; i n t e r i o r act of will and the external ac t ; and each 
of these acts has i t s object; the end i s the properly the 
object of the i n t e r i o r act of the w i l l , while the object of 
1 7 i » 
th« extern-a act ion Is th^t on which the act ion Is brought 
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t o bear . Thus the formal part of an action r e l a t e s to the 
end vhlle mater ial part rel t es to the object on which the 
action i s brought t o be'^r. Sometimes i t would seem that 
goodness or evi l derived from the end Is the sane %rhlch la 
derived by the external object as when a raan w l l l t to s t e a l 
i n order to s»lve m elms. But Aquinas says "the specif ic 
difference deprived froa the end Is aore general , gri'^ ! tha t the 
difference derived from gn object which i s e s sen t i a l l y ordered 
to ttiat end I s a specif ic difference In r e l a t i o n to the 
forner. For the w i l l , the pr-per object of which is the 
end, i s the universal niovor in respect of a l l the ot,rer of 
the soul , the proper object of which are the objects of t h e i r 
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pa r t i cu l a r a c t s " , 
i»ow we should consider the goodness or e v i l of the 
i n t e r i o r act of the w i l l , I . e . end. The end of a thing la 
in I t s perfection and perfection of a th in? i s i t s goodness 
as already s a id , therefore everything I s directed to good 
as i t s end. 
Ifov qu^'stion ar ises what type of srood is i t s end. In 
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Aquinas view, "Happiness i s nan's proper good". But man 
I s man thr u^h the Possession of reason, the re fore , i t raust 
be In accordance with th^t which is prober to reason. Thus, 
the proper end of an In te rna l act of wil l i s 'Happiness*. 
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Again queit lnn a r i s e s , what type of happiness Is the 
end of I n t e r i o r ?jct -^ f wi l l because we find di f ferent typei 
of happiness, such as one finds happiness In t a b l e , food 
and sex, while another person finds I t In v i r t u e or the 
other higher values as In God or In v is ion of God. 
Ac^lnas says the ultl-nate happiness does not consis t 
m carnal p leasure , chief of which are pleasure of t a b l e , 
food and sex. Pleasure I s for the sale of operation and 
not conversely. If an operat ion i s not the u l t imate end, 
so ple-^sure derived fr^ mi I t cannot be the ul t imate happiness. 
S imi la r ly , u l t imate happiness doe? not consis t i n 
Honour, d o r y . Wealth, worldly power, ^o->ds of the body, 
senses, moral v i r t u e s , the act of prudence, arsot ice of 
a r t or In contemplating God, i n the knowledge of God acqui-
red by demostratlon, knowlefl^e of God by f^ l th , speculat ive 
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sciences and i<no\dedge of separate substances though these 
are the d i f fe ren t grades of goodness but not hi(»hest good. 
Again questi->n r e s t s what type of happiness or end 
gives a mad ul t imate happiness, Atjulnas says, "'rtie supreme 
good i s suproiiely the end of a l l . Now thei-e is but one sup» 
retae good nataely, God, Therefore, a l l thini»s are directed 
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to the hlgbeat good, natnely God, as the i r end. As Aris-
t o t l e says, " tha t which i s supreme in any genus la the cause 
I7i:^ 
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of everything In tha t genus. Therefore the cause of good-
ness of a l l things I s tiie supreme good» vl?..* ^od, and being 
an end, He i s the u l t imate and of every end. Therefore God 
I s the ul t imate happiness of man due to His supreme good 
and ul t imate end. I t i s a lso sa id , "The I'ord hath made a l l 
things for Himself} and I gm Alpha and Omega, t^e f i r s t and 
the l a s t . 
Secondly every thlnH! tends to sane good as I t s end by 
I t s moveraent ar;d I t partakes of good In so f^r as I t I s l i k e 
the f i r s t goodness, vhlch Is Go^, Therefore, by the i r move-
ment and act ions each thing tends to a l ikeness to ^od as 
to I t s l a s t end. 
Again, "since a thing I s good so far as i t Is perfect , 
God's being i s His perfect goodness; for In God, to be, to 
l i v e , to be v i s e , to be happy, and whatever e l se i s seen to 
per ta in to perfect ion and goodness, are one and the same in 
God. Therefore, If a thing i s good SD far as i t i s , and i f 
no creature i s I t s ovn being, none i s i t s own goodness, but 
each one i s good by Marticlpating In goodness, even as by 
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Par t ic ipa t ing i n being i t i s a being". 
Thus the perfect happiness or ul t imate end Is t o be 
found only in God who i s supr'^rae «nd i n f i n i t e Good. He i s 
the ena of the ra t iona l and i r r a t i o n a l c rea tures but I t i s 
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only r a t i o n a l c r ea tu re , ^ o can a t t a i n th i s f i na l good by 
way of knoVled?e and lovet or WG can say that who e n a t t a i n 
the v is ion of Ood In which alone perfect happiness l i e s . 
And th i s perfect happiness I s only poss ib le in neoct l i f e , 
i n which man can know God as He i s , T*ile i n th i s l i f e he 
can know only that God e x i s t s . 
Lastly we can say tha t the lOtlmati end of a man Is 
happiness which l i e s i n the v is ion of God. In Aquinas words 
the l a s t end of man and of any i n t e l l i g e n t substance i s 
ca l l ed happiness or bea t i tude , for i t i s t h i s that every 
i n t e l l e c t u a l substance des i res as i t s l a s t end, and for i t s 
own sake alone. Therefore the l a s t beat i tude of happiness 
of nay Intel lecteaal substance Is to know God, As i t i s said 
(Matt. V.B.) "Blessed are the clean of h e a r t , f i r they sha l l 
see Godj and (Jo XVII 3 ) . This Is e ternal l i f e , that tiiey 
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may know thee , the only t r a e God", 
But to know God i n Kls essence is not possible in t h i s 
l i f e , because end i s man s natural a p p e t i t e , when he has 
obtained i t , he desi res nothing more; because If he s t i l l 
has a fflovement towards sancthing, i t means he has not a t t a in -
ed i t s l a s t end since the more man understands the more i s 
the des i r e to understand Him, unless perhaps there be 8;»n«-
on© who understands a l l th ings . Therefore, the ulti.Tiate 
happiness i s not possible in th i s l i f e . 
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Secondly man na tura l ly shuns death and I s sad about I t , 
because I t I s but the nature of man to aVDl<' de^ith. He 
aVDids i t not only at the moment when he f ee l s i t s presence, 
but also when he th ln i^ about I t . But man In this mortal 
l i f e , camot escape death, therefore , " I t Is not possible 
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for man to be happy In t h i s l i f e " . 
•Rius man's u l t i t i a t e happiness ( the ult l-^ate end) will 
consis t in tha t knowlerl?;e of CJod which the human tr/ind poss-
esses af ter t h i s l i f e , "hence lord pronises us 9. reward - - -
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in heaven". 
Thus, consequently, we can say that those actions would 
be morally ?ood which le^d t-) or are compatible with the 
attala'T^nt of such beat iaude, hc^piness or ultlfnate end, 
t ha t i s , Crodj while those actions v^aild be morally ev i l 
which are Incorapatable with the a t ta innent of such bea t i tude . 
But t o Ju«l8»e the ac t ion , end i s on3.y one par t , the 
other i s material one, 1,9., circumstances an'1 raeans. There-
fore Aquinas says that end does not Jus t i fy the ^eans. 
After t h i s , Aoulnas dlscus'^cr the external or mater ial 
aspect of the act w Ich pri"i3ri ly consists of neans and 
circumstances. 
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Exttrnal acts niay be sai'~' t o hf» p;o">d or ev i l In two 
ways. F i r s t , In regard to t h e i r genus, and circumstances 
connected with them. Secondly, a th in? i s said to be good 
or evil from i t s relat l :)ns to the end. End is the proier 
object of w i l l , so She nature of ^ood ^ni ev i l i s t o be faind 
f i r s t of a l l i n the act of the w i l l . On tl^e other I rnd , the 
goodness or malice which the external ac t has of i t s e l f , in 
that i t i s about due raatter and i s attended by due circums-
tances , i s derived frc^n the reason. Thus actual ly the good-
ness or ev i l of an externa! act in so far as i t comes from 
reasons ordination and apprehension, i t i s pr ior to the 
goodness o** the act of the w i l l , laat i f we consider i t i n 
so fnr as i t i s in the execution of the act done, i t is sub-
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sequent to the goodness of the w i l l , which is i t s p r inc ip l e . 
"Actually voluntar iness applies not only to the i n t e r i o r act 
of t^  e w i l l , but also t o external a c t s , in-as-much as they 
proceed from the \^11 in'; the reason. In r e a l i t y the d i f fe r -
ence of good and evi l Is applicable to botr the in te rna l and 
external a c t s , i . e . a t^ an sins by h is w i l l , not only when he 
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wi l l s an ev i l and bat a lso when he wi l l s an ev i l a c t . "Some • 
times the goodness or malict of She i n t e r i o r act i s the same 
as tha t of the external act and soTietiraea not". As a b i t t e r 
medicine i s good merely because i t procures hea l th . There-
fore there are not two goodness, the goodness of isealth and 
the goodness of the draught but one and the same. But when 
the external act has goodness or malice of i t s e l f , i . e . , accor-
ding to i t s matter and circumstances, then the goodness of 
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external act is d i s t i n c t fr-sm the goodness of the wi l l 
derived from the end; yet so that the goodness of the end 
passes into the external ac t , and the e;o-)clness of the matter 
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and circuDStancps pas'-es i n to the act of w i l l . 
Thus internal and external acts are d i f fe ren t as r e a l i -
t i e s but they combine to form one thing In the -noral order. 
Circumstances are those condit ions which are outside the 
substance of an ac t , an ' yet in sorae wny touch the human 
ac t . 
Circumstances are re la t«3 to acts i n both t ie?e ways. 
For some circu-^st^nces, that have a r e l a t i o n to r^cts, belong 
to the agent otherwise than throuc:h the «ct, e . g . , p lace and 
condition of person; whereas others belong t o the agent by 
reason of the ac t , e. ? , , the -manners in which the act i s 
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done. 
I^e circumstances w'-;ich Is outsi'^e the subst-^nc" of an 
act touches the act in three wf^ys, (1) I t touches the act 
i t s e l f , e i the r as a ' leasure, as t i e orii place or by oualify-
ing the act as the mode of act ing ( i i ) It touches cause of 
ac t , as t o the f ina l cause, bJT the circurastaaces why; aa the 
T.aterial cause, i n the circu'nstanc « about wh^t; as to the 
p r inc ipa l ef Tic lent cause, in the c i rcu ast-nces who; and as 
to the instrumental e f f ic ien t cause , in tSie circu as nances by 
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what a i d s . ( I l l ) I t touches the e f f ec t , when i t I s cDnsldered 
that vhat i s done. 
Tully fives seven clrcumstanrefl In his Rhetoric, which 
are contained in the verse . 
Qais <|Lild Ubl qulbus auxl l l Is cur quomodo quando 
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who, what, wbere, by what a id s , why, How, and i*ien. 
The circumstances V I E , , why, i t I s done a:>i what Is done 
are the aoat important, because the object or motive of the 
wil l i s the end. And in volunt ry ac t ion , the object of will 
has a importance. Therefore these circumstances touch the 
act on the part of end, v i z , the clrcurastRnc? why and second 
which touches the very substance of the ac t , vl? , , , the clrcums-
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tance what he did. 
"The fUllnesp of t^ e ler reet lon of f^n action l i e s not 
vholly in I t s sr^ 'cles, but so^e s^^Htlonsl ^erf^ction i s 
conferred in the way Tf accidents or doe circu-nstt^nces. 
Hence, if any th ins be wanting that i s recwlsi te \n point of 
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due circumstances, the a c t l i n will be e v i l . 
TtiViS Thor.as At^inas believes th?t i f end ( I n t r l o r act 
of wi l l ) and means md clrcunist'uices (extern 1 act and circums-
tances) are a l l good, act is* go->d or i f one of them i s e v i l , 
action i s e v i l . 
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Now there rR^nalns thf? cjuestiDn as to \fhy a man i s moved 
towards a vr^ng end afK? why does he choose wrong means? Man 
i s frep to do good ^rv5 to crnn'-lt e v i l , because he has freedom 
of wil l arv. i n t e l l e c t a l so . Wow i t I s obvl:xis that when a 
man is misled for t h i s , h is very wil l i s responsible . 
Thus will plays an important ro le i n voluntary act ion, 
i . e . moral actl ' jn, IVierefore, to know the evi l in 'notion we 
aiust consider the iiction of wi l l , Aquinas <31stlngaish<*s the 
act of wil l into t'.*o ca tegor ies , l . r , f i r s t those acts which 
belong; t o the wil l i t s el ^ imfnef'ls lely ?DS being e l i c i t e d by 
tile w i l l . Secondly those acts which are com-'andcd by the 
w i l l . These are iivldftd ^^..nr sub-divided as follows; 
Act Of Will 
t 
I 
ComBianded 
t 
Towards End Towards '^eans 
I 
1 ! r .1 
I i I t I f 
Volition Intent ion Enjoyment To choose To consult To use 
Now i t i s c lear from the chart that ac ts are of two 
kinds (1) Those acts of the wi l l whereby i t i s moved to the 
en{i; ( i i ) Those acts wiereby i t i s moved to the means to 
a t t a i n the end. 
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With reference to the en?^  there are three acts of the 
w i l l ; vo l i t i on , enjoytient and lntentl:>n, 
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Volit ion or " v l l l Is the ra t iona l appe t i t e " . And 
every appe t i te l i only some thing good, because a; pe t i t e i s 
nothing other th^n the i n c l i n a t i o n of being (good) and 
everything i n as mich as i t i s being and substance, i s a 
good. Therefore will i s of good. And v o l i t i o n i s not only 
of the end but i t i s also of the means, because the nature 
of f»ood, which i s the ob.lect of the power of w i l l , may be 
found not only in thcr end, but also i n the means. But wi l l 
Cannot move to the means, as such, unless i t l a moved t o the 
end, since the end i s wlll*?d in i t s e l f , whereas the •rieans, 
as such, are willed only for the end. In other words, ^^ 
can say that will I s a ratlon??l appeti te and I t moves towards 
not only end but towar«^s means too, 
TMs wil l i s moved by the I n t e l l e c t . Will i s go->d in 
general , which has the nature of m end, a«3 the object of 
i n t e l l e c t i s universal Being and Truth. The object moves, 
by determining* the ac t , a f te r the manner of a formal p r inc i -
p l e , whereby in natur-^l things actions are speci f ied , as 
heating by hea t . By t h i s kind of notion the i n t e l l e c t moves 
the w i l l , as presentir^ i t s object to I t , Sometimes i t I s 
moved by the sens i t ive appe t i t e , because the thingf that 
which I s apprehended under the nature of wh 't i s good and 
I S f 
bef i t t i ng moves the wil l =is an object. Anrl 'nan sonetiaes i s 
affected by a pas 1->n, becaus- sof^ethln? S€KIS to him f i t t i n g . 
But sometimes w i l l , t h r uah I t s vo l i t ion of t'ne end, moves 
i t s e l f to will the me«ns. On the other hand exter ior p r inc i -
ple can move the w i l l , as i t s object, offere-^ to the senses. 
Similarly i t i s also maintained th t neavenly bodies a lso 
have an influence d i rec t ly on the w i l l . Lastly God moves marts 
w i l l , as the Universal 'over t o the universa l object of the 
w i l l , which is thegood. And without th i s universal motion 
man cannot will anything. But man determines hiaself by h i s 
reasons to will this or t h a t , which i s a t rue or apparent 
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good. 
The wil l wil ls something nqtoral ly because I t fo i l ova 
the act of the I n t e l l e c t an'^  i n t e l l e c t understands so iethlng 
na tura l ly , As will tends na tura l ly to t^ rds 'good in general ' 
knowledge of t r u t h , which bef i t s the i n t e l l e c t , and to be 
l i ve and other l i k e things which regards his natur?jl well-
being - a l l of which are Included in the object of the wil l 
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as 80 nany par t icu la r goods. In other words there sjre two 
types of movement of w i l l . F i r s t , as to the exercise of i t s 
ac t ; secondly ss to the si^ecificatlon of i t s object , derived 
from the object . As to the f i r s t way, no object moves the 
wi l l necess ry , for no naatter what the object be, i t Is^naia's 
power not to think of I t , and conse<|uently not to wi l l actua-
l l y . But as to the second manner of motion the wil l Is moved 
i s i 
by one object necessarily. If the will be offered an object 
which Is rood universally and from every point of view, the 
will tends to It of necessity, If It wills anything at all, 
since It cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, 
the will Is offered an object that Is not good fSrom every 
point of view, it will not tend to It of necessity. Though 
passions of sensitive appetite moves the will In so far as 
Xh(S will Is moved by Its object. In as much as a 
man Judge something to be filling and good, which he would 
not judge thus were it not for the passion. There will is 
not moved of necessity by the lower appetite. As it is 
said "The lust shall be under thee, and thou shalt have 
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dominion over it" (Gen iv-7). But the will is moved of 
necessity by the exterior mover which is God. The will is 
an active principle that is not determined to one thing, 
but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so 
moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one 
thing, lest its movernent remains contingent and not necessary, 
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except in those things to which it is moved naturally. 
Second act of the will in reference to the end is 
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•enjoyment*. Enjoyment (fruition) is an act of the appe-
titive power because the end and the good is the object of 
the appetitive power. As Augustine says "To enjoy is to 
adhere lovingly to something for its owa sake. But tbis 
is for those only that are endowed with knowledge. And 
knowledge of the end is of two folds, perfect and imperfect. 
t S 2 
perfect knowledge of the end i s that by which we know not 
only vih^t I t i s th?3t i s the end and the good, but a lso the 
universal nature of the end and the good; and such knowledge 
belongs to the ra t iona l nature alone. Consequently, enjoy-
ment in i t s perfect nature , belongs to the r a t i nal na ture ; 
t o i r r a t i o n a l animals, imperfectly; and to dther c r e a t u r e , 
not at a l l . S lndlar ly Augustine says , " I t i s not so absurd 
to supiiose t h a t even beasts enjoy the i r fojds and bodily 
pleasure". The notion of f r i i t implies two th ings : f i r s t , 
t ha t i t shoul ' cyme l a s t ; second, th^ -^t i t should c^lm the 
appe t i te with a Cf-rtain sweetness anil d«lif»ht, iflow a thing 
i s l a s t e i the r absolutely or r e l* lve , T^eref^re the l a s t 
end alone i s tha t which man does not des i re for the sake of 
something e l s e . Thus the enjoyment i s of the l u s t end. 
I t i s possible to en j :^ tbe ei^ even th~>ugh i t be not poss-
essed. Tb enjoy i-!?plies a c e r t a in r e l a t i on of the will to 
tbe l a s t end, according as the wil l ,08Sesses something as 
a l a s t end, Anl end i s possessed i n two ways, perfec t ly 
and imperfectly. Perfec t ly when i t i s possessed not only 
in in tent ion hat a lso in r e a l i t y ; imperfectly, when i t i s 
possessed in Intent!'>n only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore , 
i s of the end already possessed, Augustine also speaks of 
perfect enjoyment. 
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Now we must c o n s i d r i n t en t ion , the th i rd get of the 
w i l l . In tent ion be! orgs f i r s t and pr inc ipa l ly to ths t which 
S3 
moves to the end, as an a rch i t ec t msves other by his command 
t o tha t wUch he Intonds, Similar ly th i s I s the wi l l tha t 
aoves a l l the othpr powers of the soul to the end. In ten t ion 
Is always of the en'l, I t neer' not alvays be of the l a s t end, 
therefore , one cpn Intend several ends at the sare time because 
two things may be taken in two ways, 
Tlie acts of the will which are relateri to the means 
tha t i s , those acts whereby I t I s move^ to the means. There 
are three acts of the wil l In reference t o the Tieans v i z . , 
(1) to choose, (?) to consent and (3) to use , 
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Choice i s an act of w i l l , because choice Is nothing 
other than the des i r e and des i r e i s an act of the w i l l . 
Reason proeeids the will and d i r e c t s i t s a c t s , namely, i n 
80 f^r as the will tends to i t s objects according to the 
order of rens-jn; for the apprehensive power presents to the 
aoppti te i t s object , Accordlr^ly, tha t act whereby the wil l 
tends to soiiethlna: propose-^ t o i t as bein? f»">od, thrwigh 
being ordained to the end by the reason, i s mater ial ly an 
act of the v t l l , but for^^ally an act of the reason. There-
fore , ch-ilce i s subs t an t i a l l y , not an set of reason, but 
of the wi l l ; for choice i s aocompllshe'^ in a c e r t a i n move-
ment of the soul towards the good which i s chosen. I t i s 
only of the means to the end or sr)^times also of the end 
but the li^st end is in no way a matter of choice, e, a;, i n 
1S4 
the vork of physician health I s the end, an-' so i t i s not 
a matter of cholc^ for physician, but a matter of p r inc ip le . 
But the health of the body i s ordained t o the ^ood of the sou l , 
and conaecMently, with one who has charge of the sou l ' s heal-
t h , health or sickness may be a matter of choice, ^t i s t ha t 
choice I s always in re<5'^ rd to human ac t s . Choice I s of those 
th lngi only tha t are dine by us . The end i s e i the r an 
actlwi or a th ing. And when the end i s c i t he j an action 
or a thlni?. And when the end i s a thing, sore human act ions 
must Intervene and th i s e l t h r r In so far as 'nan produces the 
th in? which i s the end ?sn'' the sa"ie for means. I t i s only 
of possible th ings . I t Is always concerner! with ->ur ac t ions , 
'low whatever I s dine by us I s possible to us , therefore we 
BMst needs say that choice Is only of possible th :ngs , ^nd 
man makes t h i s choice f r e r l y , Man wi l l s hap Iness of nece-
s s i t y , nor can h>e will not to be happy or to be unhappy. 
o^w since choice I s not of the perfect good, wl")Ich i s happi-
ness , but of other end par t icu lar go")ds, Therefore aan 
chooses, not of necess i ty , but f ree ly . 
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Choice i s precede;! by counsel . Choice i s an act of 
reason and ress on must of necessi ty i n s t i t u t e an Inoulry 
before decldlna: on TI^at I s to be chosen and t h i s inquiry i s 
ca l led counsel. And th i s counsel i s not of the end but of 
the means too. And th i s i s only nf th ngs that we are able 
to do. The Ineulry o^ counsel must neer's be one of resolu t ion . 
\hh 
beginning, that Is to say, from tha t which I s Intended In 
thf future , and contlnuting u n t i l I t a r r ives a t t h a t vblch 
I s t 3 be done at ^ice. 
The second act of v^lll wMch gre rolated to the means 
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I s consent. I t I s an act of appet i t ive p:»wer. But i t Is 
not In I r r a t i o n a l anl a l s , befiause, In I r r a t i o n a l animals, 
the det< rmlnabion of the appet i te to a pa r t i cu la r thing i s 
merely passive whereas consent expresses a ^'eternlnatlon of 
the a p p e t i t e , y^ida i s ac t ive ra ther than Bserely passive. 
I t Is directed only to the i iens as counsel Is only about 
the means. I t belongs to the higher part of the soul because 
as long as a man la uncertain %ihether he should r e s i s t or 
not , accordini* t J divine p r inc ip les , no Judge-nent of the 
reason can be conslderer! as " final decision. And f inal 
decis ion of what i s to bf done i s the consent to he act . 
Therefore con9*?nt to the .^ct belongs to the Mgher reason, 
but i n the sense i n ijhtch the re-son lnclu<'es the w i l l . 
Now we consider t t e third act of the vrill r e l a t i o n to 
the means to the end. iTie use of a thing sifrnifles the 
appl ica t ion of that thin^ io sn operation; and hence the 
operation to which we apply a thing Is ca l led i t s use . And 
i t i s the will w*iieh m-^ves. The sou l ' s powers to t he i r a c t s | 
and t h i s i s to apply them to operat ion. Therefore use , 
I S l i 
principally, beloagi to the wil l as f i r s t moverj to the 
reason as directing; am? to the other powers as ^ ecu ting 
the operation, which powers are compared to t i e w i l l , which 
applios thero to act , as the instrument are compared to the 
principal agent. Therefore, use is an act of the w i l l , use 
s ign i f i e s the application of one thing to another now that 
wlich i s applied to another Is resjarded in the l i gh t of a 
means to an end; an'l consequently use always applies to the 
106 107 
oieaofl. And i t follows choice. The wi l l , in a vagr, moves 
the reason also , and uses i t , we may take the use of the 
means as consisting in the consideration of the reason, 
whereby i t refers to means t > the end. In this sense use 
precedes choice. 
The act of the will i s commanded by us because whatever 
i s in (Hir power i s subject to our command. But most of the 
acts of the will are in our power, that i s voluntary actions. 
And not only the acts of the will are commanded by us but 
the acts of the reason are also cofonanded by us because the 
act of the reason are accomplished through free choice und 
by his free choice man incpaires, considers, judges and 
approves. And the acts of stfisltive appetite are also the 
subject of the conmanr! of reason as Gregory says, "that 
%*ich obeys reason is two fo ld , the concupiscible and the 
108 
irascible" which belong? to the sensit ive appetite. 
1S7 
Qa the other hand the acts of the vegetative soul are 
not fubjeet to the conEnand of reason becauae they proceed 
109 
from the natural aP e t l te not frim inte l lectual appetite. 
In this %ray the external 'T5©mbers of the body are not sub-
ject t o the commanf^  of reason i f tl^ ey are raoved by the natu-
ral povers. But i f they are moved by the sens i t ive pover 
they are subject t'y the command of reason. 
In short except natural appetite or vegitat lve soul, 
a l l human acts are sub.lect tJ the cormnand of reason. Hence 
they are good ones i f they are subject to the command of 
reason anf'^  they are evil -xes i f they are commanded by lower 
appetite. 
He further argues tbftt huisan actions are also guided 
by sorae principles v i z . , Ir*trinsic and Extrinsic. Intrinsic 
principles are powers and habits of nan and extrinsic ones 
are Devil , incl ining to ev i l and God who both instructs us 
110 
by means of His lav and Grace. 
In conclusion we can say that in Aquinas view God did 
not wil l the universe ^ i e h contained evi l in I t , God 
necessarily loves His own essence which i s in f in i te goodness 
and He freely wi l l s creation as a cossnunicatlon of His good-
ness. He cannot love whet Is opposed to goodnesF namely evil, 
1 S ^ 
More aver, evil as such cannot be willed even by a 
human %illl, for the object of the will Is necessari ly the 
good or what appears as such. The adulterer does not %rill 
the e v i l , the s in precisely as such} he wi l l s the sensible 
pleasure of m act which involves e v i l , No w i l l , therefore, 
can desire evi l precisely as such, and God in creating a 
world the ev i l of which he foresaw must be said not to have 
willed the evi ls but to have willed the world which as such 
i s good and to have willed to permit the ev i l s %rhlch he 
foresaw. 
Thus, the doctrine that evi l as such i s a Privation, 
St . Thomas Aquinas means to imply that evi l i s unreal in 
the case of being an I l lus ion , Evil is not the being (entity) 
in the sense that I t f a l l s under the definit ion as a priva-
tion of good, not In I t s ovm right as a positive ent i ty . 
For example lack of ab i l i ty to see Is not a privation in a 
stone because I t i s the mere absence of povfer which would be 
Incompatible with the nature of the stonej but blindness in 
a raan Is a privation, the absence of sornethlng which belongs 
to the fulness of man's nature. This blindness Is not, 
however a positive entity? i t Is privation of s ight yet the 
privation existed Is real; i t i s not apart fron the being 
In which i t exists but as exist ing in that bein? the priva-
tion i s real enough. 
18:1 
Evil , therefore , cannot of I t s e l f a-id by i t s e l f caase 
anything, but ex is t s anri can be caused throagh the being in 
vhlch I t ex i s t s as the deformity In the will of a fallen 
angel. I t cannot by i t s e l f can be a canse, but i t i s r ea l 
privmtlon and can be a cause by means of the posi t ive being 
in vbich i t e x i s t s . Indeed, the mcKre powerful the being in 
which i t e x i s t , the greater i s i t s e f f e c t . 
In shor t , physical ev i l was permitted by CJod and eveii 
i t can be said to have been willed by God. God did uot vfiU 
i t for i t s own sake, of course , per se but Re willed a 
universe , a na tura l order wrich involved at l e a s t the 
pos s ib i l i t y of physical defect and suf fer ing . By wi l l ing , 
God willed that Capacity for feeling pain as v e i l as pleasure 
iiAilch i s , t rue ly Sj^eaklng, necessary for human nature . He 
did not wil l suffering as such but Ke willed tha t nature 
which i s good and simple and contains the supreme perfect ion 
of goodnets. 
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In th« present study, as i t i s shown, an attempt has 
been made to present an exposition of the problem of e v i l 
with a comparative s p i r i t , l*e«, in the l ight of Christiani-
ty and Islam with special reference to St . Augustine, Imam 
al-Ghazali and St . Thomas Aquinas. I t would be desirable 
at f i r s t to make a brief survey of the exposition of the 
problem in the system of these three philosophers. 
St . Auf-ustine, the precursor of medieval period, was 
bom in 354 A.U. P o l i t i c a l , social and educational systems 
of th i s period had a decisive and last ing role in shaping 
his mind. And he was the follower of Ifeo-Platonic school. 
Under these circumstances he developed h i s philosophy 
and tried to solve the problem of ev i l through the concep-
tion of "Privation of good". For vrtiat i s that which we 
1 
call evil is simply the absence of good. 
He classified evil into two categories, " Cosmic 
evil" and " Moral evil ". 
He tried to solve the Cosmic evil on different 
grounds. Firstly he explained it through the doctine of 
2 
"nature". He argued that the source of all existence 
\[IZ 
(b«lnf) is Ood. And God is good, therefore, He can aot 
create evil, ifature is also created by God (good) there-
fore, every thing in nature is pood. Evary thing possesses 
three characteristics viz*. Measure, Order and Fom and all 
these three come from God. The greatness of good depends 
upon the presence of these three characteristics* If these 
three are present in a thing in a greater form, that thing 
possesses a greater good* But if the presence is in a 
lesser form that is a lesser good, and where these three 
are con^letely absent, there is no good at all* But these 
three can not be absent totally in a natural thing. Thus 
it can be said that every thing so far as it is natural 
thing is good. And there is gradation in goodness* Due to 
these ^ree characteristics some are higher goods and some 
are lower goods* The lover good, according to St. Augustine, 
becomes evil in respect of higher good. Therefore, evil is 
nothing in itself. For example the beauty of a man is greater 
than t^ e beauty of an ape and the people are deceived as if 
the former is good and latter is evil. 
tie further says that evil is either corruption of 
measure, order or form* But even when corrupted, so far as 
it is a natural thlxig is good and it may have value, even 
after being a corrupt thing. For example, corrupt gold is 
3 
better than incorrupt silver and corrupt silver is better 
than incorrupt lead etc. Corruption can not eonsume whole 
1 [13 
good because the good vhlch makes i t a being can not be 
destroyed completely without destroying the being i t s e l f . 
Therefore no e v i l ex is t s in i t s e l f* It i s simply an ev i l 
aspect of scMBe actual ent i ty . In otflier words "Hvery actual 
5 
ea t i ty i s good (Ominus natura Bonum est)? 
St . Aufustine further says that God has willed 
every thing in nature for tiie best of His creature. Thus 
6 
the so called evil too, is good in its own way* 
In short Aufustine Justifies Cosmic evil through 
infinite wisdom and absolute goodaess of God who ordains 
all and whose ways are beyond human understanding. 
After Cosmic evil St, Augustine comes to moral evil. 
He explains moral evil on the basis of free will* He argues 
that it is but an admitted fact that God has given man free 
7 
will and it is proved by the commandments of God* If a man 
commits a sin it is not due to force or compulsion but it 
is his freewill. Thus he says that evil does not arise 
8 
frcsn substance but from the perversion of the will* The 
will is free to turn away from the immutable good and to 
9 
turn towards mutable good* This turning towards mutable 
good is evil because this turning is towards lower good in 
comparison to higher good or immutable good, i*e., God. 
11*4 
Sec^d ly he holds that man's chief ?ood Is the good 
of the both, the body and the soul . Mutable good I s only 
for the body and not for soul . The good of soul i s the 
perfect s a t i s f ac t i on which depends on ul t imate happiness 
and ul t imate happiness can be a t ta ined by chief good and 
chief good is God. Therefore the good of the soul i s In 
Ood or turning of the wil l towards God, When a man turns 
towards mutable good, he loses h is e ternal happiness which 
becames ev i l for him. Thus the cause of the good i s i n the 
Divine goodness, whereas the cause of ev i l Is in t^e v i l l 
10 
of man which i s to ftnrn away from the lonutable good. 
But wil l in i t s e l f which turns towards good is not 
11 
e v i l , because i t is created by God, " I t i s medium good". 
That i s why i t can be misused. I t s nature is good but i t s 
effect can be good or bad jaccordin* to the way man uses i t . 
New the use to be made of free choice is under the control 
of f ree choice i t s e l f , 
(to the basis of th is free w i l l , Au«»ustine t r i e s to 
explain the s in of Adam. Adam touched the t r ee of know-
1? 
ledge of good and e v i l , i n s p i t e of the prohib i t ion from God 
by h i s f ree w i l l , therefore he experienced the penalty of 
s in . But i t does not mean t h a t t r e e in i t s e l f was ev i l 
because i t was planted by God in paradise sund therefore 
assuredly was good. But He Himself who prohibited i t s 
touch was b e t t e r than the t r e e . Therefore I t was good for 
1[i.l 
13 
Adam to turn towards God and evil to turn towards the tre«» 
Thus sin Is concerned with the will, motive and attitude of 
14 
a man. 
After Augustine we now come to Al-Ghazall. Al~Ghazall 
a great theologian and a profound philosopher, was born at 
Tus In 1058 A.D., seven hundred years after >3t, Augustine.. 
Imam Ghazall does not talk of cosmic evil* He says that 
every thing In the world Is In the grip of God. He Is eternal 
and everlasting, He Is the first and the last. He Is the 
15 
first In existence and the last In experience. 
Secondly there Is a divine purpose linking the 
antecedents to the consequents and this divine purpose Is 
manifested In the existing orderly succession of events 
16 
without the least break or Irregularity. 
Further he says that the Divine purpose Is mystical. 
Therefore every one can not know It as In the Quran It Is 
said that we did not create them but with truth. But most 
of them do not know (The ^uran, XLIVi38.39)« Therefore for 
Al-Ghazeli there Is no question of any cosmic evil. 
He takes the problem of moral evil which he calls 
•Shar'. Shar, Al-Ghasall defines, is the prohibitions of God 
and Khalr (good) is ttie commandmaats of God. He explains the 
t f)b 
moral •vil on th« basis of free vrill and the doctrine of 
"Kasab" (acquisition). 
Al-Ghazall says that man has two forms, viz. Khalq 
and Khulq. Khalq is material and Khulq is spiritual, viz. 
body and soul respectively. Soul is the essence of man and 
it controls the body. The human soul has six powers, viz. 
appetite, anger, impulse, apprehension, intellect and will. 
17 
These basic powers have their origin in the nature of man 
and play an important role in human actions..These basic 
powers are categorized by Al<-Ghazali Into two types: (i) 
18 
Shaitaniyya and (ii) Habbaniya (divine element). These two 
forces are contradictory forces in the human, self that work 
through the shahwa (passion) and Ghadab (anger) for construc-
tion and destruction respectively. When the divine element 
continuously struggles with the human evil tendency and its 
struggle gets success, the self is enabled to pursue its 
progress unimpeded towards its goal. But if these forces 
are instigated by the shataalc power, they rebel against Aql 
(reason) and overconie it and the tendency becomes strong and 
gains complete ascendancy over them, as a result that divine 
19 
element becomes weak till it almost becomes dead and the 
evil tendency becomes more ttud more stronger and continuous-
ly inciting them to gratify themselves even at the expense 
20 
of the good of the self. 
t t t? 
Mow it is clear that human heart is equally susceptl-
21 
bl« to both th« elementSf i.e., 'The Divine and the ShatanJo 
The divine element is guided by Aql (reason) and Shatanic 
elements is led by Ash-Shahwa (lust), appetition and al-
22 
ghadab. The existence of these t%ro contradictory powers 
in man shows that there is a choice for a man and this choice 
implies his freedom of will. 
To explain free will Al-Ghazali analyses the human 
action* He classifies actions into three types i (1) Natural 
action (2) Intentional action and (3) Voluntary action* All 
actions in which an alternative is possible and reason makes 
a choice are voluntary actions. He further argues that in 
voluntary actioli, knowledge is but necessary because without 
28 
it morality and good conduct are not possible. Voluntary 
action has two aspects, viz. formal and existential. Formal 
is already present. Existential is acquired but both occur 
24 
together. Through knowledge man knows his end. Therefore 
« 
all human actions are directed to some end. Philosophers 
from the very beginning have been striving their utmost to 
discover and to determine some such ends* This end vhould 
define the quality and character of maui' s behaviour endeavour-
ing to attain i t . Al-Ghaz a l i cal ls this end as Sa'ada 
(blessedness). In his view sa'ada of every thing consists 
ia the realization of perfection to the nature of that 
1 fl -s 
p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g . For a man Saad al-Haqiqiya-which i s the 
suffiwum Bonum i s the visicm of God in the next world and in 
this world love of God i s the highest Saada because Sdada Al 
Haqiqiya wi l l he achieved by one 's love of God and the 
i n t e n s i t y of love towards God i s conditioned by one 's 
knowledge of God, the re fore , when knowledge i s sought as 
an end, it i t s e l f a sa'ada* 
When a m&n understands the f u l l s ignif icance of an 
object and the d e s i r a b i l i t y of seeking i t , yearning i s 
27 
aroused in him to achieve tha t object by adopting appropriate 
means. This yearning i s Irada and t h i s Irada can be f u l f i l l e d 
by free wi l l of laan. To explain free wi l l Al-Ohasali brings 
th ree r e a l i t i e s , v i z . God, mental world and physical world. 
Man has the middle pos i t ion in between the t h r e e . His w i l l 
Is not completely deterasined l i k e the mater ia l objects not 
i t i s absolutely free l i ke fod. This conception i s ca l l ed 
"Kasab" (acquis i t ion) by Al-Ghazali . 
I t i s t h i s doctr ine of acquis i t ion on the bas i s of 
v^iich a map. i s regpoasible for h i s act ions <ind he i s subject 
to reward and punishment. 
Al-Ghazali presents a sequence theoiry of causat ion 
l i k e t h a t of Hume and r e j e c t s the eff ic iency theory of 
28 
causa t ion . He defines cause in the sense of power or 
ihii 
•ffloient force whan applied to things other than God. The 
29 
efficient cause is only one and that is God. fti the other 
hand two things or events are conjoined together like rela-
tion between the condition and conditioned by God# Certain 
conditions are evident but some can be understood only by 
30 
intuition* As Quran says ' Most of them do not know '. 
It is in the hand of man either to use this power 
in the right direction or in the wrong direction. The 
right direction is the dominance of Quwat-i-Rabbaniya 
(Spiritual power) and wrong direction is the dominance of 
the Wuwat-i-Shatanlya (devil power). Evil occurs when 
Shataniya dominates. 
The root of moral evils» in view of Al-GhaEali,lles 
in the love of the worla, pride, love of wealth and love of 
honour etc. A man can overcome these evils through under-
standing his own end, not only on this earth, but also in 
the next world. In other words man can save himself frcai 
evil through knowledge of God, love of God and ultimately 
vision of God. "Man is guided by spiritual forces and these 
forces influence him through his reason. These influences 
help man to walk on the path of Allah which is called Taufio" 
31 
(the guidance of God). God is just and merciful. He favours 
those who endeavour in his way. Thus the question of grace 
20 
in the philosophy of Al-Ghazali is irrevocably bound up 
with human effort. 
After Al-Gha2ftli we now come to St. Thomas Aquinas. 
St. Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 A.D, in Italy. He came 
Just after a century of Al-Ghasali. He was the product of 
transitional period, i.e., between medieval and modern era. 
There is the culmination of scholasticism in his system. He 
was the follower of Aristotelian school, though he was 
influenced by plotinus St. Augustine, and Muslim philoso-
phers including Al-Ghasali. 
In solving the problem of evil St. Thomas Aquinas 
agrees with St. Augustine that evil is "privation of food". 
He too like Augustine classifies evil into two categories, 
viz. (i) fivil in being and (ii) Bvil in action. 
Being a theist he believes that "Every thing that 
33 
in any way is, is from God, and God is the cause of all the 
causes. Therefore in his view the being and the perfection 
of any natural object is good and evil can not signify any 
being or any form of nature. £vil signifies only s<M&e 
absence of good. But it does not mean that evil is not a 
fact. It is a fact but it is simply the absence of good and 
this lack of good is "Privation of good." 
tl <\ 20 i 
He further says that being In Itself Is good because 
nil beings are emanated from universal causei i.e. God. Thus 
contingent beings owe their existanoe to the necessary being 
34 
and proceed from God who is all good. Therefore, being in-
itself can not be evil. 
Secondly like Augustine he also makes a distinction 
among the ^ oods. 
Thirdly, he like Augustine Justifies gradation of 
good through Divine wisdom. To him the cause of the in-
equality (Gradation ) is nothing other than Divine Wisdom 
35 
of God. 
Fourthly, the subject of evil, is good'j i.e., evil 
can not exist in Itself but it exists only in good. There-
fore evil is good in itself. 
Thfxnas Aquinas explains mor&l evil on the basis of 
free will like St. Augustine and Al-Ghazali. In explaining 
freedom of will he makes a thorough analysis of human act-
ions. In the analysis of human actions he agrees with Al-
Ghasali and differs from Augustine. Primary evil in acti(m, 
36 
in his opinion, comes from its object. But some times it 
is derived from supervening accidents or circumstances as 
shape and colour etc. Therefore, if some thing be wanting 
20i 
that is requisite as a due circumstances, the action will 
37 
be evil. Thus according to St. Thoiaas Aquinas the goodness 
of an action depends on two elements, viz. (1) formal ele-
ment which relates to the end towards which the act is 
directed and (11) the material one which relates to the 
means that is adopted to attain that end aad circumstances 
that are connected with the choice of the means* If all 
these are good, the action is good; if all these are bad 
38 
the action is evil* 
The end which is the formal part of the action, is 
happiness as ^ t* Thomas Aquinas holds; it is man*s proper 
good and it must be In accordance with that which is proper 
39 
to reason. Such type of happiness only lies in the vision 
40 
of God because God is supreme good and ultimate end* There-
fore by their movement and action, all thiags turn towards 
God aa their last end* Such type of vision is not possible 
in this life because end in man's natural appetite* When 
he obtains it, there remains no more desire to attain for 
him; because if he still has a movement towards something, 
41 
it means he has not attained its last end* Therefore it 
can not be attained in this life, but in the life hereafter. 
He, therefore, argues that those actions which are compati-
ble with the attainment of such beatitude happiness or 
ultimate end are good and those are evil which are impedi-
ments with the attainment of such beatitude* And end does 
'-JO.) 
not Justify the means because it is a part of the whole act-
ion. Hence St. Aquinas is in complete agreenent with Al-
Ghazali because for Al-Ghazali too, vision of God is Summum 
Bonum and the actions leading towards that vision are good 
and the actions which mar this vision are evil. 
The external act may be said to be good or evil in 
two ways, first in regard to their genus and circumstances 
connected with them. Secondly a thing is to be pood or evil 
42 
from its relation to the end. 
Circumstances are those conditions which are outside 
the substance of an act and yet In a way touoh the human act. 
And the most important circumstances are, "Why" and"what he 
43 
did". If any thing be wanting that is, its requisite in 
44 
spite of due circumstances the act will be evil. Thus if 
internal (end) and external (circumstances and meeuis) are 
good, act is rood; if one of them Is bad acticxi is evil« 
After explaining evil St. Thomas Aquinas turns to-
wards will because there is nothing other than will which 
misleads for choosing wrong and and means. 
Actions under will are of two kinds. First are 
those acts which belong to the will itself immediately as 
204 
being stimulated by the will and secondly ate those which 
are conwanded by the v l l l . 
First type of action Is done towards end and means. 
In relation to end will w i l l s ^ood, because It Is rational 
46 
and the l ike Inclines Inclination to the l i k e . Secondly 
I t arrives at the terminus through the middle ground. But 
If vol it ion Is of the end I t Is also of the means. The wi l l 
moves the other powers of the soul of their acts . And wil l 
Is moved by the Inte l l ec t because the object of I n t e l l e c t 
Is also universal being l ike the Truth as the object of 
wi l l . But sometimes It i s moved by the sens i t ive appetite 
because man Is affected by passions. In short some times 
I t Is moved by the Interior object ( I n t e l l e c t , sensit ive 
appetite and wi l l I t s e l f ) . And at others, It Is moved by 
exterior object. I . e . by God. 
The notion of w i l l , to him. I s natural, i . e . the will 
wi l l s something naturally. I t Is not moved out of necessity, 
neither by the Interior object not by the exterior object. 
But he argues that though the action of wil l Is free 
to move towards Its end and to choose I t s neans, but Insplte 
of this freedom I t s action can be controlled by reason and 
reason can be controlled by man. Therefore man Is responsi-
ble for the action of his w i l l . 
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Human actions are also guidtd by Intrinsic and 
•xtrinsic principles. Intrinsic parinciples are powers 
and habits of man and extrinsic principles are Devils* 
inclination to evil. It is God that instructs a man by 
means of His laws and Grace. Here Thomas Aquinas is yery 
close to Al*Ghazali because Al-Ghasali too mentions the 
two powers in man, i.e*, Angelic power (Wuwati;>Babbaniya) 
and Devilish power (Quwat-1-Shaitaniya). 
Thus 3t. Aquinas tries to isolve the problem of evil 
through the "conception of privation of good". For physical 
evil he argues that God willed a universe having a natural 
order which involved, at least, the possibility of physical 
defeat and suffering. God willed that capacity for feeling 
pain as well as pleasure. He did not will suffering as such 
but he willed the nature which is pood. The physical evil 
is only the privation of this pood; similarly in respect of 
moral evil, it is only the privation of food In man's will. 
After presenting the basic position of these three 
philosophers we now come to their similarities» 
First of all these three philosophers are thelsts 
and as a thelsts they believed that God is the supreme Being. 
He is all good, all wise, all powerful and all knowing. As 
46 
Augustine says "God is to possess the highest good. To 
20fi 
Al-Ghazali "Whatever rood be fa l i e th thee" (O'man) i t i s 
47 
from Allah", and for St . Thomas Aquinas "iiverything in 
any way i s , i s from God. God i s the f i r s t cause of a l l 
48 
things". 
Secondly, all the three philosophers are mystics. 
They practised mysticism and presented their mystical 
experience to propound their view regarding evil. We need 
not substantiate it as their lives and philosophy evidently 
prove it. 
Thirdly they believe in free will and consider it to 
be the eaute of moral evil. 
fourthly they believe in grace of God, And they 
give a mystical explanation to explain this conception. 
Thus we see that in soae of the vital points they 
share each other, i^ ow after the points of siciilaritles, we 
come to their differences. It woiild not be wrong to assert 
that each of these philosophers is an independent thinker 
and has propounded his own philosophy with his own discipline 
of thought. Keeping this in view we come to conclude that 
there must exist some differences between them. We should 
also note that these differences lie in the core of their 
thought due to their different disciplines. 
20 
We haye repeatedly mentioned "The privation of good". 
We are aware that two of thase philosophers namely St* 
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas have defined evil, as "the 
privation of rood". But there is a difference in their 
interpretation and explanation of it. St. Aquinas, inspite 
of adopting it does not talce the same position as that of 
St. Augustine, St. Thonias Aqulaas like St. Augustine does 
believe in evil as the privatlcaa of good but unlike him he 
speaks of its two categories* (1) Privatum esse (Privation 
in essence) and (11) Privarl, (Privation in process). 
So far as Al-Chaz&li is concerned it is but evident 
that he does not balleve in any concept of evil like that 
of 'Privation of good*. He believes that it is the divine 
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law which pronounces the actions as good or evil. Thus 
veiry first point of difference between the christian and 
the Muslim philosopher is regarding the definition of evil. 
The another point of difference between the 
Christian Philosophers and the Muslim philosopher lies in 
the fact that dt. Augustine and St. Aqulaas believe in the 
original sin and the doctrine of redemption, but Al-Ghazali 
does not support these conceptions. On the basis of original 
sin both Augustine and Aqulaas advocates the freedom of will 
of Adam. Al-Ghaa4ll, too, accepts that Adam violated the 
command of God but whether this violation was completely in 
20^ 
the hand of AdamV Al-Ghazali observes silence and says 
that the answer of this question is the subject matter of 
Ila-al Mukashafa (Intuitive knowledge) and it can not be 
discussed on the rational plane. He simply says that food 
and evil are determined by Divine Law* But man is adorned 
with the gift of free will and he is free to choose to do 
or not to do something. But roan has not the absolute 
freedom, his freedo^ n is limited. Only God has the absolute 
freedom. And thus he puts forward his theory of acquisitlen 
according to which origin of action is in God but its ccwnple-
tion is in man. 
Having discui^ s^ed the similarities and differences, 
it is apt for us to present a resume of the discussion we 
have done so far. To beigrn with, we should make it explicit 
that all these three phijuosophers are primarily the scholars 
of religion. In support of our argument we only refer to 
their lives, works and teachings. St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas are the Christian saints. They are the ardeiit 
believers of their religion and saioe is the case with Al-
Ghasali. He is regarded as an argument on Islam. It is but 
evident that the roots of their thought lie in the respective 
religion they followed. For Augustine and Aquinas the Bible 
is the source of inspiration and for Al-Ghazali, it is the 
Quran. We are not wrong to assert that the problem of evil 
2O0 
Induced then towards Itself because primarily it is the 
problem of religion. All the three took it to solve because 
it was Interpreted in many ways by different thinkers. Some 
held God to be responsible for the evil. And others put 
all its responsibility on man, yet there was a group of 
atheists who challenged the omnipotency of God arguing that 
He could not eradicate evil from the world. Besides this 
there was still another controversy regarding evil as to 
whether evil is an illusion or a reality. Some supported 
the former and others held up the latter. 
St. Augustine, Al-Ghazali and St. Aquinas dealt with 
the problem in their own way. They share each other on many 
points which have been discussed. These similarities are 
boimd to come in, for both, Christianity and Islam are 
revealed religions and the Quran categorically says that 
all the Prophets from Adam to Mohammad came in world with 
one and the same relipion. The W'uran also speaks of good 
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christian for recalling their value of love. 
Our discussion in the preceding chapters clearly 
explains the position of these three philosophers. Evaluat-
ing it we assert that St. Augustine and St. Aquinas do not 
believe in the existence of evil in real sense but they call 
it as a lesser good in respect of higher good, iiut actually 
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speaking evil Is evil and we can not call it either as lesser 
good or good in itselfi for example, suffering of innocent 
people or blindness of a man or, earth quake etc*, can not 
be considered as good or lesser good* Though these evils 
are justified by saying that God punishes the wicked nations 
for their evil deeds} yet what remains unexplained is the 
fact that innocent persons are not wicked and therefore, 
should not be punished but they also face these suffering. 
St* Augustine and St* Aquinas tried to solve it as 
"privation of good;" for instance the wound is the privation 
of health but this theory fails to explain it. For consider-
ing evil as privation of good implies the absence of pood 
in a thing which is good in itself because they believe 
that element of good is present in every thing and on this 
basis they made grades of the things to arrange them in 
hierarchic order, i.e., higher good is that good which 
possesses more good and on the same basis the lower is 
lesser good* 
From this, it is evident that the absence of rood 
is impossible because every thing has a nature which is 
good, therefore, there can not be 'the privation of good.' 
Thus the solution of evil as the privation of good seems 
contradictory in itself. 
2 1 1 
Secondly according to them wound and disease are 
nothing other than privation of health| therefore unhealthy-
body Is lesser good In respect of healthy body. But It 
does not prove that these are not evil, these are evil at-
least till these are present In the body. Therefore evil 
exists as evil. We can not justify It as to call it lesser 
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good or privation of good. 
In the light of above discussion it becomes clear 
that evil is not good in any form, it is different from rood. 
So far moral evil is concerned the stand may be 
appreciated that good and evil are based on the pronounce-
ment of God. God, in the interest of mankind, proclaimed 
some kinds of action as good and another type as evil. He 
also gave freedom of will to man, so that he may choose bet-
ween good and evil. This choice would have been impossible 
without the alternatives and without choice free will would 
have no meaning and there would not be any .lustification 
for reward and punishment in the next world. That's why 
St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Imam Al-Ohazali 
preached the freedom of man. In this way man is responsible 
for moral evil as he has the free will. 
21 i 
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